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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural producers face many natural risks such as weather, 
disease, insects, and other pests over which they have little or no 
control. Because of the inherent nature of agricultural production, 
these producers face more risk in their operations than do many other 
types of businessmen. 
Natural phenomena can create low and variable income for both 
individual farm firms and the agricultural industry. Low yields 
reduce cash returns to the farm reducing the farmer's ability to meet 
creditor demands or plant a crop for the coming year. Weather and 
other natural phenomena affect the supply of crops resulting in 
instability in crop prices. 
Other sources of income variability in the agricultural industry· 
include general business conditions, inflation, livestock and 
commodity cycles, and domestic and foreign government actions, such as 
export embargoes, price controls, environmental restrictions, 
commodity price support and production controls. Government actions 
may be designed to buffer the risks associated with natural phenomena, 
however u ne xpec ted program changes often add to the uncertainty that 
agr ic u 1 tu ra 1 pro due er s face ( Tweeten). Information on government 
programs is frequently not available until after farmers have made 
planting decisions. Subsequent program changes often create costly 
1 
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changes in production organization or confusion over the proper or 
best action. 
Many government programs have been enacted to solve farm 
problems, or at least remedy their symptoms. Farm programs have 
typically supported farm income and reduced farm income variability. 
In recent years, policymakers have become concerned about the large 
government out lays associated with the "low yield" Disaster Payments 
Program. The government paid an estimated $750 million in direct 
disaster payments to producers in 1980 (Benjamin). To share the costs 
of low yield protection, the Federal Crop Insurance Program has been 
greatly expanded. As with other types of insurance, the producer pays 
a relatively small certain premium per acre rather than bearing the 
risk of a large loss should crop failure occur. If premiums are so 
high that the farmer pays more into the program than is received as 
indemnities, premiums are reduced. With the Federal Crop Insurance 
Program the farmer receives a premium subsidy so that the producer and 
the government share the risk of adverse yields at the farm level. 
The Problem 
Currently only two government programs are available to 
agricultural producers, the Deficiency Payments Program and the FCIC's 
"All Risk" Crop I_nsurance Program. A 1 so, the Disaster Payments 
Program may be available if the producer cannot participate in the 
"All Risk" Crop Insurance Program because of uninsurability. The 
availability of these programs and the transition from the Disaster 
Payments Program to the "All Risk" Crop Insurance Program as the major 
·production risk aversion program establishes the basis for this study. 
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Farmers currently face excess supplies of grains and low 
commodity prices. Land values are declining. Interest rates remain 
at relatively high levels. These factors increase the vulnerability 
of farm firms, particularly those that are highly leveraged or low 
equity operations. Un c e r t a int y o v e r the b en e f its and costs of 
All-Risk crop insurance and government commodity programs simply 
compound these problems. With more information concerning the 
implications of participating in each of these programs and 
alternative program combinations, producers will be better prepared to 
make efficient decisions. 
Despite continual expansion of FCIC insurance coverage, 
participation in this program has npt been extensive. Less than 13 
percent of the eligible crop acreage has been insured in any one year 
since 1948 (Miller). The FCIC expects participation to increase as 
the program is expanded to cover more crops in more counties during 
the next few years. Nevertheless, low rates of participation in the 
Federal Crop Insurance Program present a problem. Many factors may 
contribute to the producer's decision not to participate in this 
program. Perhaps premium rates need be adjusted downward to encourage 
participation. If premiums are lowered to attract participants, the 
balance between premiums and indemnities may be disturbed requiring 
further subsidy. Also, high-risk areas may be drawn into cultivation 
that would normally be in non-crop uses. 
Federal Crop Insurance Program participation may be low only in 
certain program crops. For instance, cotton producers may be better 
off by participating in this program while wheat producers become 
worse off. The opposite may be true in other geographical locations. 
4 
Wheat producers in Oklahoma's Panhandle may find it advantageous to 
purchase Federal Crop Insurance while southwest Oklahoma wheat 
producers may not. Perhaps premium rates need only be selectively 
adjusted to encourage program participation. 
With knowledge of the possible effects of these farm programs 
legislators can better determine whether the programs are 
accomplishing the objectives for which they were designed. The 
potential effects on the economic success of the farm firm of 
participation in each government farm program may be of interest to 
many. In addition, the other effects of commodity programs on 
government costs may be of interest. With a policy objective of 
reducing government costs associated with providing farm programs, 
decision makers are interested in comparisons of the costs of 
government farm programs analyzed in this study. 
Hypotheses 
The s true ture, cost and operation of each of the government farm 
programs may reduce the long-run viability of farm firms. The acreage 
reduction or set-aside requirement for participation in the Deficiency 
Payments and Disaster Payments Programs may impose such a large cost 
on producers that the payments received by the producer will be less 
than the value of foregone production. The set-aside requirement for 
participat;ng in the Deficiency Payments and Disaster Payments 
Programs may reduce the economic viability of farmers in some areas 
who participate in these programs. If low commodity yields are more 
prevalent than low commodity prices, the Disaster Payments Program may 
be more appealing to the producer, even with the set-aside 
5 
requirement. If low commodity prices are more prevalent, the 
Deficiency Payments Program may produce more desirable results. 
However, the set-aside requirement for these programs may put the farm 
in a worse position than a nonparticipation option. 
Similar effects may be prevalent under the Federal Crop Insurance 
Program. It is hypothesized that FCI premium rates for at least some 
crops are too high for the level of risk in some or all areas. 
Premium rates for some insurance Options may be appropriate while 
premium rates of other FCI options for the same crop may be too high 
or too low. High premium rates relative to indemnities paid reduce 
incentives for farmers to participate in "All-Risk" Federal Crop 
Insurance. Each of these programs may be established correctly for 
certain geographical areas but not for others because of differences 
in prices and yields for various areas. 
A farm producer making decisions concerning the participation in 
government farm programs may make different decisions than other 
farmers. There may be several explanations (in addition to program 
structural problems) as to the reasons farmer decisions differ. 
Managers of farm firms are generally concerned first with the 
survivability of their firms and then with the level of firm growth, 
income, and the stability of income. A farm manager with very little 
risk of failure may pay more attention to the level of income and firm 
growth. This farmer may be able or willing to accept a large year to 
year variance in income in order to attain a higher level of firm 
growth and mean income. 
Bankruptcy is not a major problem among farmers who have a small 
amount of liability relative to the value of their assets. Farmers 
6 
who have very little equity in their assets may find they have very 
little capacity to borrow. In years of low prices or low yields these 
farmers may find it difficult or impossible to meet previous loan or 
credit commitments. Firm failure is a potential problem among low 
equity farms. The level of farmer equity may be a basis for selection 
of different government farm programs. Farmers with low equity may be 
helped more by government farm programs than high equity operators. 
These low equity farmers may select different government risk 
management programs from farmers in a high equity position. 
Another basis for different decisions concerning selection of 
government farm programs may be differing farm production 
organizations. Farmers in different geographic regions may be 
affected differently by alternative government farm programs. Farms 
who have diversified well may need very little more protection against 
risk. Geographic location affects the farm managers ability to 
diversify. Farmers in one area may have only a few enterprise 
alternatives while in another area farmers may have many. Many 
factors, such as production expenses and investment in machinery, may 
be very different across different production organizations. A farm 
manager with a riskier production organization may find that he needs 
protection against both yield and price fluctuations, while another 
farmer may only need help in averting risks due to price variability. 
The costs to the government of providing agricultural producers 
with risk management programs have historically been very high. 
Policymakers have, in recent years, become concerned with the large 
government outlays associated with providing these programs. The 
reduction of these costs is an important reason for the enactment of 
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the Federal Crop Insurance Program. Producers who choose to 
participate in this program must pay a premium for each acre of the 
insured crop, therefore sharing the expense of providing the 
government farm programs. The cost to the government of providing 
yield and price programs may be lower for deficiency payments and 
All-Risk crop insurance than for deficiency payments and disaster 
payments. 
Objectives 
The primary objective of this study is to analyze the effects of 
participation in alternative government farm programs, and 
combinations of these programs on the economic measures of the firm's 
growth and viability. Secondary objectives of this study are: 
1. To develop a set of whole-farm scenarios typical of various 
areas of the state of Oklahoma, and to simulate the 
activities of each farm scenario in a stochastic, inflation 
free environment, 
2. To determine the importance of the beginning firm equity 
level on the outcomes resulting from the participation in 
each government farm program and combinations of government 
farm programs, 
3. To determine if effects on economic measures of the farm 
scenario and farm survivability, resulting from participation 
in government farm programs and their combinations, vary due 
to differing production organizations characterized by 
different geographic locations of the subject areas, 
4. To determine if the per acre Federal Crop Insurance premium 
8 
rates are set correctly for each insurable crop in the study 
areas, and to evaluate possible adjustments in these premiums 
rates, and 
5. To evaluate the government costs associated with providing 
government farm programs to agricultural producers in the 
study areas. 
The objectives of this study are achieved through the use of the 
whole-farm simulation model developed by Hardin. This model, entitled 
"A Simulation Model for Analyzing Farm Capital Investment 
Alternatives", incorporates correlated, stochastically generated 
prices and yields based on historical series of prices and yields 
observed in the subject area and simulates the activities of a 
whole-farm scenario over a specified planning horizon. The model then 
replicates the simulation a stipulated number of times creating the 
information necessary to calculate statistics for each economic 
measure. 
The simulation model must be modified to incorporate information 
concerning the government farm programs. The model must compute costs 
and returns associated with participation in the various programs. In 
cases such as the Deficiency Payments Program or the Disaster Payments 
Program or their combinations, the production acreage of the 
participation crops must be reduced to meet any set-aside or acreage 
diversion requirements. This information as well as other important 
information such as premium rates and target prices must be 
incorporated into the model. 
Scenarios will be developed for each of the three subject areas 
within the state of Oklahoma through the aggregation of information 
\ 
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obtained from Oklahoma State University, Agricultural Experiment 
St at ion, Crop and Livestock Enterprise Budgets and other publications 
relating to each subject area. Certain assumptions must be made about 
the size and production organization of the farm scenarios. Other 
assumptions such as expected investments, family living expenses, age 
of existing assets and the inflation rate (in this study held at zero) 
must be made. Each farm scenario is simulated a number of times each 
assuming a different government program option. 
The Locations of Study 
Three locations, within the state of Oklahoma, were chosen to 
develop a set of realistic data for this study. The shaded areas in 
Figure 1 identify each of the study locations. Jackson, Texas and 
Wagoner Counties in Oklahoma are the specific county locations chosen 
for this study. Each location was chos-en to represent a somewhat 
different production organization, characteristic of the particular 
geographic area. Production techniques may also vary from location to 
location, even on crops common to more than one location. 
Jackson County 
Jackson County, bordering with the state of Texas on the Red 
River, was chosen as a study area in southwest Oklahoma. 
Approximately 470,000 acres are used in farming operations. This 
represents approximately 90.0 percent of the total land area of the 
county. Nearly 70.0 percent of this farm land is in crop enterprises, 
mostly dryland. Total irrigated acreage is approximately 50,000 acres 
OKLAHOMA 
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using wells and surface irrigation water from the Altus-Lugert Project 
reservoir in Kiowa County Oklahoma. 
Major crops produced in Jackson County are wheat and cotton. 
However, many other crops are grown in the area. Grain sorghum, 
alfalfa hay, peanuts and oats are examples of these crops. Livestock 
enterprises including cow-calf, stocker and dairy production are also 
common in Jackson County. Three thousand seven hundred acres of 
irrigated wheat were harvested in 1980. Also in that year 239,300 
acres of dryland wheat, 6, 300 acres of alfalfa, 47,000 acres of 
irrigated cotton and 15,500 acres of dryland cotton were harvested. 
Texas County 
In the Oklahoma panhandle, Texas County farm producers must 
irrigate much of their crop acreages. Most of this water comes from 
wells at least 350 feet deep. Irrigated crops produced in Texas 
County include wheat, grain sorghum, alfalfa and corn. These crops 
are also produced on dryland acreages in this area. In 1980 Texas 
County producers harvested 65,000 acres of irrigated grain sorghum and 
46, 000 acres of dry land grain sorghum for grain, 101,000 acres of 
irrigated wheat and 247,000 acres of dryland wheat. Wheat stocker 
cattle and cow-calf operations are also somewhat common in Texas 
County. 
Texas County is a somewhat dry, almost arid land composed of 
1,319,680 acres of which. approximately 1,170,000 acres are used in 
farming. About 500,000 acres of this farmland is engaged in crop 
production. Of the land engaged in crop production about one-half is 
irrigated. 
12 
Wagoner County 
Wagoner County, in northeast Oklahoma, has a more humid climate 
than both Texas and Jackson Counties. Annual rainfall in this area is 
considerably higher than the annual rainfall in Texas County and 
hence, more suitable to the production of such crops as soybeans and 
hay, Total land area in Wagoner County is 360,320 acres. 
Approximately 68.0 percent of this land is involved in farming 
operations. With about 245,000 acres used in farming, approximately 
135,000 acres are used in crop production. Crops commonly produced in 
Wagoner County are wheat, grain sorghum, soybeans, alfalfa hay and 
native hay. Cattle, both beef and dairy, are common enterprises in 
this area, as are hogs and some poultry. 
In 1980 Wagoner County producers harvested 26,000 acres of wheat, 
7, 500 acres of alfalfa hay and 15,500 acres of other hay. Soybeans 
harvested totaled 41,000 acres and grain sorghum acres harvested for 
grain were 1,600. Generally, there are very few if any crop acres 
irrigated in Wagoner County. 
Organization of the Remaining Chapters 
Chapter II contains a complete description of the simulation 
model used to analyze the effects on each farm scenario in a "before 
and after" comparative context. Also, a detailed discussion and 
description of the mathematical computations of the costs and returns 
associated with participation in government farm programs is addressed 
he re. The third chapter contains a description of each farm scenario 
and other required input data. A description of the experiments used 
in the actual analysis and the simulation results for each experiment 
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are presented in Chapter IV. These results present the decision maker 
with a set of expected outcomes and also distribution information 
about those outcomes. Chapter V summarizes and presents concluding 
statements about this study. 
CHAPTER II 
MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES 
Risk and uncertainty, whether it be production, marketing or 
financial risk, present many problems for both individual farm 
producers and the agricultural industry. Because of the risk 
prevalent in agricultural production and marketing the farm producer 
is faced with a host of risk management decisions in addition to 
normal production and marketing decisions. 
Previous Research 
Studies by Hazell, Hardin, and Richardson and Nixon have revealed 
models useful in analyzing farm risk management techniques. The 
models reviewed and researched in these studies involve such methods 
as Monte Carlo techniques, simulation, quadratic risk programming, and 
MOT AD. 
In 19 71 Hazell proposed a linear programming method (Minimization 
of Total Absolute Deviations; MOTAD) as an alternative to quadratic 
and semivariance programming for farm planning under uncertainty. He 
s t a t e s th a t t he c on v e n t i on a 1 1 in e a r p r o g ram mi n g mo de 1 ignores 
uncertainty. Haze 11' s study is cone erned with uncertainties in 
activity costs, yields, and prices that affect the objective function 
of the conventional linear programming model and which may be 
summarized as gross returns net of variable costs. 
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The mode 1 developed by Hardin was designed to analyze the effects 
of alternative capital investment expenditures on a whole-farm 
scenario in an uncertain environment. The mo de 1 incorporates 
enterprise data, with trended, correlated prices and yields and 
simulates the activities of the firm iteratively to develop balance 
sheet and cash flow information. The model determines the chances of 
firm survival given the specified data and based on a specified 
minimum equity leve 1. The model developed by Richardson and Nixon, 
similar to the model developed by Hardin, is also a simulation model 
incorporating stochastically generated prices and yields as a method 
of incorporating risk and uncertainty. 
The analytical techniques described in these and other studies 
have been extensively used in analyzing the effects (both on the farm 
level and the agricultural structure) of previously available and 
currently available government commodity programs. In an early study 
Gisser (1969) constructed a model in which he analyzed the effects 
that certain government commodity programs would have on the farm 
labor market. He stated that the major goal of agricultural policies 
is to relieve farm poverty and that the programs considered by the 
government are price support, acreage control, subsidizing inputs and 
production control. 
Halcrow' s early paper discussed the assumptions of three basic 
types of crop insurance~ These forms of crop insurance are 1) 
all-risk crop insurance, 2) area-yield insurance and 3) weather-crop 
insurance. Halcrow presented special problems unique to each type of 
insurance and the necessary conditions to make each type a viable, 
effective program. The insurance programs suggested in Halcrow's 
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paper are 1) all-risk crop insurance in areas of low risk, 2) 
area-yield insurance in high risk crop regions and 3) weather-yield 
insurance in the ranching areas of the western United States provided 
the specific relationship between weather phenomena and range or 
forage yields can be determined. Halcrow also expresses that the 
major reason for failures in insurance programs is that they have been 
based on a "faulty conception of the actl\arial problems involved." 
Many studies, in recent years, have concerned themselves with the 
farm level effects of government farm programs. With the expansion of 
the Federal Crop Insurance Program has come a large, intense series of 
studies in an attempt to analyze the effects of this program. Casler 
performed a study comparing Federal "All-Risk" Crop Insurance, 
Cr op-Hai 1 Insurance and these two programs combined with the Disaster 
Payments Program. Casler's study compares gross income and returns 
over variable costs per acre with each program option and with no 
government programs. Cas.ler' s study was designed to provide a 
framework by which the crop producer can make a decision as to which 
alternative to choose. He suggested a payoff matrix which utilizes 
the producer's subjective probabilities about yields. Casler also 
prepared a worksheet which the producer can use to help make decisions 
concerning these commodity programs. 
Oamek et al. produced a similar study comparing each of the 
Federal All-Risk Crop Insurance options with a no insurance option. 
This study also suggests a payoff matrix and a worksheet as an aid to 
producers in making participation decisions. The major difference 
between this payoff matrix and the one suggested by Casler is that 
individual producer's historical yields rather than subjective 
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probabilities of yields are used as the events that determines 
possible outcomes. This payoff matrix consists of net cash revenues 
and are shown for each action/event combination. Oamek et al. also 
provide a programmable calculator program which can be used to 
calculate the net cash revenues for the payoff matrix. 
Many studies analyzing the Federal Crop Insurance Program and 
other commodity programs have been made in a simulation framework 
(De an; King and Oamek; Lemieux et al.). Dean developed a whole-farm 
scenario typical of Jackson County in southwest Oklahoma and used the 
model developed by Hardin to analyze various commodity programs. Dean 
s imu lated the scenario with each program alternative, including the 
Deficiency Payments Program, the Disaster Payments Program, the 
Crop-Hail Insurance Program and the various options of the Federal 
Crop Insurance Program and compared them with a "no program" 
alternative. Program alternatives including the Deficiency Payments 
Program or Disaster Payments Program provide the scenario with the 
greatest level of firm growth and also enhance the chances of firm 
survival above the level of other program alternatives. Program 
alternatives including both types of insurance put Dean's Jackson 
County farm scenario in worse condition at the end of the simulation. 
Here the firm showed no growth and survival rates above those 
r<~ s u 1 ting from a no commodity program option. Dean also analyzed the 
per acre government costs of providing farmers with the risk 
management strategies. He found that the expected per acre government 
costs are greater with the expanded FCI Program than with the early 
FCI Program because the premium rates with the expanded FCI Program 
are subsidized by the government. 
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A similar study by Lemieux et al. simulated a typical Texas High 
Plains cotton farm over a 10-year planning horizon assuming 
participation in the FCI Program, Disaster Payments Program or 
nonparticipation. The authors of this study found that the 75 percent 
guarantee level with the highest price elective option provided a 
level of risk coverage about equal to that of the Disaster Program. 
The study by King and Oamek evaluated the same programs in a similar 
context for Colorado dryland wheat producers. The King and Oamek 
study produced similar results to the Lemieux et al. study. 
The Model 
The model used in this study is a whole-farm simulation model 
developed by Hardin to analyze capital investments in a stochastic 
e nv i ronme n t. The mode 1 was specifically designed to ascertain the 
profitability, charrces of survival, solvency and liquidity of a farm 
firm under alternative capital investments. By making certain 
modifications within the model it gained the ability to calculate the 
costs and returns associated with participation in government farm 
programs. The model is designed to replicate the "n" year simulation 
a specified number of times to generate distributions of cash flows 
(both inflows and outflows), net worth and profitability for each farm 
scenario. The simulation model also determines average (across 
replications) income statement information, average (across 
~eplications) balance sheet information, and a summary of annual 
borrowing. Analysis of the outcomes of simulations assuming 
participation in each government farm program or combinations of the 
programs and a base run with no participation in government farm 
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programs al lows the potential gains of participation in each program 
alternative to be compared along with the potential enhancement of 
firm survival. 
A major ad vantage of this type of analysis is that it allows the 
direct comparison of outcomes "with and without" government farm 
programs and permits comparisons among alternative government farm 
programs. Identical firm organizations can be simulated under 
identical price and yield distributions but using different government 
farm programs. Outcomes can then be compared across alternative 
government farm program options and the effects of each noted. The 
analysis focuses on changes in the government farm program 
alternatives and their accumulative effects on the economic viability 
of the farm. 
A General Model Description 
A brief overview of the model, the modifications and figure 2 
will provide an understanding of the basic operations of the model. 
The model can be divided into two sections. The first section 
establishes the basic appearance and structure of the farm scenario 
and the second section executes the actual simulation and iterative 
loop. In the first section the model reads and calculates that 
information which does not change with each replication. The first 
section a 1 so reads information concerning the beginning inventory and 
valuation of machinery and buildings. Liability information 
including, loan values, repayment schedules and loan lives are all 
required inputs for the first section. Other required information 
includes beginning cash reserves, length of planning horizon, desired 
NO 
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number of replications, tax rates, minimum equity ratios, farm 
acreages, enterprise patterns and future capital expenditures. This 
first section also amortizes existing liabilities and depreciates 
existing assets for the planning horizon and stores the values in 
arrays for later use. The model summarizes the initial balance sheet 
and f i na nc ial information before proceeding to the simulation section 
of the model. 
The next section reads the stochastically generated random 
correlated prices and yields. These prices and yields are used along 
with the base information to calculate costs and returns of the 
enterprises and costs and returns of the specified commodity program. 
(The costs and returns from participation in government farm programs 
and the stochastic generation of the random correlated prices and 
yields will be discussed later in this chapter.) These costs and 
returns are used to determine income taxes, repayment of existing debt 
and net re turns. This information is then used to revise the balance 
sheet information, calculate net worth, test for insolvency and derive 
annual net cash flows. 
The model determines the firms ability to repay debt in each 
year, thus evaluating the firm's stability. If cash flows are 
positive in a particular year of the simulation the model accumulates 
the· funds in cash reserves to be drawn on in the future. If cash 
flows are negative the debt is financed through any existing cash 
reserves. If these reserves are not sufficient to meet the deficit 
the model compares the current equity situation with the specified 
minimum equity level. If the current equity level is below the 
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minimum equity level the firm fails the survival test. 1 If the firm 
fails the survival test and the bankruptcy is recorded the iteration 
is continued assuming that the firm can borrow funds to meet the cash 
flow deficit. By continuing the iteration, the estimates of net worth 
and other results for this simulation can be compared with the results 
of other simulations. If the iteration is not allowed to continue the 
estimates of variables, such as net worth and present value of cash 
flows, would be biased upward. Also, some variation in these 
estimates would be omitted. If the firm can survive this test a loan 
is made and the simulation is continued until ·the end of the planning 
horizon at which time the next replication is initiated. 
After the model has replicated the simulation the desired number 
of times, it calculates the statistical information for cash flows, 
ending net worth, net present value, and annual borrowing. 
Probability distributions and average financial information are 
calculated and printed along with the statistical information. Other 
information calculated and printed includes the summary of annual 
borrowing, the probability of firm survival, the probability of 
refinance, and the number of bankrupt iterations which occurred during 
the analysis. Virtually all of the detailed financial accounting data 
for each replication and year of the analysis, and for the entire 
1Rather than declaring bankruptcy once the firm's equity level 
has fallen below the minimum the firm could perhaps liquidate some 
assets and reduce the deficit. This may allow the firm to continue 
operation for an additional year or, perhaps even "survive" to the end 
of the simulation. Not permitting a partial liquidation of assets 
probably biases the results toward slightly too many bankrupt 
iterations. However, the implications of alternative government farm 
program strategies may not be altered. ·· 
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analysis, are summarized by the model. Only information pertinent to 
this study will be summarized in the context of this analysis. 
Stochastic Prices and Yields 
This mo de 1 allows the user to specify a set of fixed incomes and 
expenses for the length of the simulation or stochastically generated 
prices and y i e 1 ds. Stochastically generated prices and yields allow 
the user to incorporate risk due to price and yield variability into 
the analysis. The stochastically generated prices and yields may be 
allowed to display either a normal distribution or a triangular 
distribution. The triangular distribution option allows the user to 
incorporate his subjective evaluation of the historical variation in 
product prices and yields when specifying the distributions of the 
prices and yields. Under this option of the user specifies a minimum 
possible yield (price), a maximum possible yield (price) and the most 
likely value for yields (prices). The stochastic prices and yields 
generated for this analysis are based on a subjective interpretation 
of historical series of Oklahoma prices and county yields. These 
yield and price series are collected for the commodities produced on 
the farm scenario and are detrended. A matrix of correlation 
coefficients for the yields and prices must be developed as a first 
step in preparing input for the computer procedure used to generate 
the stochastic observations. Separate matrices are drawn for yields 
and prices to portray no relationship between farm level yields and 
the price distributions the farmer must face. A procedure developed 
by Clements et al. is used for factoring these matrices into unique 
upper triangular matrices. 
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A trend factor can be spec if ied for the generated price and yield 
distributions. Assumptions made in specifying trend factors for price 
and yield distributions may be very difficult to justify. Factors 
effecting trends in prices, yields, costs of production, and prices of 
future investments may include changes in supply and demand factors, 
technological changes, and inflation rates. Improper specification of 
trends in prices and costs of production may unrealistically cause 
increased or decreased profitability. Improper inflation of machinery 
and equipment purchase prices may result in unsatisfactory machinery 
compliments. Uncertainty about actual trend factors, even in the near 
future, makes their specification difficult. Rather than specifying 
unrealistic trend factors, perhaps it may be more realistic to attempt 
holding the current situation constant. In this study inflation is 
assumed to be constant at a rate of zero for all input data and hence, 
the prices are not trended. The yields are also not trended as 
technological developments are assumed to not increase yields a 
significant amount over the planning horizon of the simulation. The 
procedure combines the trend and distribution information and 
multiplies the upper triangular matrices by a vector of random 
deviates to determine a set of trended, correlated and triangularly 
distributed observations. 
Government Farm Programs 
The following discussion reviews the basic assumptions of each of 
the government farm program options analyzed in this study. Also, the 
mathematical equations used to calculate the costs and returns unique 
to each government farm program option are explained. These equations 
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are used to incorporate the effects of commodity programs. Payments 
and costs associated with participation in these government farm 
programs are based on certain criterion specified by each program's 
administration. These assumptions and criterion as well as definitions 
of terms important to each commodity program are discussed in this 
section. 
Deficiency Payments Program 
The Agricultural Act of 1970 provided for a type of deficiency 
payment for upland cotton, wheat and feed grains. This deficiency 
payment was tied to a parity ratio. The Agricultural and Consumer 
Protection Act of 1973 dropped the parity calculation and introduced 
the target price. To participate in the Deficiency Payments Program 
the producer generally was asigned an allotment. Several significant 
modifications were introduced in the Food and Agricultural Act of 1977 
although this act maintained the same basic structure of the 1973 
legislation. The 1977 legislation did away with the allotment system 
and tied the target prices to changes in the variable cost of 
production, and tied changes in the loan rates to excess supplies. 
The deficiency payments are based on the difference between the target 
price and the average market price for the first five months of the 
marketing year or the difference between the target price and the loan 
rate, whichever is the smallest. 
The major purpose of the Deficiency Payments Program is to reduce 
the adverse effects of low commodity prices on farm income. Publicly 
financed technological advances may be another source of farm income 
reductions. Since the aggregate demand for agricultural products is 
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price inelastic, advances in production technology increase output 
less than the resulting price declines, one results is a reduction in 
farm income. Deficiency payments are triggered by low commodity 
prices and somewhat offset the impact of these low prices on income. 
Administration of the Deficiency Payments Program falls under the 
authority of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service 
(ASCS) and the Secr-etary of Agriculture. Agricultural producers 
choosing to participate in this program are subject to certain 
requirements specified under the 1982 Agriculture and Food Act (P.L. 
97-98) To participate in the Deficiency Payments Program the producer 
must: 
1. Sign an intention of participation previous to a specified 
date. 
2. Reduce acreage for harvest by a stipulated amount. 
3. Place at least the acreage reduction in a soil conserving use 
(Nelson et al.). 
Table l indicates the specified acreage reduction factors, under 
the 19 8 2 program for program crops produced on the farm scenarios in 
this study. Strengthening of prices for the program commodities is 
the major purpose of the required acreage reduction or set-aside. 
The target price concept provides the basis for computing income 
payments to participating producers. Target prices do not actually 
increase the price farmers receive for their products but provide an 
income supplement when low commodity prices are prevalent. By means 
of the target price mechanism farmers more nearly realize prices equal 
to the target prices (Ray). The legislation also provides loan rates 
at which the producer may use his produce as collateral in obtaining a 
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Commodity Credit Corporation non-recourse loan. The basic computation 
of the deficiency payment rate is the difference between the target 
price and the price farmers receive for their crop or the loan rate, 
whichever is smaller. Computationally, the deficiency payment rate is 
determined by the following equations. 
= TP - P 
ct ct 
(1) 
or 
= TP - LR 
ct ct (2) 
where: 
=the deficiency payment rate for the particular crop in 
year t, in dollars per crop unit 
= the target price for the crop in year t. 
=the five-month average price (in this study the 
stochastic price) for the crop in year .t, in dollars 
per crop unit. 
= the loan rate for the crop in year t, in dollars per 
crop unit. 
Table 1. Announced Acreage Reductions Required for Each Crop 
Wheat Corn Grain Sorghum Cotton 
15.0% 10.0% 10.0% 15.0% 
Source: Nelson, et al. 
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Farmers can always receive the loan rate as a price for their 
crops so, they are not compensated for market prices which fall below 
this loan rate. To make the deficiency payment rate operational 
payments are not computed based on each price each farmer receives for 
his crop but, on the average price received by all farmers during the 
first five months of the marketing year. In this study the market 
price is the stochastically generated price for the crop in the given 
year. In cases where the actual price is above the target price the 
deficiency payment rate will be zero. Table 2 presents the minimum 
target prices and loan rates, authorized under the 1982 program, for 
program crops produced on the farm scenarios of this study. 
Table 2. Minimum Target Prices and Loan Rates 
Item 
Target Prices 
Loan Rates 
Wheat 
$/bu 
4.05 
3.55 
Source: Nelson, Et al. 
Corn 
$/bu 
2. 70 
2.55 
Cotton 
$/lb. 
o. 71 
o. 55 
Grain Sorghum 
$/bu 
2. 60 
2.42 
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The farm yield for the crop, generally called the normal farm 
yield ( NFY), is specified by the county ASCS office for the specific 
farm. The NFY is based on an average of historical farm yields and 
determined by the county ASCS Board. A farmer may, provided he 
supplies solid documentation, petition the county ASCS office to raise 
the NFY of the farm. The acreage covered by deficiency payments on a 
specific farm is based on acreages planted for harvest by the producer 
and the ASCS desired total U.S. crop acreage harvested for the 
commodity. The farm program acreage covered by deficiency payments is 
determined by the formula: 
=AP xAF 
ct ct 
(3) 
where: 
= Farm Program Acreage for the crop in year t. 
=acreage planted for harvest on the specific farm for 
the crop in year t. 
=nationally applied Allocation Factor for the crbp in 
year t. 
The allocation factor is designed to penalize U.S. crop producers 
for harvesting acreages above the level desired by the program 
administration. This factor, which is the same for all farm 
producers, is computed as the ratio of the announced desired harvested 
acreage of the crop to the total U.S. acreage actually harvested. 
This desired level of harvested acreage is the level of harvested 
acres, assuming normal yields, required to meet estimated domestic and 
net export needs plus any adjustments in ending year stocks (Ray). 
The Secretary of Agriculture is required to determine the desired 
harvest acreages in time to aid farmers in developing their production 
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plans. Allocation factors must be between 0.8 and 1.0 and is assumed 
to be 1.0 for this study. 
is: 
The equation for computing the farmer's actual deficiency payment 
DP 
ct 
= DPR x NFY x FPA 
ct ct ct 
(4) 
where: 
NFY 
ct 
= the deficiency payment for the crop in year t, in 
dollars. 
= the deficiency payment rate for the crop in year t, in 
dollars per crop unit. 
=the normal farm yield for the crop in year t, in crop 
units per acre. 
= the farm program acres for the crop in year t. 
No out-of-pocket costs are incurred for participating in the 
Deficiency Payments Program; however, the set-aside acreage reduction 
requirement will frequently reduce the level of net returns. The 
normal pattern for participation in the wheat program is to plant the 
entire wheat acreage and graze-out the set aside acreage, since the 
program allows such a practice. The acreage reduction can not be 
mechanically harvested but, may be grazed or cut for hay at any time 
before the County Destruction Date (hard dough stage), assumed to be 
May 15 in this study. 
Disaster Payments Program 
The Disaster Payments Program was designed to reduce income 
variability by compensating the producer when crop yields were 
substantially below normal. The Disaster Payments Program was 
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originally a feature of the Agricultural and Consumer Protection Act 
of 1973 and provided payments to producers who were prevented from 
planting any portion of their allotment because.of drought, flood or 
natural disaster or any other condition beyond their control 
(Twee ten). The Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 provided for disaster 
payments based on "prevented planting" and "low yields". The 1982 
program contains no provisions for low yield disaster payments (under 
normal conditions) due to its replacement by the FCI program, This 
analysis is based on the 1977 Act in determining low yield payments 
since it is the most recent program of this type. 
The Disaster Payments Program is also administered by ASCS and 
re q u i re s the a c re age red u c t ion or s e t - a s id e fa c tors. Acreage 
reductions stipulated under the 1982 Deficiency Payments Program are 
assumed to be required under the Disaster Payments Program for this 
study. For wheat and feed grains the disaster payments are based on 
yields be low 60 percent of normal farm yields (using the same NFY as 
under the Deficiency Payments Program) and one-half of the appropriate 
wheat or feed grain target price. Cotton program yields are tested 
against 75 percent of the NFY and computed with one-third of the 
cotton target price. If crop yields produced by the farmer are below 
the specified 1eve1 s the producer is compensated for the difference 
betwee~ this yield and the producers actual harvested yield, The 
computational equation is: 
LYDPct = [ ac (APc·t x NFY ) - (AP x Y ) ] S TP ct ct ct c ct (5) 
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where: 
LYDPct ::: the low yield disaster payment for the crop in year t, 
in dollars. 
a. = the yield test coefficient for the crop (0. 60 for wheat 
c 
AP ct 
NFYct 
and feed grains, 0.75 for cotton). 
= the acreage planted for harvest for the crop in year t. 
= the norma 1 farm yield for the crop in year t, in crop 
units per acre. 
Yet = the ac tua 1 stochastic yield for the crop in year t, in 
crop units per acre. 
~c = the target price adjustment coefficient for the crop 
0.50 for wheat and feed grains, 0.33 for cotton). 
::: the target price for the crop in year t, in dollars per 
crop unit. 
As with the Deficiency Payments Program there are no out-of-pocket 
casts associated with participation in the Disaster Payments Program 
except that which is implied by the acreage reduction requirement. 
The same graze-out assumptions are made as under the Deficiency 
Payment Program. 
The basic ASCS requirements are much the same as with the 
Deficiency Payments Program. Requirements in addition to the acreage 
reduction or set-aside include: 
1. A Normal Crop Acreage (NCA) for the farm must be established 
by the county ASCS off ice. 
2. To participate the farmer must "sign-up" at the county ASCS 
office during the announced sign-up period. 
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3. The total acreage plus the set-aside must not exceed the NCA 
for the farm. 
4. The farm must be in compliance with acreage reductions for 
all other crops grown on the farm for which an acreage 
reduction has been announced. 
The set-aside acreage must be land which has been used for crops in at 
least one of the past three years and not harvested for the entire 
year (Nelson and Scearce). 
Federal Crop Insurance Program 
The F edera 1 Crop Insurance Program is designed to give producers 
a management tool that will help to reduce crop production risk due to 
yield f luc tua t ions and to replace the ASCS Disaster Payments Program 
in providing production risk assistance. Rather than incurring an 
irregular and perhaps large damaging loss, the producer pays a much 
smaller, but regular annual premium. When low yields occur, the 
producer collects an indemnity for a portion of the value of the lost 
product ion. 
In 1922 a bill concerning a federal "all risk" type insurance was 
introduced in Congress. The first Federal Crop Insurance Act was 
passed in 1938 and covered only wheat but, in 1939 a bill was passed 
to extend the program to cover the 1942 cotton crop (Tweeten). The 
program was intended to cover cash production costs associated with 
the crop, however, the indemnities were tied to crop yields. The 
farmer had to pay insurance premiums, the coverage was not designed to 
guarantee a profit to the producer, only the lost production costs. 
The Federal Crop Insurance Act, approved in February 1938, was 
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the original law initiating the Federal Crop Insurance Program. This 
act created the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) as an 
executive agency of the United States Department of Agriculture. 
Through the years, the program has been modified by a number of new 
acts and amendments. The latest law, the Federal Crop Insurance Act 
of 1980 (P.L. 96-365), was approved by President Carter in September 
1980. This law is designed to eventually build the Federal Crop 
Insurance Program into an "all-risk" crop insurance program for 
virtually all major crops in all producing counties of the country. 
The administration of the program is handled through the manager 
of the Corporation (FCIC) and a five-member board of directors (of 
which the manager is a member) appointed by the Secretary of 
Agriculture. 
On the local level operations are handled a number of ways. The 
Corporation may set up local offices staffed by federal employees to 
serve a group of counties. Arrangements may be made for service 
through private agents on a commission basis or through another USDA 
agency (such as county ASCS of-fices) to sell and service the 
insurance and provide an office. The law authorizes an appropriation 
to cover operating and administrative expenses. Thus, the premium 
does not include a charge for this purpose. 
Only owners of crops may purchase insurance. Those purchasing 
insurance may be individuals, partnerships, corporations or other 
legal entities. Landlords and tenants may apply for insurance 
individually. Co-owners and co-operators of a crop may insure their 
shares together or each may insure his or her separate share. 
Each type of insurance contract has a closing date established 
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after which new applications for insurance for that year will not be 
accepted. These dates are usually set in advance of the normal 
planting period for the crop. The closing dates are set so that an 
initial decision on participation can be made before much is known 
about the prospects of the crop. The purpose of the closing dates is 
to prevent producers from taking insurance in the years in which there 
is less than a normal chance for a crop. 
After an owner has had a contract accepted, the insurance remains 
in effect until it is cancelled. The insured producer simply reports 
the acreage he has planted in the county each year. If the producer 
wishes to cancel his insurance coverage for subsequent years, he must 
notify the FCIC through the county office in writing on or before the 
cancellation date of that particular crop year. The Corporation may 
also cancel the insurance coverage on any crop in any year with a 
written notice to the producer. If an unpaid overdue premium for a 
previous year exists past a specific date, the insurance will be 
automatically terminated. 
Each crop insurance unit (the insurance unit can be a producer's 
entire acreage or a specific field or group of fields) is considered 
separately for loss purposes. In this way, very good production on 
one unit will not offset severe losses on another unit. The producer 
must insure the total acreage for the specific crop within the county 
location if the producer chooses.to participate in the FCI Program. 
An insured producer may assign the indemnity to a creditor as 
collateral for loans or credit. If and when a loss occurs, the 
indemnity is paid by joint check to the producer and the creditor who 
has the assignment. The insured producer may transfer his right to an 
36 
indemnity along with a transfer of any part of his share of the 
insured crop. The producer, as long as it is practical, is expected 
to replant the crop in order to produce a satisfactory stand. Any 
time a loss or damage to the crop has occurred, the ~nsured producer 
is required to promptly report the incident to the Corporation's 
county office. 
The Federal Crop Insurance Act states that the FCIC shall set 
rates for premiums at a level the Board of Directors feels is 
sufficient to cover claims for losses and to establish as 
expeditiously as possible a reasonable reserve to protect the 
Corporation against unforeseen losses. In determining the premium 
rates, the Actuarial Division of the Corporation sets an average 
premium level for the county. The field underwriting offices adjust 
the premium rates according to the classified risk areas in the 
county. These field underwriting offices may have one or more rates 
per county depending on the number of areas with different levels of 
risk. 
The producer has nine basic options in deciding how to insure a 
crop. The producer may choose one of three price elections which are 
coupled with one of three yield guarantee levels. Price elections 
(currently $2.50, $3.50 and $4.50 per bushel for wheat) are set by the 
Corporation and are the same throughout the nation. The guarantee 
levels are 50, 65 and 75 percent of the average crop yield 
(established by the FCIC and not the same Normal Farm Yield 
established by the ASCS for Deficiency Payments and Disaster Payments 
Programs) for the farming unit. Table 3 presents an example of 
actuarial rates and coverages for Jackson County Oklahoma wheat 
Table 3. Wheat Actuarial Table for Jackson County Oklahoma 1982 
and Succeeding Crop Years 
Production 
Guarantee Price Election Per Bu. 
Classification Per Acre $2.50 $3.50 $4.50 
Premium Per Acre 
(Bu. ) (Dol) (Dol) (Dol) 
Level 1 
Risk Class 1 8.4 l. 80 2.50 3.30 
Risk Class 2 9.6 l. 90 2.65 3.45 
Risk Class 3 6.7 1. 75 2.40 3.10 
Level 2 
Risk Class 1 11. 0 3.00 4.20 5.40 
Risk Class 2 12.5 3.15 4.35 5.60 
Risk Class 3 8.70 2.80 3.90 5.05 
Level 3 
Risk Class 1 12.5 4.50 6.30 8.10 
Risk Class 2 14.5 4.85 6.85 8.80 
Risk Class 3 10.0 4.30 6.00 7. 75 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation, County Actuarial Rates and 
Coverages, Jackson County, Oklahoma, 1982. 
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producers. Classification refers to the guarantee level and the risk 
class of specific farm groups. Level 1, 2 and 3 categories refer to 
the SO, 65 and 7 5 percent guarantee levels, respectively. The risk 
class of specific farm groups are covered under each of the guarantee 
level. The average crop yield is based on the county average of the 
county in which the farming unit is located. A higher average yield 
can be established if the producer can present proof for at least 
three of the most recent consecutive years that the unit produces 
higher yields than the county average. 
A producer's premiums will be reduced as much as 5 percent per 
year, up to a 50 percent reduction, as long as the producer has a 
continuous insurance contract and has paid more in premiums than this 
producer has received in indemnities (i.e. the producer has a loss 
ratio less than one). Premium rate adjustment factors for wheat, 
grain sorghum and soybeans are contained in Table 4 and those for 
cotton and corn are contained in Table S. Premiums for an insured 
cotton or corn crop shall be reduced as indicated in Table 5 for 
consecutive years of insurance without a loss year (a loss year in the 
cotton or corn program occurs when the indemnities received in a 
particular year are greater than the total premiums paid in that 
ye a r) • The premium rate adjustment factors for cotton and corn still 
apply even though the producer has received an indemnity payment, as 
long as the indemnity is not larger than the premiums paid in that 
year. 
If a loss year occurs on a producer's cotton crop, the number of 
consecutive insurance years is reduced by three, with a couple of 
exceptions. If a loss year occurs when the producer has more than 
Table 4. Percent Adjustment Factors for Continuous Federal 
Crop Insurance Experience for Wheat, Soybeans and Grain 
Sorghum 
"· Adjuatm.nts for Favorable Continuous Insurance Experience 
I Numbers of Years Continuous Experience Through Previous Year 
I 0 I I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I 6 I 7 I 8 I 9 10 111 112113 114 I m~~e 
' ass Ratio' I 
-Through 
Previous Crop Percentage Adjustment Factor For Current Crop Year 
Year 
00-.20 100 95 95 90 90 85 80 75 70 70 65 65 60 60 55 
21-.40 100 100 95 95 90 90 90 85 80 80 75 75 70 70 65 
41-60 100 100 95 95 95 95 95 90 90 90 85 85 80 80 75 
.61-.80 100 100 95 95 95 95 95 95 90 90 90 90 85 85 85 
.81-1.09 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
"• Adjuatments for Unfavorable lnaurance Experience 
Number of Loss Years Througn Previous Year• 
0 2 3 4 5 I 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 I 14 
Loss Ratio' II 
Through 
Previous Croo I percentage Adjustment Factor For Current Crop Year 
Year 
1.10-: .19 100 100 100 102 104 106 I 108 110 112 114 116 118 120 I 122 124 
~ .20-1.39 100 100 100 ! 104 108 112 I 116 120 124 128 132 136 140 144 148 
140-1.69 100 100 100 108 116 124 I 132 140 148 156 164 172 ' 180 188 196 
! .70-1.99 100 100 100 112 122 132 1142 152 162 172 182 192 202 212 222 
2.00-2.49 100 100 100 116 128 140 I 152 164 176 188 200 212 224 236 248 
2.50-3.24 100 100 100 120 134 148 I 162 176 190 204 218 232 246 260 274 
3.25-3.99 I 100 '100 105 124 I 140 156 1172 188 I 204 220 ' 236 252 268 284 ' 300 
4.00-4.99 I 100 100 110 128 146 164 1182 200 I 218 236 254 i 272 290 I 300 300 
5.00-5.99 I 100 100 115 I 132 I 152 172 1192 21 2 232 252 I 272 292 ! 300 I 300 , 300 
8.00-Up 100 ! 100 120 136 I 158 180 1202 224 246 268 290 300 I 300 ! 300 
Scurce: Z.5. Department of .>.griculcure .. .\n Inside Look ac All-'.l.isk C::on 
Ir..suranc-c. iJ. S. Government PrintL'1.g Office: Federal Crop Irr-
surance Corporation, 1980. 
1Loss Ratio means the ratio of indemnity(iesl paid to premium(s) 2a::ned . 
., 
-only the :nost: recent 15 crop years will be cised to determine the ctumber 
.y[ ''Loss Years 11 • (.~ crop year :_s determined to be a "Loss Year" 
:vhe~ the amount af indemnity· tor the ;;-ear .:xceeds the premium for 
t'1e vear.) 
300 
50 
60 
70 
80 
100 
15 
126 
152 
204 
232 
260 
288 
300 
300 
300 
300 
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Table 5. Percent Adjustment Factors for Favorable 
Continuous Federal Crop Insurance Experience for Cotton and 
Corn 
Premium Consecutive Years 
Reduction with no loss 
5 percent after 1 year 
5 percent after 2 years 
10 percent after 3 years 
10 percent after 4 years 
15 percent after 5 years 
20 percent after 6 years 
25 percent after 7 or more years 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Federal 
Crop Insurance Corporation, Federal Crop 
Insurance Policy, Continuous Contract, MS-Cotton. 
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seven years without a loss, a reduction to four will be made. If a 
1 o s s year occurs when the producer has three or less consecutive years 
of insurance experience without a loss year, a reduction to zero will 
be made. 
The producer is entitled to a subsidy equal to 30 percent of the 
premium cost up to ti'le 65 percent coverage level. If the producer 
wishes to have 75 percent coverage, the government will pay 30 percent 
of the 65 percent coverage premium and the producer will pay the 
remainder of the 7 5 percent coverage premiums. This subsidy is 
already incorporated in the actuarial table presented (Table 3). 
A producer may receive a discount on the premium if hail and fire 
protection is deleted from the FCIC policy. If the producer chooses to 
delete the hail and fire protection from the FCIC policy at least as 
much hail and fire protection must be purchased from a private 
insurance company. All acreage insured by the FCIC policy must be 
covered and the purchase must be reported to the FCIC within 72 hours 
after purchase of the private hail and fire insurance. The amount of 
the discount is equal to 40 percent of the average county hail and 
fire premium, but not less than 15 percent and not more than 30 
percent of the FCIC premium. This study assumes the hail and fire 
protection will be provided in the FCIC policy and that no hail and 
fire insurance will be purchased in simulations that do not assume 
participation in the Federal Crop Insurance Program. 
An indemnity will be paid to the insured producer whenever the 
actual production falls below the guarantee yield level of production. 
The guarantee level of production is 50, 65 and 75 percent, as 
selected by the insured producer, of the average yield. The amount of 
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loss is the difference between the guarantee level of production and 
the actual production. This loss is multiplied by the price election, 
chosen by the producer at the onset, to calculate the value of the 
program indemnity. The following formula is used to calculate the 
program indemnity payments. 
(6) 
where: 
FCict = the total indemnity paid to the producer for the crop 
in year t, in dollars. 
GYct =the FCIC guaranteed yield for the crop in year t, in 
crop units per acre. 
Yet = the ac tua 1 stochastic yield for the crop in year t, in 
AP 
ct 
crop units per acre. 
= the acreage planted for harvest for the crop 1n year t. 
=the FCIC price elective selected by the producer for 
the crop in year t, in dollars per crop unit. 
The total premiums paid are calculated using the following 
equations. 
where: 
AP ct 
PPR ct 
= AP x PPR x PRA 
ct ct ct (7) 
= total insurance premiums paid for the crop acreage in 
year t, in dollars. 
= the acreage planted for ~arvest for the crop in year t. 
=per acre premium rate for the crop in year t, in 
dollars per acre. 
= per acre premium rate adjustment factor for the crop in 
year t. 
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The producer does not have to harvest the crop to receive an 
indemnity. However, the FCIC must be notified through the county 
office so that they may inspect the farming unit or field and make an 
appraisal of the actual production on the farming unit. This actual 
production appraisal is used to calculate the indemnity. 
Program Combinations 
During the 1981 crop year, the year after the initiation of the 
1980 Act, all three programs were available for some crops. This 
presents an opportunity to analyze the programs in combination. Under 
the assumptions of this study the producer may participate in any of 
the program alternativ~s or in any of the four possible program 
combinations. However, certain adjustments must be made in the 
program costs and returns calculations. If the producer participates 
in either the Deficiency Payments Program or the Disaster Payments 
Program, the acreage reduction requirement must be met. If 
participation in both programs is assumed, only one acreage reduction 
is assumed and double payment is not allowed. If the producer 
receives disaster payments for a portion of the potential production, 
the quantity of the crop covered by disaster payments must be excluded 
fr om the quantity covered by deficiency payments. This means that a 
producer cannot be paid a disaster and a deficiency payment on the 
same bus he 1 of production. The calculation for the disaster payment 
remains the same as described earlier however, the deficiency payment 
is calculated as follows: 
= DPR [(NFY xFPA) - ((a NFY ) - (AP xY ))] (8) 
ct ct ct c ct ct ct 
where: 
NFYct 
FPAct 
a 
c 
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the deficiency payment for the crop in year t, in 
dollars. 
=the deficiency payment rate for the crop in year t, in 
dollars per crop unit. 
= the normal farm yield for the crop in year t, in crop 
units per acre. 
= the farm program acres for the crop in year t. 
=the yield test coefficient for the crop (0.60 for wheat 
and feed grains, 0.75 for cotton). 
= the acreage planted for harvest for the crop in year t. 
= the ac tua 1 stochastic yield for the crop in year t, in 
crop units per acre. 
In the 1981 crop year, program combinations including the 
Disaster Payments Program and Federal Crop Insurance were allowed. 
Under this alternative the producer was not allowed to take advantage 
of the 30 percent FCI premium subsidy. If the producer chose to 
participate in both programs, the government would not pay the 30 
percent premium subsidy. The premium rates must be increased to 
incorporate this alternative into the study. With participation in 
program combinations including either or both of the Disaster Payments 
Program and the Deficiency Payments Program and the Federal Crop 
Insurance Program the producer must still meet the set-aside 
requirements. 
In the next chapter required input data for the model is 
presented. This data provides a detailed description of each of the 
four farm scenarios used to analyze the implications of the government 
farm program alternatives. 
CHAPTER III 
INPUT DATA FOR FARM SITUATIONS 
The four whole-farm situations analyzed are designed to represent 
typical, full-time, commercial farming operations in three different 
areas of Oklahoma. Two farm situations are developed for Jackson 
County, one a high equity and the other a low equity situation. 
Scenarios for the other two study areas are designed to represent 
recently established, low equity farming situations similar to the low 
equity situation in Jackson County. Basic differences in the 
scenarios of each county are total farm acreages, machinery 
complements, beginning inventories of machinery and equipment, 
cropping patterns and stochastic yields. The high equity and low 
equity farm scenarios for Jackson County are referred to as Farm 1 and 
Farm 2, respectively. Farm scenarios for Wagoner and Texas Counties 
are referred to as Farm 3 and Farm 4, respectively. 
Farm Situations 
Land Ownership 
The two Jackson County farm scenarios are assumed to have 
identical land holdings. However, differences exist in the timing of 
land purchases and the value of the land at the time of the purchases. 
These differences are· important because they are critical determinant 
factors in the level of liability against the farm land owned by the 
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farm operator. Each farm operator is assumed to own 800 acres of 
cropland and rent an additional 320 acres of cropland for a total of 
1, 120 acres of cropland. Cropland is rented at an annual cash rental 
rate of $35 per acre. The average current value of owned farm land is 
about $1,000 per acre. Land acquisitions for Farm 1 were made in 1970 
(160 acres), 1973 (400 acres), and 1977 (240 acres). Farm 2 land 
acquisitions were made in 1976 (160 acres), 1978 (240 acres), and 1980 
(400 acres). Table 6 and Table 7 summarize the land loans for Farm 1 
and Farm 2, respectively. Farm 1 has an equity ratio in land of 73.64 
percent and Farm 2 has an equity ratio in land of 44.14 percent. 
The land purchases for Farm 3, in Wagoner County, were made in 
1976 (120 acres), 1978 (140 acres) and 1980 (200 acres) and are 
summarized in Table 8. The operator of this farm scenario is assumed 
to own 560 acres of cropland and native hay meadow and rent 160 acres 
of cropland. Cropland in Wagoner County is assumed to be rented at an 
annual rate of $50 per acre. The beginning value of the owned land is 
$560,000. The owners equity in land at the beginning of the 
simulation is 43.67 percent. 
The Texas County farm scenario, Farm 4, is assumed to operate a 
total of 1,600 acres, 1,200 of which are owned with the remaining 400 
rented at an annual rate of $20 per acre. Owned land was acquired 
through purchases. in 1976 (240 acres), 1978 (360 acres) and 1980 (600 
acres) and has a current beginning average value of about $1,000 per 
acre. Table 9 summarizes the land purchases and outstanding land 
loans for this farm. 
44.14 percent. 
The owner's equity in land for this farm is 
Table 6. Summary of Land Purchase and Outstanding Land Loan Balances for Jackson County 
Farm Scenario - Farm 1 
Purchase Total 1982 
Year Interest Loan Price A Purchase Down B Loan C Outstanding 
Purchased Acres Rate Life Per Acre Price Payment Amount Principle 
(%) (Yrs.) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) 
1970 160 8 30 261 41,760 10,440 31, 320 26, 073 
1973 400 8 30 340 136,000 34,000 102,000 90,756 
1977 240 8 30 551 132,240 33,060 99,180 94,044 
AThe purchase price per acre is taken from Farm Real Estate Market Developments, National 
Economic Analysis Division, USDA. 
BThe down payment is equal to 25 percent of the total purchase price. 
CThe loan amount is equal to the total purchase price minus the down payment. 
.p. 
" 
Table 7. Summary of Land Purchases and Outstanding Land Loan Balances for Jackson County 
Farm Scenario - Farm 2 
Purchase Total 1982 
Year Interest Loan Price A Purchase Down B Loan C Outstanding Purchased Acres Rate Life Per Acre Price Pa~ment Amount PrinciEle 
(%) (Yrs.) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) 
1976 160 8 30 521 83 ,360 20,840 62, 520 58,471 
1978 240 9 30 680 163,200 40,800 122,400 118,293 
1980 400 10 30 912 364,800 91,200 273,600 270,107 
AThe purchase price per acre is taken from Farm Real Estate Market Developments, National 
Economic Analysis Division, USDA. 
BThe down payment is equal to 25 percent of the total purchase price. 
CThe loan amount is equal to the total purchase price minus the down payment. 
.i::-
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Table 8. Summary of Land Purchases and Outstanding Land Loan Balances for Wagoner County 
Farm Scenario - Farm 3 
Purchase Total 1982 
Year Interest Loan Price A Purchase Down B Loan c Outstanding Purchased Acres Rate Life Per Acre Price Payment Amount Principle 
(%) (Yrs.) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) 
1976 120 8 30 521 62. 520 15,630 46,890 43,854 
1978 140 9 30 680 95,200 23,800 71, 400 69,005 
1980 300 10 30 912 273,600 68,400 205,200 202,580 
AThe purchase price per acre is taken from Farm Real Estate Market Developments, National 
Economic Analysis Division, USDA. 
BThe down payment is equal to 25 percent of the total purchase price. 
CThe loan amount is equal to the total purchase price minus the down payment. 
-"' 
\0 
Table 9. Summary of Land Purchases and Outstanding Land Loan Balances for Texas County 
Farm Scenario - Farm 4 
Purchase Total 1982 
Year Interest Loan Price A Purchase Down B Loan C Outstanding Purchased Acres Rate Life Per Acre Price Pa!ment Amount PrinciEle 
(%) (Yrs.) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) 
1976 240 8 30 521 125,040 31,260 93,780 87,707 
1978 360 9 30 680 244,800 61,200 183,600 177 J 440 
1980 600 10 30 912 547,200 136,800 410,400 405,161 
AThe purchase price per acre is taken from Farm Real Estate Market DeveloEments, National 
Economic Analysis Division, USDA. 
BThe down payment is equal to 25 percent of the total purchase price. 
CThe loan amount is equal to the total purchase price minus the down payment. 
ln 
0 
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Machinery, Equipment and Building Inventories 
The machinery and equipment complements are based on Oklahoma 
Crop and Livestock Enterprise Budgets. The purchase pn.ces of the 
machinery and equipment are consistent with the year in which they 
were purchased. Current year market values for the specific machinery 
items are calculated by subtracting depreciation accumulated since 
purchase from the purchase ~rice. Depree ia t ion on machinery, 
equipment and buildings is calculated using a straight line method 
assuming a s a 1 vage value of 10 percent of the purchase pn.ce. Table 
10 presents a detailed description of the machinery and _equipment as 
well as the building inventory for Farm 1. The total 1982 market 
value of the machinery and equipment on Farm 1 is $45,143 and the 
current market value of buildings is $29,325. 
Farm 2 has a current (1982) market value of machinery and 
equipment of $66,565 and the market value of buildings is $35,846 
(Table 11). The 1982 market value of machinery and equipment, and 
buildings for the Wagoner County farm scenario, Farm 3, are $44,964 
and $29,655, respectively (Table 12). Machinery and equipment on Farm 
4 has a current market value of $153,174. Buildings on Farm 4 have a 
19 8 2 market value of $45, 537. ·The description of the inventories for 
the Texas County scenario are presented in Table 13. 
Machinery, equipment and building loan balances are based on 
their respective dates of purchase, interest rates, and loan lives. 
The loan life for each inventory item is determined by the item's 
respective purchase price. The outstanding loan balances on Farm 1 
machinery, equipment and buildings are presented in Table 14 and total 
$31,338. Farm 1 has equity in these assets of 57.92 percent. Table 
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15 summarizes the machinery, equipment and building outstanding loan 
balances of Farm 2. These total $55,325 and the equity in these 
assets is 45. 98 percent of their 1982 market value. Table 16 and 
Table 17 provide the summary of outstanding machinery, equipment and 
bu i 1 ding loans for Farm 3 and Farm 4, respectively. Farm 3 has equity 
in machinery, equipment and buildings of 40.19 percent. The equity in 
these assets for Farm 4 is 45.75 percent. 
The beginning balance sheet information for the farm scenarios is 
summarized in Table 18. Fann 1 has a total asset value of $879,468, 
liabilities of $260,938 (including an outstanding operating loan of 
$18, 727) and a beginning net worth of $618,530. This farm scenario 
has a beginning equity to asset ratio of approximately 70.33 percent 
and a debt to equity ratio of 42.19 percent. Farm 1 has a very good 
leverage status and will have little chance of firm failure. The 
equity to asset ratio for Farm 2 is 39.49 percent and its leverage 
ratio is 153.23 percent. Farm 2 has an outstanding operating loan of 
$46, 878 and liabilities of this scenario total $549,074. Total assets 
and net worth for Farm 2 are $907,411 and $358,337, respectively. 
This farm scenario will be subjected to a greater chance of bankruptcy 
due to the limited risk bearing ability implied by the operator's low 
equity in the firm. 
Farm 3 has a total asset value of $639,619, total liabilities of 
$386,970, and a net worth of $252,649. The liabilities include an 
operating loan of $26,902. This scenario has an equity to asset ratio 
of 39. 50 percent and a liability to equity ratio of 153.17 percent. 
The Texas County farm scenario, Farm 4, has an equity to asset ratio 
of 38. 97 percent and a leverage ratio of 156.63. The total asset 
Table 10. Machinery, Equipment and Building Inventory Specifi-
cations and Market Values for Jackson County Farm Scenario -
Farm 1 
Year Purchase Useful 1982 *arket 
Inventorv 3ize Purchased Price Life Value 
($) (Yrs.) ($) 
:1achi:iery and Equipment: 
Spring tooth 24.0 ft. 1974 1,243 10 348 
Electric Fence 2.0 Mi. 1974 216 10 43 
'il'ater Tank 250.0 Ga 1. 1974 149 10 30 
6 Row Cultivator 20.0 ft. 1975 2,651 10 981 
6 Row Planter 20.0 ft. 1975 3,489 10 1, '.!91 
Rotary Mower 14.0 ft. 1975 2, 678 10 991 
Offset Disk 18.0 ft. 1976 4,493 10 2,067 
Drill 26. 6 ft. 1976 4, 964 10 2,283 
Tractor 125 .• 0 HP. 1977 21, 523 7 7,687 
Sprayer 20.0 ft. 1977 3,600 10 1,980 
Tractor 150.0 HP. 1978 28,401 7 13,795 
8.ol lover )1, B. Plow ( 5-18) , " ft. 1978 ~, 549 10 2' 3-:'5 1 ... :
7R '2Bar- !..ister 23.3 :t. 1973 1, iJ14 lCl 649 
::lectric Fence 3.0 Mi. 1978 441 10 282 
3 Water Tanks 250.0 Gal. 1973 606 10 388 
Pickup 0.5 TN. 1979 7 ,303 6 4,017 
c::-i i;;e:.. 23.0 ft. 1980 6,507 ,,, •'J 5. 3 36 
3uildings: 
Machine Shed 3,500 sq. ft. 1975 24,SOO 30 19' 355 
Barn 2,000 sq. ft. 1977 3,295 30 2, 746 
Corral 10,000 sq. ft. 1979 7,938 30 7,224 
Source: Invent0ry specifications and purchase prices are from Oklahoma Cron and 
Livestock Enterprise Budgets, Southwest Oklahoma. 
-"The 198° ' ~ mar«:et vlaues ar2 .equal tu the purchase price minus the t:ital of yearly 
depreciation since the item's purchase. Yearly deor~ciation is calculated bv 
sub~racting the 10 :>ercent salvage '-'alue from the :>urchase tirice and dividing th~ 
~emainder by the useful life. 
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Table 11. Machinery, Equipment and Building Inventory Specifi-
cations and Market Values for Jackson County Farm Scenario -
Farm 2 
Inventory Size 
Machinery and Equipment: 
Spring tooth 24. 0 ft. 
Electric Fence 2. 0 Mi. 
Water Tank 250. 0 Gal. 
6 Row Cultivator 20. 0 ft. 
6 Row Planter 20. 0 ft. 
Rotary Mower 14.0 ft. 
Offset Disk 18. 0 ft. 
Drill 26. 6 ft. 
Tractor 125.0 HP. 
Sprayer 20. 0 ft. 
Tractor 150.0 HP. 
Rollover M.B. Plow (5-18) 7.5 ft. 
7R 2Bar Lister 23.3 ft. 
Electric Fence 3.0 Mi. 
3 Water Tanks 250.0 Gal. 
Pickup O. 5 TN. 
Chisel 23. O ft. 
3ui ldings: 
ciachine Shed 3, 500 sq. ft. 
Barn 2,000 sq. ft. 
Corral 10,000 sq. ft. 
Year Purchase 
Purchased Price 
1976 
1976 
1976 
1977 
1977 
1977 
1978 
1978 
1978 
1978 
1979 
1979 
1980 
1980 
1980 
1981 
1981 
1977 
1979 
1980 
($) 
1,449 
252 
173 
3,092 
4,070 
3,124 
5,241 
5, 791 
23,245 
3,888 
30,674 
5,201 
1, 183 
514 
707 
9,200 
7' 590 
28' 5 77 
3,843 
3,573 
Useful 
Life 
(Yrs. ) 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
7 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
6 
10 
JO 
30 
30 
1982 ~arket 
Value 
($) 
667 
116 
80 
1,701 
2,239 
1,718 
3,354 
3, 706 
11, 290 
2,488 
18,843 
3,665 
970 
421 
580 
7,820 
6,907 
24,290 
3,497 
8,059 
Source: Inventory specifications and purchase prices are from Oklahoma Crop and 
Livestock Enterprise Budgets, Southwest Oklahoma. 
"The 1982 market values ar·e equal to the rurchase price minus the total of yearly 
depreciation since the items purchase. Yearly depreciation is calculated by 
S•Jbtracting the 10 percent salvage value from the purchase and dividing che 
remainder by the useful life. 
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Table 12. Machinery, Equipment and Building Inventory Specifi-
cations and Market Values for Wagoner County Farm Scenario -
Farm 3 
Year Purchase Useful 1982 *arket 
Inventor! Size Purchased Price Life Value 
($) (Yrs.) ($) 
Machinery and Equipment: 
Springtooth 20.0 ft. 1976 1,260 10 580 
Spike Harrow 18.0 ft. 1976 504 10 232 
Electric Fence 2. 5 Mi. 1976 315 10 145 
Water Tank 250.0 Gal. 1976 173 10 80 
6 Row Cultivator 16.0 ft. 1977 2, 586 10 1, 422 
6 Row Planter 18.0 ft. 1977 5,309 10 2,920 
Tractor 80. 0 HP. 1978 18,008 7 8,747 
Tandem Disk 16. 0 ft. 1978 4,410 10 2,822 
Tractor 100.0 HP. 1979 24,323 7 14,941 
M. B. Plow (5-16) 6.6 ft. 1980 4,973 10 4,078 
Rotary Mower 7.0 ft. 1980 2, 143 10 1, 757 
Pickup O. 75 TN. 1981 8,518 6 7,240 
Buildings: 
~lachine Shed 2,500 sq. ft. 1979 23,809 30 21,666 
?ia rn 2,000 sq. ft. 1977 3,402 30 2,892 
Corral 4,000 sq. ft. 1980 5,422 30 s' .J9 7 
Source: Inventory specifications and .purchase price are from Okahoma Crop and 
Livestock Enterprise Budgets, Northeast Oklahoma. 
A.The 1982 market 11a lues are equal to the purchase price minus the total of yearly 
depreciation since the icem' s purchase. Yearly depreciation is calculaced by 
subtracting the 10 percent salvage value from the purchase price and dividing the 
remainder by the usefullife. 
55 
56 
Table 13. Machinery, Equipment and Building Inventory Specifi~ 
cations and Market Values for Texas County Farm Scenario -
Farm 4 
Yeoar Purchase Useful 1982 *arket 
Inventor:! Size Purchased Price Life Value 
($) (Yrs.) ($) 
Machinery and Equipment: 
Rod Weeder 20.0 ft. 1976 3,088 10 1,420 
Sweep 24.0 ft. 1976 5 ,672 10 2,609 
Electric Fence 3.5 Mi. 1976 441 10 203 
2 Water Tanks 250. 0 Gal. 1976 347 10 160 
Surf ace Irrigation System 1976 28,344 10 13,038 
Land Plane 12.0 ft. 1977 4, 764 10 2,620 
Off set Disk 16.0 ft. 1977 4,900 10 2,695 
Sprayer 36.0 ft. 1977 2,858 8 1,250 
Planter 20.0 ft. 1978 5,733 10 3,669 
Row Cultivator 20.0 ft. 1978 3,744 8 2,607 
Lister 20.0 ft. 1978 3,161 10 2,023 
Horse 1978 588 8 323 
Surface Irrigation System 1978 33,870 10 21, 6 77 
Tractor 100.0 HP. 1979 24,323 7 14,941 
Spike Harrow 20.0 ft. 1979 972 10 710 
Drill w/o Fert. 13.0 ft. 1979 3,175 10 2,318 
Spring tooth 30.0 ft. 1979 2, 382 10 1, 739 
Tractor 125.0 HP. 1980 32,836 7 24,392 
:hi se l 20. 0 ft. 1980 7' 287 10 5, 974 
Stalk Shredder 13.3 ft. 1980 4, 715 8 3,654 
C:lectric Fence 4.0 Mi. 1980 686 LO 563 
3 Water Tanks 50.0 Ga 1. 1980 707 10 580 
Table 13. (Continued) 
Year Purchase Useful 1982 *arket 
Size Purchased Price Life Value: Inventory 
(S) (Yrs.) ( $) 
Pickup 0.5 TN. 1981 7,870 6 6,690 
Field Cultivator 20.0 ft. 1981 4,259 10 3, 876 
Surface Irrigation System 1981 37,333 10 33,973 
Buildings: 
Machine Shed 4, 750 sq. ft. 1977 38,753 30 32' 940 
Barn 2,000 sq. ft. 1979 3,843 30 3, 497 
Corral 12, 750 sq. ft. 1980 9,681 30 9,100 
Source: Inventory specifications and purchase prices are from Oklahoma Croo and 
Livestock Enterorise Budgets, Panhandle Oklahoma. 
AThe 1982 market values are equal to the purchase price minus the totalof yearly 
depreciation since the item's purchase. Yearly depreciation is calculated by 
subtracting the 10 percent salvage value from the purchase price aud dividing the 
remainder by the useful life. 
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Table 14. Summary of Outstanding Loan Balances for Machinery, Equipment and 
Buildings for Jackson County Farm Scenario - Farm 1 
Years Loan 1982 
Loan Remaining Interest OutstandiRg 
Item Size Life On Note Rate Princi2le 
(Yrs.) (Yrs.) (%) ($) 
Machinery and Equipment: 
Tractor 125.0 HP. 8 3 8 7,239 
Tractor 150.0 HP. 8 4 9 12,468 
Rollover M. B. (5-18) 7.5 ft. 5 1 9 822 
Pickup 0. 5 TN. 4 1 10 1, 5 70 
Chisel 23.0 ft. 6 4 10 3,552 
Buildings: 
Machine Shed 3,500 sq. ft. 8 1 8 2,961 
Corral 10,000 sq. ft. 5 2 10 2,726 
AThe operator was required to make a 25 percent down payment on all machinery, 
equipment and building purchases. 
Vl 
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Table 15. Summary of Outstanding Loan Balances for Machinery, 
Equipment and Buildings for Jackson County Farm Scenario -
Farm 2 
Years Lo'1n 1982 
Lonn Rem11ining Intnr0st Outst1ndiRg 
TtPm Size Life On Note Rate Principle 
(Yr~.) (Yn.) (%) ($) 
Machinery and E-f!u i pmf'·nt: 
OffsPt Disk Pl. 0 ft. 5 9 9'27 
Drill 26.6 ft. 5 9 I ,024 
Tr.1c tor 125.0 HP. 8 4 9 10,205 
Tractor 150,0 HP. 8 10 16,347 
Rollover M.B. Plow (5-18) 7.5 ft 5 2 10 1,724 
Pickup 0.5 TN. 4 3 11 S,4JS 
ChisP.l 23.0 ft. 6 11 4,973 
Bui I.dings: 
Machine Shed 3,500 sq. ft. 8 3 8 9,612 
Barn 1,000 sq. ft. 4 10 827 
Corral 10000 sq. ft. 5 3 11 l,, 251 
AThe opo>rator was n•quired to m11kP a 25 percPnt down p;iyment on all machin<•ry, Pquipme11t 
and building purchases. 
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Table 16 •. Summary of Outstanding Loan Balances for Machinery, Equipment and Buildings 
for Wagoner County Farm Scenario - Farm 3 
Years Loan 1982 
Loan Remaining Interest OutstandiRg 
Item Size Life On Note Rate Princi2le · 
(Yrs.) (Yrs. ) (%) ($) 
Machinery and Equipment: 
Tractor 80.0 HP. 8 4 9 7,906 
Tandem Disk 16.0 Ft. 5 1 9 780 
Tractor 100.0 HP. 8 5 10 12,962 
M.B. Plow (5-16) 6. 6 ft. 5 3 10 2,447 
Rotary Mower 7.0 ft. 3 1 10 588 
Pickup O. 75 TN. 4 3 11 5,032 
Buildings: 
Machine Shed 2, 500 sq. ft. 8 5 10 12,688 
Corral 4,000 sq. ft. 4 2 10 2, 226 
Ah . d . T e operator was require to make a 25 percent down payment on all machinery, 
equipment and building purchases. 
°' 0 
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Table 17. Summary of Outstanding Loan Balances for Machinery, 
Equipment and Buildings for Texas County Farm Scenario -
Farm 4 
Years Loan 1982 
Loan Remaining ~nterest ':lutstandixg 
:tem Size Life On Note ~ate Princiole 
(Y!'s.) rYrs.) I ~I', 
'"' ,10/ '• I 
~1achinery and Equi ?ment: 
Sur~ace Irrigation System 8 2 3 6,597 
Planter 20.0 ft. 9 1, 014 
Surface Irrigation System 8 4 9 14, 869 
Tractor 100.0 HP. 8 10 12, ?62 
9rill 01/0 Fe rt. 13.0 ft. 5 2 10 1, 090 
Tractor 125.0 HP. 8 6 10 20' 105 
Chisel 20.0 ft. 6 4 10 3,978 
Stalk Shredder 13.3 ft. 5 3 10 2,320 
Pickup 0.5 TN. 4 3 11 ~' 649 
Field Cultivator 20.0 ft. 4 3 11 2,516 
Surf ace Irrigation System 8 7 l l 25,639 
3ui ldings: 
'1ach ine Shed 4, 750 ;q. ft. 8 13,034 
3arn 2,000 sq. :t. 4 10 827 
Corral 12, 750 sq. ft. '1 '. i,301 
'"::i.o, •)per a tor ·.vq s r~quired to make a 25 ?C:"":er:t :!.own ;:iay-:-::€nr: ..::::n J.: l ".:ia.c:1 i :1:? -::: ~ ~c;.u:.p1knL 
3nd Jui:iing ?ur:ha.ses. 
Table 18. Beginning Balance Sheet Information for the 
Four Farm Scenarios 
Farm l Farm 2 Farm 3 Farm 4 
~ 
Land $800,000 $800,000 $560,000 $1,200,000 
Buildings 29' 325 35,846 29,655 45,537 
Machinery and Equipment 45' 143 66,565 44,964 153,174 
Cash Reserves 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 
Total Assets $879,468 $907' 411 $639,619 $1,403, 711 
LIABILITIES 
Land $210,873 $446,871 $315,439 $670,308 
Buildings 5,687 14, 690 14,914 18,662 
Machinery and Equipment 25,651 40,635 29' 715 95' 739 
Other 18r727 46, 878 26, 902 72,019 
Total Liabilities $260,938 $549,074 $386,970 $856, 728 
EQUITY 
Operators Net Worth $618,530 $358,337 $252, 649 $546,983 
Leverage Ratio (L/E) 0.4219 1. 5323 1. 5317 l. 5663 
Equity Ratio (E/A) o. 7033 0.3949 0.3950 0.3897 
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value of Farm 4 is $1,403, 711, total liabilities equal $856, 728 and 
the operator's net worth is $546,983. Total liabilities include an 
outstanding operating loan of $72,019. These two farm scenarios are 
in a leverage position similar to that of Farm 2 in Jackson County. 
Their chances of firm failure will be much greater than that of a farm 
scenario i"n the same study area with a much lower leverage ratio. 
Expected Capital Replacement Expenditures 
To take into account machinery inventory obsolescence due to 
machinery use and depreciation, a set of expected capital replacement 
expenditures are supplied as input data for the farm simulation model. 
Machinery replacement is based on the useful lives of the beginning 
machinery inventory. During the simulation, when the useful life of a 
piece of machinery has passed, a new, like piece of machinery is 
purchased. In this analysis, inflation is assumed to be zero. Thus, 
purchase prices for future replacement expenditures will be the same 
as prices for machinery at the beginning of the planning horizon 
(1982). The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act allows the owner of a farm 
to write off as an expense up to $5000 of machinery expenditures in 
the year of purchase. Investment tax credit is allowed on these 
purchases except for the amount expensed in the year of purchase. The 
amount eligible for investment tax credit is equal to 10 percent of 
the purchase price except for pickup trucks which investment tax 
credit is equal to 6 percent of the purchase price. 
The 1981 legislation provides for a method of depreciation for 
capital expenditures of this type. This method is referred to as 
Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS). Another method of 
64 
depreciation allowed under the 1981 legislation is a straight line 
method with no salvage value and a five year useful life, Since this 
method fits the simulation model better than the ACRS method the 
straight line method was selected foi use in this analysis. 
Depreciation can only be calculated on that portion of the purchase 
price which is not elected as part of the $5000 first year expense. 
Each of these capital expenditures is assumed to be financed 
through a loan established in the year of purchase, The loan lives 
for the expected cap ital replacement expenditures are determined by 
the value of the purchase prices of the assets. A real interest rate 
of 6 percent per year is assumed for each loan, By using real 
interest rates for future capital expenditures and uninflated asset 
and product prices the results can be reported in 1982 real dollars. 
Tables 19, 20, 21 and 22 summarize the expected capital replacement 
expenditures for farm scenarios 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. These 
tables specify the machinery or equipment item, its year of purchase 
and the purchase price of the item. Also summarized are the 
depreciable lives, loan lives, loan interest rates, amount expensed in 
the year of purchase and the amount eligible for investment tax 
credit. 
Enterprises 
Both farm scenarios in Jackson County produce the same 
enterprises and the same acreages (or head) of each enterprise. These 
enterprises are dryland wheat, dryland cotton, irrigated cotton, 
alfalfa hay and stocker steers. Seven hundred twenty acres of wheat 
are produced on dryland acreages at a cost of $71.16 per acre. The per 
Table 19. Summary of Expected Capital Replacement Expenditures for Jackson 
County Farm Scenario - Farm 1 
Amount 
Expensed Eligible 
Year of Dep. Loan Int. Expected A Firsfi For Invest. 
Item Size Purchase Life Life Rate Expenditure Year Tax Credit 
(Yrs.) (Yrs.) (%) ($) ($) ($) 
Springtooth 24.0 ft. 1984 5 3 6 2,300 230 
Electric Fence 2. 0 Mi. 1984 5 l 6 400 40 
Water Tank 250.0 Gal 1984 5 l 6 275 28 
Tractor 125.0 HP. 1984 5 8 6 31,625 5,000 2,663 
6 Row Cultivator 20.0 ft. 1985 5 4 6 4,543 454 
6 Row Planter 20.0 ft. 1985 5 4 6 5,980 5,000 98 
Rotary Mower 14.0 ft. 1985 5 4 6 4,590 459 
Pickup 0.5 TN. 1985 5 4 6 9,200 552 
Offset Disk 18.0 ft, 1986 5 5 6 7,130 5,000 213 
Drill 26.6 ft. 1986 5 5 6 7,878 788 
Tractor 150.0 HP. 1986 5 8 6 38,640 3,864 
Sprayer 20.0 ft. 1987 5 4 6 5,290 5,000 29 
Rollover M.8. Plow (5-18) 7.5 ft. 1988 5 4 6 6,325 5,000 133 
7R 2Bar Lister 23.3 ft. 1988 5 2 6 1,380 138 
O"I 
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Table 19. (Continued) 
Item Size 
Electric Fence 3. 0 Mi. 
3 Water Tanke 250. 0 Ga 1. 
Chisel 23. 0 ft. 
Year of 
Purchase 
1988 
1988 
1990 
Dep. 
Life 
(Yrs.) 
5 
5 
5 
Loan 
Life 
(Yrs.) 
5 
Int. 
Rate 
(%) 
6 
6 
6 
Expected A 
Expenditure 
($) 
600 
825 
7,590 
Amount 
Expensed 
FirsB 
Year , 
($) 
5,000 
Eligible 
For Invest, 
Tax Credit 
($) 
60 
83 
259 
Source: The expected expenditures and size specifica~ions are from Oklahoma Crop snd Livestock Enterprise Budgets, 
Southwest Oklahoma. 
AAssumiog no inflation, the expected expenditure in each year is equal to the purchase price of a like piece of 
Machinery in the beginning year. 
8 The Economic Recovery Act of 1981 allows a maximum of $5000 of asset purchases to be expensed, in addition to regular 
depreciation, in any particular year. 
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Table 20. Summary of Expected Capital Replacement Expenditures for ~Tackson 
County Farm Scenario - Farm 2 
Item Size 
Tractor 125.0 HP. 
Spring tooth 24. 0 ft. 
Electric Fence 2. 0 Mi. 
Water Tank 250. 0 Ga 1. 
Tractor 150.0 HP. 
6 Row Cultivator 20.0 ft. 
6 Row Planter 20. 0 ft. 
Rotary Mower 14. 0 ft. 
Pickup O. 5 TN. 
Offset Disk 18. 0 ft. 
Drill 26.6 ft. 
Sprayer 20.0 ft. 
Year of 
Purchase 
1985 
1986 
1986 
1986 
1986 
1987 
1987 
1987 
1987 
1988 
1988 
1988 
Dep. 
Life 
(Yrs. ) 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Loan 
Life 
(Yrs.) 
8 
3 
8 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
4 
Int. 
Rate 
m 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
Expected A 
Expenditure 
($) 
31,625 
2,300 
400 
275 
38,640 
4,543 
5,980 
4,590 
9,200 
7,130 
7,878 
5,290 
Amount 
Expensed 
Firsfi 
Year --~~--'~---';..;;..;;..;:;."--"'~-
Eligible 
For Invest, 
Tax Credit 
($) ($) 
5,000 2,663 
230 
40 
28 
5,000 3,364 
454 
5,000 98 
459 
552 
5,000 213 
788 
529 
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Table 20. (Continued) 
Amount 
Expensed Eligible 
Year of Dep. Loan Int. Expected A FirsB For Invest. Item Size Purchase Life Life Rate Expenditure Year Tax Credit 
(Yrs,) (Yrs.) (%) ($) ($) ($) 
Electric Fence 3. 0 Mi. 1988 5 1 6 600 60 
3 Water Tanks 250. 0 Ga 1. 1988 5 1 6 825 83 
Chisel 23. 0 ft. 1990 5 5 6 7,590 5,000 259 
Source: The expected expenditures and size specifications are from Oklahoma Crop and Livestock Enterprise Budgets, 
Southwest Oklahoma. 
AAssuming no inflation, the expected expenditure in each year is equal to the purchase price of a like piece of 
Machinery in the beginning year. 
8 The Economic Recovery Act of 1981 allows a maximum of $5000 of asset purchases to be expensed, in addition to regular 
depreciation, in any particular year. 
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Table 21~ Summary of Expected Capital Replacement Expenditures for Wagoner 
County Farm Scenario - Farm 3 
·- ... -------
Amount 
Expensed Eligible 
Year of Dep. Loan Int. Expected A Fires For Invest. 
Item Size Purchase Life Life Rate Expenditure Year Tax Creidt 
(Yrs.) (Yrs.) (%) ($) ($) ($) 
Tractor 80.0 HP 1985 5 8 6 18,008 5,000 1,301 
Tractor 100.0 HP. 1986 5 8 6 24,323 5,000 1,932 
Springtooth 20.0 ft. 1986 5 3 6 1,260 126 
Spike Harrow 18. 0 ft. 1986 5 2 6 504 50 
Electric Fence 2. 5 Mi. 1986 5 1 6 315 32 
Water Tank 250. 0 Ga 1. 1986 5 1 6 173 17 
6 Row Cultivator 16.0 ft. 1987 5 3 6 2,586 259 
6 Row Planter 18. 0 ft. 1987 5 4 6 5,309 5,000 31 
Pickup O. 75 TN. 1987 5 4 6 8,518 511 
Tandem Disk 16.0 ft. 1988 5 5 6 4,410 4,410 0 
H.B. Plow (5-16) 6. 6 ft. 1990 5 5 6 4,973 4,973 0 
Rotary Mower 7. 0 ft. 1990 5 3 6 2, 143 27 212 
Source: 1'he expected ex1>enditures and size specifications are from Oklahoma Crop and Livestock Enterprise Budgets, 
Northeas't Oklahoma. 
AAssuming no inflation, the expected expenditure in each year is equal to the purchase price of a like piece of 
machinery in the beginning year. 
8 The Economic Recovery Act of 1981 allows maximum of $5000 of asset purchases to be expensed, in addition to regular 
depreciation, in sny particular year. 
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Table 22. Summary of Expected Capital Replacement Expeditures for Texas 
County Farm Scenario - Farm 4 
Amount 
Expensed Eligible 
Year of Dep. Loan Int. Expected Firefi For Invest. 
Item Size Purchase Life Life Rate ExpenditureA Year Tax Credit 
(Yrs.) (Yrs.) (%) ($) ($) ($) 
Sprayer 36. 0 ft. 1985 5 4 6 4,200 4,200 0 
Sweep 24. 0 ft. 1986 5 6 6 9,000 5,000 400 
Rod Weeder 20. 0 ft. 1986 5 4 6 4,900 490 
Electric Fence 3. 5 Mi. 1986 5 l 6 700 70 
2 Water TankB 250.0 Gal. 1986 5 l 6 550 55 
Row Cultivator 20. 0 ft. 1986 5 4 6 5, 135 514 
Horse 1986 5 l 6 800 80 
Tractor 100. 0 HP. 1986 5 8 6 30,640 3,064 
Tractor 125.0 HP. 1987 5 8 6 38,300 5,000 3,330 
Land Plane 12. 0 ft. 1987 5 5 6 7,000 700 
Offset Disk 16.0 ft. 1987 5 5 6 7,200 720 
Pickup 0. 5 TN. 1987 5 4 6 8,500 510 
Planter 20.0 ft. 1988 5 5 6 7,800 5,000 280 
Lister 20. 0 ft. 1988 5 4 6 4,300 430 
Stalk Shredder 13. 3 ft. 1988 5 4 6 5,500 550 
Drill w/o Fert. 13.0 ft. 1989 5 4 6 4,000 4,000 0 
Spike Harrow 20.0 ft. 1989 5 2 6 l,225 l,000 23 
"-.I 
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Table 22. (Con tinuecl) 
Amount 
Expensed Eligible 
Year of Dep. Loan Int. Expected A Firs Ji For Invest. Size Purchase Life Life Rate Expenditure Year Tax Credit 
(Yrs.) (Yrs.) (%) ($) ($) ($) 
Spring tooth 30.0 ft. 1989 5 3 6 3,000 JOO 
Chisel 20. 0 ft. 1990 5 5 6 8,'.;QO 5,000 350 
Electric Fence 4. 0 Hi. 1990 5 l 6 8,000 80 
2 Water Tanks 250.0 Gal 1990 5 1 6 825 83 
Field Cultivator 20.0 ft. 1991 5 4 6 4,600 4,600 0 
Source: The expected expenditures and size specifications are from Oklahoma Crop and Livestock Enterprise Budgets, 
Panhandle Oklahoma. 
AAssuming no inflation, the expected· expenditure in each year is equal to the purchase price of a like piece of 
machinery in the beginning year. 
BThe Economic Recovery Act of 1981 allows a maximum of $5000 of asset purchases to be expensed, in addition to regular 
depreciaiton, in any particular year. 
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acre production costs for the enterprises are based on Oklahoma Crop 
and Livestock Enterprise Budgets and include operating inputs, and 
taxes and insurance for machinery items. Expenses for operating 
inputs for the crop enterprises include charges for seed, fertilizer, 
chemicals, interest on operating capital, labor, fuel, lubricants, 
repairs and custom harvesting. Fixed charges such as depreciation on 
machinery is excluded from the per acre costs of production and 
computed by the model. Stocker steers are grazed on winter wheat 
pasture at a rate of two acres per head from November 1 to March 15. 
When participation in either the Deficiency Payments Program or the 
Disaster Payments Program is elected, the producer is assumed to graze 
out the set-aside wheat acreage from November 1 to May 15. This 
practice is assumed for on all farm scenarios. Farm 1 and Farm 2 
produce 120 acres of dryland cotton and 240 acres of irrigated cotton 
at per acre cost of $160.16 and $298. 03, respectively. The producer 
is assumed to use canal irrigation from the Altus-Lugert Project to 
irrigate cotton. Forty acres of alfalfa hay are produced at a cost of 
$142. 31 per acre. These farm scenarios graze a total of 360 head of 
stocker steers on the wheat acreage. The production cost per head for 
the stocker steers (excluding the purchase cost of the steers which is 
computed by the mode 1) is $55. 93. The per head production cost for 
the stocker steer enterprises was de·termined in the same fashion as 
the per acre production costs for the crop enterprises. Operating 
inputs for the stocker steer enterprises include such items as starter 
feed, salt, mineral, trucking, sales commissions, medications and 
labor. 
The Wagoner County scenario, Farm 3, is assumed to produce 170 
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acres of dry land wheat at a cost of $88. 78 per acre and 45 acres of 
grain sorghum at $121.93 per acre. Other crops produced are soybeans 
(330 acres), alfalfa hay (40 acres) and native hay (135 acres) at per 
acre costs of $89.29, $197.06 and $51.07, respectively. Eighty-five 
stocker steers are grazed on wheat pasture each year at a cost of 
$67.30 per head. 
Fa rm 4, in Texas County, produces dryland wheat, irrigated wheat, 
dryland grain sorghum, irrigated grain sorghum, irrigated corn and 
stocker steers. Dryland wheat is produced on 640 acres and costs 
$57. 24 per acre to produce and harvest. Irrigated wheat is produced 
on 280 acres and costs $156.94 per acre to produce. The irrigation 
systems used to irrigate wheat, as well as grain sorghum and corn, are 
gated pipe flood irrigation systems. Per acre costs of production 
include variable irrigation costs. This farm scenario produces 
dryland grain sorghum (340 acres) and irrigated grain sorghum (200 
acres) at costs of $47. 71 and $180. 74 per acre, respectively. 
Irrigated corn is produced on 140 acres at a cost of $280.89 per acre. 
The 460 head of stocker steers cost $63. 20 per head to graze on winter 
wheat pasture. The units produced and per unit costs of production 
for each farm scenario are presented in Table 23. 
Table 24 contains a summary of information common to all four 
farm scena;rios. The inflation rate, as discussed earlier, is zero 
percent per year and sets the basis for the interest. rates. The 
after-tax discount rate of 4 percent represents the real rate of 
return based on a riskless investment and is used in calculating 
present values of cash inflows, cash outflows, etc. The 
intermediate-term interest rate is two percentage points above the 
Table 23. Enterprises, Units Produced and Production Costs 
for Each Farm Scenario 
Per Unit 
.A Enterprise Units Units Produced Production Cost 
($) 
Jackson Countz Farm Scenario - Farm 1 and Farm 2 
Dry land Wheat (Acres) 720 71.16 
Dry land Cotton (Acres) 120 160.16 
Irrigated Cotton (Acres) 240 298.03 
Alfalfa Hay (Acres) 40 142.31 
Stocker Steers (Head) 360 55.93 
Wagoner Countz Farm Scenario - Farm 3 
Dryland Wheat (Acres) 170 88. 78 
Dry land Grain Sorghum (Acres) 45 121. 93 
Dry land Soybeans (Acres) 330 89.29 
Alfalfa Hay (Acres) 40 197.06 
Native Hay (Acres) 135 51. 07 
Stocker Steers (Head) 85 67.30 
Texas Countz Farm Scenario - Farm 4 
Dryland Wheat (Ac res) 640 57.24 
Irrigated Wheat (Acres) 280 156.94 
Dryland Grain Sorghum (Acres) 340 47. 71 
Irrigated Grain Sorghum (Acres) 200 180. 74 
Irrigated Corn (Acres) 140 280.89 
Stocker Steers (Head) 460 63.20 
Source: The per unit costs of production are taken from Oklahoma Crop and 
Livestock Enterprise Budgets, Southwest, Northeast and Panhandle, 
Oklahoma. 
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Table 24. Additional Input Data Common to All Farm Scenarios 
Number of Replications 
Length of Planning Horizon 
After-tax discount rate 
Intermediate-term interest rate 
Long-term interest rate 
Minimum long-term equity to asset ratio 
Minimum intermediate-term equity to asset ratio 
Inflation rate, per year 
Beginning cash reserves 
Number of personal tax exemptions 
Annual family living expenses 
100 
10 yrs. 
4% 
6% 
5% 
30% 
30% 
0% 
$5,000 
4 
$16,000 
75 
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assumed discount rate and the long-term interest rate is one point 
above the discount rate. The mini.mum equity ratios of 30 percent are 
used to determine the firms solvency. When the firm's equity level 
falls be low 30 percent in a particular replication of the simulation, 
the firm is considered bankrupt. Each farm is assumed to have $5000 
in cash reserves at the onset of each replicati~n. The firms may 
retain and invest in a savings account additional cash reserves as 
economic conditions allow. Each family is assumed to have four 
members and require to $16,000 per year to purchase food, housing, 
clothing and other family necessities. 
Federal Crop Insurance Rates and Coverages 
In establishing premium rates the Actuarial Division of the FCIC 
determines the average premium rate for the county. Two kinds of 
yield data are used in establishing the county average premium rates: 
( 1) yield records for individua 1 farms, which are seldom avail ab le or 
usually cover only a few years; (2) Department of Agriculture 
estimates, which reflect losses per acre due to all causes. From the 
county average crop loss the Actuarial Division can establish premium 
rates covering all risks. The field underwriting offices adjust the 
rate to the classified risk areas in the county. The underwriting 
office may establish more than one premium rate for a particular crop 
in a county depending on the number and type of risk areas. Final 
approved coverages and premium rates for areas are listed in the 
county actuarial table which, together with the official maps and 
lists of the area, becomes an official record of insurance terms for 
land in the county. These documents are kept on file in the FCIC 
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office of the county and are available for inspection by the insured 
producers. The premium rates and yield coverages for the insurable 
crop enterprises produced on each farm analyzed are presented in 
Tables 25 through 34. 
Tables 25, 26, and 27 present the per acre premium rates and 
coverages for the Jackson County farm scenarios. Wheat, dryland 
cotton and irrigated cotton are produced on these farms and these 
crops are all insurable in Jackson County. Under the heading 
"classification", levels 1, 2 and 3 refer to the 50, 65 and 75 percent 
of average yield guarantee levels, respectively. The producer chooses 
the guarantee level and the price election, and the premium rate is 
selected from the corresponding row and column within the table. The 
first set of premiums presented in each table are applicable when both 
the FCI Program and the Disaster Payments Program are analyzed 
together. Premium rates in the second section are applicable under 
all other government farm program alternatives and are reduced for the 
government subsidy. 
Crop damage may occur during one of three growth and production 
stages under the cotton and irrigated cotton programs. The production 
guarantee and hence, the amount of the indemnity depends on the growth 
stage in which the damage occurred. The first stage begins after it 
is too late to plant cotton and lasts until the first blooms are shed. 
Stage two occurs from the time the first blooms are shed until the 
acreage qualifies for the third stage. The third stage begins after 
harvest of at least 20 percent of the pound guarantee per acre for 
this stage has taken place and lasts to the end of the insurance 
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period. It is assumed, in this study, that no specific crop damage 
occurs 1n the first two growth stages. 
Tables 28, 29 and 30 present the per acre actuarial rates and 
coverages for the FCIC insurable crops produced by the Wagoner County 
farm scenarios, wheat, grain sorghum and soybeans. Dryland grain 
s or gh um is produced in Texas County, however, the FCIC Crop Insurance 
Program will not provide coverage for dryland grain sorghum in Texas 
County. Irrigated grain sorghum as well as dryland wheat, irrigated 
wheat and irrigated corn are insurable crops in Texas County under the 
FCIC program and are produced on the farm scenario for this area. Per 
acre actuarial rates and coverages for these crops are presented in 
Tables 31, 32, 33 and 34. 
Each county selected as part of the study area contains several 
risk areas for each insured crop. The tables presented provide only 
rates and coverages for the specific risk area in which the farm 
situations are assumed to be located. 
Stochastically Generated Prices and Yields 
A major share of the income variability associated with 
agricultural production is due to the high level of variability in 
agricultural prices and yields. Not all price and yield variations 
produce adverse effects on firm growth and net farm income. Positive 
variations in prices or yields will produce favorable, above average 
net fa rm income and hence will allow above average firm growth. When 
prices or yields are low, net income received by the producer will be 
adversely affected. The government farm programs analyzed in this 
Table 25. Federal Crop Insurance Program Per Acre Actuarial Rates and Coverages for 
Jackson County Winter Wheat 
Production 
Guarantee Price Elections Per Bu. Price Elections Per Bu. 
Classification Per Acre $2.50 $3.50 $4.50 $2.50 $3.50 $4.50 
Base FCI Per Acre 
Per Acre Premium Premium Reduced for 30% Subsidy 
(Bu) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) 
Level 1 (50%) 9.6 2.70 3.80 4.90 1.90 2.65 3.45 
Level 2 (65%) 12.5 4.50 6.20 8.00 3.15 4.35 5.60 
Level 3 (75%) 14.5 6.20 8.70 11. 20 4.85 6.85 8.80 
Source: The rates and coverages are taken from County Actuarial Rates and Coverages, 
Jackson County, Oklahoma. United States Department of Agriculture, Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation. 
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Table 26. Federal Crop Insurance Program Per Acre Actuarial Rates and Coverages for Jackson County 
Dryland Cotton 
Production 
Guarantee Price Elections Per Lb. Price Elections Per Lb. 
Per Acre 
Classification STGl STG2 STG3 $0.35 $0.45 $0.50 $0.35 $0.45 $0.50 
(Lbs.) (Lbs.) (Lbs.) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) 
Base FCI Per Ac re 
Per Acre Premium Premium Reduced for 30% Subsidy 
Level 1 (50%) 68 101 135 3.70 4.80 5.30 2.60 3.35 3.70 
Level 2 (65%) 88 131 175 5.90 7. 60 8.40 4.15 5.30 5.90 
Level 3 (75%) 100 150 200 8.10 10.40 11. 60 6.35 8.10 9.10 
Source: The rates and coverages are taken from County Actuarial Rates and Coverages, Jackson County, 
Oklahoma. United States Department of Agriculture, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. 
00 
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Table 27. Federal Crop Insurance Program Per Acre Actuarial Rates and Coverages for Jackson County 
Irrigated Corn 
Production 
Guarantee Price Elections Per Lb. Price Elections Per Lb. 
Per Acre 
Classification STGl STG2 STG3 $0.3S $0.4S $0.SO $0.3S $0.4S $0.SO 
(Lbs.) (Lbs.) (Lbs.) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) 
Base FCI Per Acre 
Per Acre Premium Premium Reduced for 30% Subsidy 
Level 1 (SO%) 138 206 27S 6. so 8.40 9.30 4.SS S.90 6.SO 
Level 2 (6S%) 180 270 360 10.SO 13.SO lS.00 7. 3S 9.4S 10.SO 
Level 3 (7S%) 208 311 41S 14. so 18. 70 20.80 11. 3S 14.6S 16.30 
Source: The rates and Coverages are taken from County Actuarial Rates and Coverages, Jackson County, 
Oklahoma. United States Department of Agriculture, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. 
co 
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Table 28. Federal Crop Insurance Program Per Acre Actuarial Rates and Coverages for 
Wagoner County Winter Wheat 
Production 
Guarantee Price Elections Per Bu. Price Elections Per Bu. 
Classification Per Acre $2.50 $3.50 $4.50 $2.50 $3.50 $4.50 
Base FCI Per Acre 
Per Acre Premium Premium Reduced for 30% Subsidy 
(Bu) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) 
Level 1 (50%) 14.5 1.40 2.00 2.50 1.00 1.40 1.75 
Level 2 (65%) 19.0 2.30 3.20 4.20 1.60 2.25 2.85 
Level 3 (75%) 22.0 3.10 4.40 5.60 2.40 3.45 4.35· 
Source: The rates and coverages are taken from County Actuarial Rate and Coverages, 
Wagoner County, Oklahoma. United States Department of Agriculture, Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation. 
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Table 29. Federal Crop Insurance Program Per Acre· Actuarial Rates and Coverages for 
Wagoner County Grain Sorghum 
Production 
Guarantee Price Elections Per Bu. Price Elections Per Bu. 
Classification Per Acre $1. 70 $2.00 $2.40 $1. 70 $2.00 $2.40 
Base FCI Per Acre 
Per Acre Premium Premium Reduced for 30% Subsidy 
(Bu) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) 
Level 1 (50%) 21.0 2.10 2.40 2.90 1. 45 1. 70 2.05 
Level 2 (65%) 27.5 3.30 3.90 4.70 2.30 2.75 3.30 
Level 3 (75%) 32.0 4.60 5.40 6.50 3.60 4.25 5.10 
Source: The rates and coverages are taken from County Actuarial Rates and Coverages, 
Wagoner County, Oklahoma. United States Department of Agriculture, Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation. 
00 
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Table 30. Federal Crop Insurance Program Per Acre Actuarial Rates and Coverages for 
Wagoner County Soybeans 
Production 
Guarantee Price Elections Per Bu. Price Elections Per Bu. 
Classification Per Acre $4.50 $6.00 $7.00 $4.50 $6.00 $7.00 
Base FCI Per Acre 
Per Acre Premium Premium Reduced for 30% Subsidy 
(Bu) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) 
Level 1 (50%) 11. 0 3.90 5.10 6.00 2. 75 3.55 4.20 
Level 2 (65%) 14.0 6.00 8.10 9.40 4.20 5.65 6.00 
Level 3 (75%) 16.0 8.30 11. 00 12.90 6.50 8.55 10.10 
Source: The rates and coverages are taken from County Actuarial Rates and Coverages, 
Wagoner County, Oklahoma. United States Department of Agriculture, Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation. 
00 
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Table 31. Federal Crop Insurance Program Per Acre Actuarial Rates and Coverages for 
Texas County Dryland Winter Wheat 
Production 
Guarantee Price Elections Per Bu. Price Elections Per Bu. 
Classification Per Acre $2.50 $3.50 $4.50 $2.50 $3.50 $4.50 
Base FCI Per Acre 
Per Acre Premium Premium Reduced for 30% Subsidy 
(Bu) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) 
Level 1 (50%) 7. 7 3.30 4.60 5.90 2.30 3.20 4.15 
Level 2 (65%) 10.0 5.20 7.30 9.40 3.65 5.10 6.60 
Level 3 (75%) 11. 5 7.40 10.30 13.20 5.85 8.10 10. 40 
Source: The rates and coverages are taken from County Actuarial Rates and Coverages, 
Texas County, Oklahoma. United States Department of Agriculture, Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation. 
00 
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Table 32. Federal Crop Insurance Program Per Acre Actuarial Rates and Coverages for 
Texas County Irrigated Winter Wheat 
Production 
Guarantee Price Elections Per Bu. Price Elections Per Bu. 
Classification Per Acre $2.50 $3.50 $4.50 $2.50 $3.50 $4.50 
Base FCI Per Acre 
Per Acre Premium Premium Reduced for 30% Subsidy 
(Bu) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) 
Level 1 (50%) 17. 5 3.30 4. 70 6.00 2.30 3.30 4.20 
Level 2 (65%) 22.5 5.30 7.40 9.50 3.70 5.20 6.65 
Level 3 (75%) 26.0 7. 50 10.50 13. 50 5.90 8.30 10~65 
Source: The rates and coverages are taken from County Actuarial Rates and Coverages, 
Texas County, Oklahoma. United States Department of Agriculture, Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation. 
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Table 33. Federal Crop Insurance Program Per Acre Actuarial Rates and Coverages for 
Texas County Irrigated Grain Sorghum 
Production 
Guarantee Price Elections Per Bu. Price Elections Per Bu. 
Classification Per Acre $1. 70 $2.00 $2.40 $1.70 $2.00 $2.40 
Base FCI Per Acre 
Per Acre Premium Premium Reduced for 30% Subsidy 
(Bu) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) 
Level 1 (50%) 39.0 2.40 2.80 3.40 1.70 1.95 2.40 
Level 2 (65%) 51. 0 3.80 4.50 5.40 2. 65 3.15 3.80 
Level 3 (75%) 59.0 5.30 6.30 7.50 4.15 4.95 5.90 
Source: The rates and coverages are taken from County Actuarial Rate and Coverages, 
Texas County, Oklahoma. United States Department of Agriculture, Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation. 
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Table 34. Federal Crop Insurance Program Per Acre Actuarial Rates and Coverages for 
Texas County Irrigated Corn 
Production 
Guarantee Price Elections Per Bu. Price Elections Per Bu. 
Classification Per Acre $1. 70 $2.00 $2.70 $1. 70 $2. 00 $2.70 
Base FCI Per Acre 
Per Acre Premium Premium Reduced for 30% Subsidy 
(Bu) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) 
Level 1 (50%) 49.0 4.30 5.00 6.80 3.00 3.50 4. 75 
Level 2 (65%) 64.0 6.80 8.10 10.90 4.75 5.65 7.65 
Level 3 (75%) 74.0 9.50 11. 20 15.10 7.45 8. 75 11. 85 
Source: The rates and coverages are taken from County Actuarial Rates and Coverages, 
Texas County, Oklahoma. United States Department of Agriculture, Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation. 
00 
CIJ 
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study are designed to at least partially offset the unfavorable 
effects of low prices and yields. 
The stochastically generated prices and yields are based on a 
subjective interpretation of historical price and yield data in an 
attempt to reflect realistic variability within the distrib--.itions. 
The historical price series for each study area are seasonal average 
prices for Oklahoma from 1965 through 1980 and are presented in Table 
35. This table includes price series for enterprises produced by each 
of the four farms analyzed. The yield data collected are county 
average yields per harvested acre from 1975 through 1980 for each of 
the three counties. These data are presented in Tables 36, 37 and 38 
for Jackson, Wagoner and Texas Counties, respectively. The forage 
yields presented are derived from clipping samples of wheat test plots 
from Oklahoma State University experiment station locations near each 
study area. These yields are used to correlate stocker steer rates of 
gain with the yields of the other crops. A study by Walker and 
Plaxico showed that stocker steer rates of gain and wheat pasture 
production were positively correlated and that this relationship 
provided evidence of an imperfect stocking rate adjustment to grazing 
availability. This study assumes that stocker steer rates of gain and 
forage production are nearly perfectly correlated (positively) when 
assuming a constant stocking rate. The stocking rate assumed in this 
study is two acres per head and applies in each study area. 
Correlation Matrices 
The yields of the farm commodities produced are not independent 
at the farm level. Low levels of summer rain will cause low yields of 
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grain sorghum, soybeans, alfalfa hay and other summer crops. Wheat 
yields and wheat pasture yields are related with summer crop yields 
since lack of summer rains may mean too little soil moisture to 
produce an adequate stand of wheat at planting time. Prices are also 
assumed to be correlated in some manner however, the logic of this 
relationship may not be as clear as the yield relationships. Prices 
and yields are assumed to be independent at the farm level. The 
stochastically generated prices and yields should possess the 
appropriate correlation relationships so that they will more nearly 
reflect realistic income variations. Separate correlation coefficient 
matrices were constructed for the price and yield series to portray an 
independent relationship between prices and yields. Before the 
correlation coefficient matrices were constructed the price series 
were deflated using the GNP Implicit Price Deflator. The matrices of 
correlation coefficients for Oklahoma deflated prices and county 
yields were derived using the Statistical Analysis System (SAS) and 
are presented in Tables 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44. These correlation 
coefficient matrices must be factored into unique upper and lower 
triangular matrices to generate the triangularly distributed and 
appropriately correlated prices and yields (Clements, et al.). Only 
the upper right triangular correlation matrices are needed and these 
are presented in Tables 45, 46, 47, 48, 49 and 50 for Jackson, Wagoner 
and Texas counties, respectively. Assuming the trend values for both 
prices and yields are zero, only the distribution parameters remain to 
be developed. 
Table 35. Historical Oklahoma Price Series Used in Developing Stochastic 
Price Distributions 
Grain Alfalfa Native November March 
Year Wheat Cotton Sorghum Soxbeans Corn Hax Hax Steers Steers 
($/Bu) (c/Lb) ($/Bu) ($/Bu) ($/Bu) ($/TN) ($/TN) ($/CWT) ($/CWT) 
1965 l. 36 27. 07 l. 02 2. 32 l. 29 23.86 17.02 27. 12 21. 41 
1966 l. 66 17.96 l.08 2.68 1. 40 26.31 18.47 27. 81 28.56 
1967 l. 4 7 21. l 7 l. 00 2. 37 l.27 26.44 18.41 28.50 24.98 
1968 1. 25 19.67 0.95 2. 29 l. 15 26.36 17. 71 30. ll 26.52 
1969 I. 23 19. 73 l. 09 2.17 l. 21 27.03 19. 19 33.78 29.95 
1970 l. 33 20.00 l. 15 2. 6 7 1. 32 31.31 21. 09 35.81 35.08 
19 71 l. 42 28.40 l. 06 2.83 l. 21 34.49 23.13 42.80 33. 32 
1972 I. 70 25.90 l. 41 4.23 l. 47 33.24 23.38 49. 74 38.33 
1973 3. 56 49.50 2. 29 5.31 2. 59 44.08 31.62 59.30 53.15 
1974 3. 95 29.90 2.86 6.48 3. 22 54.96 38. 71 29.06 42.26 
1975 3.43 47. 20 2. 36 4.44 2. 63 54.98 39.66 38.10 27.16 
1976 2. 78 61.10 2.00 6.45 2.29 62.60 44.05 38.40 39. 5 7 
1977 2. 32 46.60 1. 86 5.35 2. 15 63.41 45. 73 26.04 39.68 
1978 3.03 53. 90 2.06 6.35 2.48 56. 55 48. 75 75.68 53.35 
19 79 :J. 95 59.50 2.32 5.56 2. 70 58.94 49.19 92. 14 89.73 
1980 3. 85 77. 40 :J. 16 7. 75 3. 55 72. 28 51. 53 79.38 77. 96 
Source: The price serie a are seasonal average prices received by Oklahoma producers. Oklahoma 
A11:ricultural Statistics, Oklahoma Crop and Livestock Reporting Service, Oklahoma Department \D 
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Table 36. Historical Yield for Jackson County Oklahoma Used in 
Developing Stochastic Yield Distributions 
Irrigation Alfalfa A Year Wheat Cotton Cotton Ha I Forage 
(Bu/Acre) (Lbs/ Acre) (Lbs/Acre) (Tns./Acre) (Lbs/Acre) 
1975 23.1 257. 1 412.0 2.94 2434.0 
1976 20.0 196.6 461.0 2. 12 2011. 0 
1977 22.0 334.1 627. 0 3.30 1547.0 
1978 21. 6 247. 7 544.0 2.33 1953.0 
1979 32.0 401.1 795.0 2.37 2279.0 
1980 25.8 123.1 607.0 2.22 1870.0 
Source: County average yields for wheat, cotton, irrigated cotton and 
alfalfa hay are from Oklahoma Agricultural Statistics. 
Oklahoma Crop and Livestock Reporting Service, Oklahoma 
Pepartment of Agriculture. Various Issues. 
AForage yield series was derived from Oklahoma State Experiment 
Station. Results from the Mangum, Oklahoma Test Station. 
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Table 37. Historical Yield Series for Wagoner County Oklahoma Used in Developing 
Stochastic Yield Distributions 
Grain Alfalfa Native A Year Wheat Sorghum So~beans Ha~ Ha~ Forage 
(Bu/ Acre) (Bu/Acre) (Bu/Acre) (Tns/Acre) (Tns/Acre) (Lbs/Acre) 
1975 17. 7 48.5 26.5 3.33 1.64 1436 
1976 35.0 54.0 24.3 4.29 1.34 3467 
1977 37.1 38.9 24.6 3.25 1.33 4053 
1978 28.9 31. 3 22.1 2. 71 1. 79 2439 
1979 35.7 51.5 22.2 3.29 1.78 4907 
1980 34.2 24.4 10.0 2. 68 1.13 5200 
Source: County Average yields for wheat, grain sorghum, soybeans alfalfa hay, and 
native hay are from Oklahoma Agricultural Statistics, Oklahoma Crop and 
Livestock Rreporting Service, Oklahoma Department of Agriculture. 
Various Issues. 
~orage Yield series was derived from Oklahoma State Experiment Station. 
Results from the Haskell, Oklahoma Test Station. 
l.D 
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Table 38. Historical ~ield Series for Texas County Oklahoma Used in Developing 
Stochastic Yield Distributions 
Dry land Irrigated 
Dry land Irrigated Grain Grain Irrigated A Year Wheat Wheat Sorghum Sorghum Corn Forage 
(Bu/Acre) (Bu/Acre) (Bu/Acre) (Bu/Acre) (Bu/Acre) (Lbs/ Acre) 
1975 13. 6 33.1 23.0 65.9 88.6 7336 
1976 13. 9 37.5 18.3 67. 0 110. 6 7595 
1977 19.6 41. 7 29.3 6 7. 7 103.3 7846 
1978 15.3 33.3 23.6 64.0 76.4 6003 
1979 31. l 49.4 28.7 79.7 123.0 8527 
1980 29.5 40.8 23.8 64.6 88.1 8817 
Source: County average yields for dryland wheat, irrigated wheat, dryland grain 
sorghum, irrigated grain sorghum and irrigated corn are from Oklahoma 
Agricultural Statistics, Oklahoma Crop and Livestock Reporting Service, 
Oklahoma Department of Agriculture. Various Issues. 
~orage yield series was derived from Oklahoma State Experiment Station. 
Results from the Goodwell, Oklahoma Test Station. 
\.0 
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Table 39. The Correlation Coefficient Matrix Used in Developing the Triangularly 
Distributed Prices for Jackson County Farm Scenarios - Farm 1 and Farm 2 
Alfalfa November March 
Wheat Cotton Hay Steer Steer 
Price Price Price Price Price 
Wheat Price 1. 0000. o. 4792 0.6213 0.0234 0.3187 
Cotton Price 0.4792 1.0000 0.5524 0.2414 0.1837 
Alfalfa Hay Price 0.6213 0.5524 1.0000 -0.3728 -0.1144 
November Steer Price 0.0234 0.2414 -0.3728 1.0000 0.7671 
March Steer Price 0.3187 0.1837 -0.1144 o. 7671 1. 0000 
l.O 
LJ1 
Table 40. The Correlation Coefficient Matrix Used in Developing the Triangularly 
Distributed Yields for Jackson County Farm Scenarios - Farm 1 and Farm 2 
Dry land Irrigated Alfalfa 
Wheat Cotton Cotton Hay Forage 
Yield Yield Yield Yield Yield 
Wheat Yield 1.0000 o. 4792 0.8112 -0.1618 0.3801 
Dryland Cotton Yield 0.4792 1.0000 0.5768 0.4542 0.1446 
Irrigated Cotton Yield 0.8112 0.5768 1.0000 -0.0595 -0.1729 
Alfalfa Hay Yield -0.1618 0.4542 -0.0595 1.0000 -0.2355 
Forage Yield 0.3801 0.1446 -0.1729 -0.2355 1. 0000 
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Table 41. The Correlation Coefficient Matrix Used in Developing the Triangularly 
Distributed Prices for Wagoner County Farm Scenario - Farm 3 
Grain Alfalfa Native 
Wheat Sorghum Soybean Hay Hay 
Price Price Price Price Price 
Wheat Price 1.0000 0.9269 o. 7455 0.6213 0.6361 
Grain Sorghum Price 0.9269 1. 0000 0.8029 0.6812 0.6079 
Soybean Price o. 7455 0.8029 1.0000 o. 7726 o. 7523 
Alfalfa Hay Price 0.6123 0.6812 o. 7726 1. 0000 0.9020 
Native Hay Price 0.6361 0.6079 o. 7523 0.9020 1.0000 
November Steer Price 0.0234 -0.1351 -0.0191 -0.3728 -0.1226 
March Steer Price 0.3187 o. 2116 0.2456 -0. 1144 0.0376 
November 
Steer 
Price 
0.0234 
-0. 1351 
-0.0191 
-0.3728 
-0.1226 
1.0000 
o. 7672 
March 
Steer 
Price 
0.3187 
0.2116 
0.2456 
-0. 1144 
0.0376 
o. 7672 
1.0000 
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Table 42. The Correlation Coefficient Matrix Used in Devloping the Triangularly 
Distributed Yields for Wagoner County Farm Scenario - Farm 3 
Grain Alfalfa Native 
Wheat Sorghum Soybean Hay Hay 
Yield Yield Yield Yield Yield 
Wheat Yield 1. 0000 -0.1039 -0. 3310 0.1208 -0.4036 
Grain Sorghum Yield -0. 1039 1.0000 0.7361 0.8405 0.3438 
Soybean Yield -0.3310 0.7361 1.0000 0.5529 0.5372 
Alfalfa Hay Yield 0.1208 0.8405 0.5529 1.0000 -o. 1125 
Native Hay Yield -0.4036 0.3438 o. 5372 -0. 1125 1.0000 
Forage Yield o. 8465 -0.2368 -0.6507 -0.1283 -0.4648 
Forage 
Yield 
0.8465 
-0.2368 
-0.6507 
-0.1283 
-0.4648 
1.0000 
'° (X) 
Table 43. The Correlation Coefficient Matrix Used in Developing the 
Triangularly Distributed Prices for Texas Canty Farm Scenario - Farm 4 
-·-----· Grain November 
·.~heat Sorghum Corn Steer 
Price Price Price Price 
------------· 
Wheat Price l.OOUO 0.9269 0.9429 0.0234 
Grain Sorghum Price 0.9269 1.0000 0.9768 -0. L351 
Corn Price 0.9429 0.9768 1.0000 -0. 1725 
November Steer Price 0.0234 -0. 1351 -0. 1 725 1.0000 
March Steer Price 0.3187 0.2116 0.1912 0. 76 72 
March 
Steer 
Price 
0.3167 
o. 2116 
0.1912 
o. 76 72 
1. 0000 
ID 
ID 
Table 44. The Correlation Coefficient Matrix Used in Developing the Triangularly 
Distributed Yields for Texas County Farm Scenario - Farm 4 
Dry land Irrigated 
Dry land Irrigated Grain Grain 
Wheat Wheat Sorghum Sorghum Corn 
Yield Yield Yield Yield Yield 
Drylarid Wheat Yield 1. 0000 0.8436 0.5592 0.5887 0.3921 
Irrigated Wheat Yield 0.8436 1.0000 0.6322 0.8467 0.7927 
Dryland Grain Sorghum Yield 0.5592 0.6322 1.0000 0.5324 0.2670 
Irrigated Grain Sorghum Yield 0.5887 0.8467 0.5324 1.0000 0.8379 
Corn Yield 0. 3921 0.7927 0.2670 0.8379 1.0000 
Forage Yield 0.7792 0.7529 0.3014 0.4646 0.5761 
..... 4' 
Forage 
Yield 
o. 7792 
o. 7529 
0.3014 
0.4646 
0.5761 
1.0000 
t-' 
0 
0 
Table 45. The Upper Right Triangular Correlation Matrix Usesd in Developing 
the Triangularly Distributed Prices for Jackson County Farm Scenarios - Farm 1 
and Farm 2 
Alfalfa November March 
Wheat Cotton Hay Steer Steer 
Price Price Price Price Price 
Wheat Price 0.6703 0.0887 0.5680 -0.3446 0.3187 
Cotton Price o.o 0.6465 0.7237 0.1566 0.1837 
Alfalfa Hay Price 0.0 o.o 0.8885 -0.4443 -0.1144 
November Steer Price 0.0 o.o o.o 0.6415 o. 76 71 
March Steer Price o.o o.o o.o o.o 1.0000 
,_. 
0 ,_. 
Table 46. The Upper Right Triangular Matrix Used in Developing the Triangularly 
Distributed Yields for Jackson County Farm Scenarios - Farm 1 and Farm 2 
Dry land Irrigated Alfalfa 
Wheat Cotton Cotton Hay Forage 
Yield Yield Yield Yield Yield 
Wheat Yield 0.0440 -0.2461 0.8874 -0.0744 0.3801 
Dryland Cotton Yield o.o 0.5305 0.6673 0.5024 0.1446 
Irrigated Cotton Yield 0.0 o.o 0.9795 -0.1031 -0.1729 
Alfalfa Hay Yield o.o o.o o.o 0.9719 -0.2355 
Forage Yield 0.0 0.0 o.o o.o 1. 0000 
I-' 
0 
N 
Table 47. The Upper Right Triangular Correlation Matrix Used in Developing the Triangularly 
Distributed Prices for Wagoner County Farm Scenario - Farm 3 
Grain Alfalfa Native November 
Wheat Sorghum Soybean Hay Hay Steer 
Price Price Price Price Price Price 
Wheat Price 0.3080 0.5395 0.2530 0.1315 0.5589 -0.3447 
Grain Sorghum Price o.o 0.5506 0.3452 0.2506 0.5051 -0.4637 
Soybean Price 0.0 o.o 0.5370 0.2743 0.6866 -0.3235 
Alfalfa Hay Price 0.0 o.o o.o 0.3291 0.8235 -0.4444 
Native Price o.o o.o o.o 0.0 o. 9710 -0.2361 
November Steer Price o.o o.o o.o o.o o.o 0.6414 
March Steer Price o.o o.o o.o o.o o.o o.o 
March 
Steer 
Price 
0.3187 
0.2116 
0.2456 
-0.1144 
0.0376 
o. 7672 
1.0000 
>-' 
0 
LU 
Table 48. The Upper Right Triangular Correlation Matrix Used in Developing the Triangualrly 
Distributed Yields for Wagoner County Farm Scenario - Farm 3 
Grain Alfalfa Native 
Wheat Sorghum Soybean Hay Hay Forage 
Yield Yield Yield Yield Yield Yield 
Wheat Yield o. 0128. -0.4302 o. 2087. 0.2336 -0. Ol15 0.8465 
Grain Sorghum Yield o.o 0.2884 0.0801 0.8858 0.2640 -0.2368 
Soybean Yield o.o o. 0 0.4683 0.5357 0.2651 """.0.6507 
Alfalfa Hay Yield o.o o.o o.o o. 9725 -0.1944 -0.1283 
Native Hay Yield o.o o.o o. 0 o.o 0.8854 -0.4648 
Forage Yield o.o o.o 0.0 o.o o.o 1.0000 
...... 
0 
+:'-
Table 49. The Upper Right Triangular Correlation Matrix Used in Developing the 
Triangularly Distributed Prices for Texas County Farm Scenario - Farm 4 
Grain November March 
Wheat Sorghum Corn Steer Steer 
Price Price Price Price Price 
Wheat Price 0.2730 -0.0031 0.8397 -0.3447 0.3187 
Grain Sorghum Price o.o 0. 2114 0.8340 -0.4637 0.2116 
Corn Price o.o o.o 0.8461 -0.4976 0.1912 
November Steer Price 0.0 o.o o.o 0.6414 o. 7672 
March Steer Price 0.0 o.o o.o o.o 1.0000 
...... 
0 
V1 
Table 50. The Upper Right Triangular Correlation Matrix Used in Developing the 
Triangularly Distributed Yields for Texas County Farm Scenario - Farm 4 
Dry land Irrigated 
Dry land Irrigated Grain Grain 
Wheat Wheat Sorghum Sorghum Corn 
Yield Yield Yield Yield Yield 
Dryland Wheat Yield 0.0063 0.3608 0.0571 0.5045 -0.0695 
Irrigated Wheat Yield 0.0 0.2757 0.2055 0.3494 0.4392 
Dryland Grain Sorghum Yield o.o o.o o. 7533 0.5733 0.1142 
Irrigated Grain Sorghum Yield o.o 0.0 o.o 0.5454 o. 6977 
Corn Yield 0.0 o.o o.o 0.0 0.8174 
Forage Yield 0.0 0.0 o.o 0.0 o.o 
Forage 
Yield 
0. 7792 
o. 7529 
0.3014 
0.4646 
0.5761 
1.0000 
...... 
0 
°' 
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Price and Yield Distribution Parameters 
When triangular probability distributions are used for the prices 
and yields of each commodity, they can be completely specified by the 
minimum, maximum and modal values. The price distributions 
constructed for this study are based on the deflated historical data 
series and converted to current dollars. The mode or most likely 
values are the historical averages of the current dollar series. The 
maximums and minimums are based on the variance of the deflated 
historical series. The crops eligible for deficiency payment coverage 
are assumed to have less price variation below the modal value than 
other crops as the loan rate and set-aside has historically provided 
some support to program crop prices. The maximum value for each 
commodity price is set at two standard deviations above the modal 
value and the minimum value is set at two standard deviations below 
the mode except for those crops which are eligible for deficiency 
payments. The minimum values for Deficiency Payments Program crops 
are set at one standard deviation of each crops respective historical 
price series below their respective modal value. 
The yield parameters are based on the historical series and 
knowledge of on farm yield variation in each area. The modal values 
are the historical county average yields for each crop. Actual farm 
level yields are expected to reflect more variability than do the 
county yields. For example, the county yield for a particular 
commodity would never be zero. Howe v e r , a t the f a rm 1eve1 , a 
commodity yield would have a reasonable possibility of being zero, 
particularly on dryland crops. The entire farm acreage of a crop 
planted would rarely have a zero yield but, in certain instances, the 
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yield could be substantially below the county average. The maximum 
farm yields are likely to be considerably above the county average. 
The maximum value for each commodity yield distribution is set at 
approximately 2. 5 standard deviations above the modal value. The 
minimum values are placed at least 2.5 standard deviations below the 
mode. For some crops, such as wheat, the minimum possible yield was 
placed lower to reflect the possibility of crop damage due to 
phenomena such as hail, fire or flood. The price and yield parameters 
for each study area are presented in Tables 51, 52 and 53. This price 
and yield data and all the other data presented in this chapter are 
combined in a comprehensive format to complete the specific 
experiments of this analysis. These experiments are described in 
detail in the next chapter. 
Table Sl. Triangular Distributions Used in Developing Stochastic Yield 
and Price Distributions for Jackson County Farm Scenarios- Farm 1 and 
Farm 2 
Yields Units Minimum Mode Maximum 
Wheat (Bu./ Acre) 4.00 25.00 36.00 
Cotton (Lbs. /Acre) 63.00 260.00 4Sl. 00 
Irrigated Cotton (Lbs. I Ac re) 211. 00 575.00 894.00 
Alfalfa Hay (Tns. I Acre) 1. 09 2.SO 3. 70 
Stocker Gain (Lbs./Day) o. so 1.SO 3.00 
Prices 
Wheat ($/Bu.) 2.80 4.00 6.3S 
Cotton ($/Lb.) 0.46 0.62 0.94 
Alfalfa Hay ($/Tn.) 52.10 73.10 94.10 
Nov. 4-S CWT. Cho. Strs. ($/CWT.) 42. IS 77. so 112. 8S 
Mar. 6-7 CWT. Cho. Strs. ($/CWT.) 38.SO 69.85 101.20 
I-' 
0 
\.() 
Table 52. Triangular Distributions Used in Developing Stochastic 
Yield and Price Distributions for Wagoner County Farm Scenario -
Farm 3 
Yields Units Minimum Mode Maximum 
Wheat (Bu./Acre) 4.00 32.00 so.so 
Grain Sorghum (Bu./Acre) 11.00 41. so 72. 00 
Soybeans (Bu. /Acre) 7.00 22.00 37.00 
Alfalfa Hay (Tns./Acre) 1. 80 3.30 4.80 
Native Hay (Tns./Acre) 0.80 1.50 2. 20 
Stocker Gain (Lbs./Day) 0.50 1. so 3.00 
Prices 
Wheat ($/Bu.) 2.80 4.00 6.35 
Grain Sorghum ($/Bu.) 2. 15 2.90 4.30 
Soybeans ($/Bu.) 3.80 7.20 10.60 
Alfalfa Hay ($/Tns.) 52.10 73.10 94.10 
Native Hay ($/Tns.) 35.70 52. 60 69.SO 
Nov. 4-5 CWT. Cho. St rs. ($/CWT.) 42.15 77. 50 112. 85 
Mar. 6-7 CWT. Cho. Strs. ($/CWT.) 38.50 69.85 101.20 
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Table 53. Triangular Distributions Used in Developing Stochastic 
Yield and Price Distributions for Texas County Farm Scenario -
Farm 4 
Yields Units Minimum Mode Maximum 
Dryland Wheat (Bu. I Acre) 4.00 21.00 41.00 
Irrigated Wheat (Bu./Acre) 16.00 39.50 55.00 
Dryland Grain Sorghum (Bu./Acre) 5.00 25.00 36.00 
Irrigated Grain Sorghum (Bu. I Acre) 33.00 69.00 84.00 
Irrigated Corn (Bu./Acre) 37.00 98.50 142.00 
Stocker Gain (Lbs./Day) 0.50 1. 50 3.00 
Prices 
Wheat ($/Bu. ) 2.80 4.00 6.35 
Grain Sorghum ($/Bu.) 2. 15 2.90 4.30 
Corn ($/Bu.) 2. 60 3.40 4.95 
Nov. 4-5 CWT. Cho. Strs. ($/CWT.) 42. 15 77. 50 112. 85 
Mar. 6-7 CWT. Cho. St rs. ($/CWT.) 38.50 69.85 101. 20 
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CHAPTER IV 
GOVERNMENT FARM PROGRAM EVALUATION RESULTS 
When each option of the three government farm programs analyzed 
in this study and the no government farm program alternative are 
considered the farm producer has a total of forty program alternatives 
from which to choose. It is assumed that the producer may participate 
in each of the programs (the Deficiency Payments Program, Disaster 
Payments Program and the Federal Crop Insurance Program) independently 
or in any combination or the producer may choose not to participate in 
any of the programs. In analyzing participation in the Federal crop 
Insurance Program, three yield guarantee levels and three price 
elective options are included for a total of nine options to be 
considered. In this study all insurable crops are assumed to be 
insured at the same level under each option of the Federal Crop 
Insurance Program. Results from the various evaluation experiments 
conducted on the government farm programs are presented in this 
chapter. All results presented are in 1982 dollars. 
Farm Situation Results 
The r·esults of simulations of each farm scenario assuming 
participation in each of the government farm program alternatives and 
their combinations are reported in this section. The two Jackson 
County farm scenarios are studied to determine the impact of 
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government risk management programs on high and low equity farms in 
the same geographic area. Low equity farms in Jackson County (Farm 
2), Wagoner County (Farm 3) and Texas County (Farm 4) are evaluated to 
test the hypothesis that differing production organizations in 
different geographic areas of the state will result in a different 
"best" government farm program alternative. The "best" program 
alternative for each scenario are based on the ave·rage level and 
variance of present value of net cash income and nominal ending net 
worth and the number of bankrupt iterations for each 100 replication 
s i mu lat ion. The simulation results presented in this section include 
information about the average (across replications) present value of 
net cash flow and the average (across replication) nominal ending net 
worth. The results include the means, medians, maximums, minimums and 
ranges or coefficients of variations for present value of net cash 
flow and nominal ending net worth. The number of bankrupt iterations 
which occurred during the 100 repetitions is also presented. 
Jackson County 
The implications of the results of the two Jackson County Farm 
simulations are very similar. These results are presented in Tables 
54, 55, 56 and 57. Tables 54 and 56 contain present value of net cash 
flows for Farm 1 and Farm 2, respectively, under assumptions of 
participation in each of the .forty government farm program options. 
Nominal ending net worth and the resulting number of bankruptcies for 
the two situations are presented in Tables 55 and 57. 
No Government Programs. Initial simulations of the two Jackson 
County situations assume no participation in the government farm 
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Table 54. Net Cash Flow Information for the Jackson County High 
Equity Situation - Farm 1 
Present Value of Net Cash Flow ($000) 
Program 02tion Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. C.V.(%) 
No Governement Programs 214.31 219. 77 620.18 -187.61 160.25 74. 77 
Disaster Payments 168.01 197. 65 562.86 -129.63 145.14 78. 03 
Deficiency Payments 228. 69 233. 78 581.80 -82. 33 139. 80 61.13 
Disaster & Deficiency Payments 241.12 252. 38 583.03 -37.09 134. 21 55.66 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. 178.64 187.96 575.31 -161.95 156. 72 87. 73 
Level 2 - High P.E. 188.26 193.85 591.30 -178.86 159.49 84. 72 
Level - High P.E. 194.09 201. 74 602. 03 -211. 23 162.12 83.53 
Level 3 - Med P.E. 184.98 191.81 583.08 -163.56 157.ll 84.93 
Level 2 - Med P.E. 192. 74 197.55 596.23 -181.21 159. 53 82. 77 
Level - Med P.E. 197.50 204.98 605.33 -207.90 161. 82 81. 93 
L.evel 3 - Low P.E. 192. 83 196.90 592.91 -169.45 157. 67 81. 76 
Level 2 - Low P.E. 198.14 203.28 602. 22 -183.61 159.65 80.57 
Level - Low P.E. 201. 80 208.99 609.14 -202. 99 161.39 79. 98 
Disaster Payments & 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. 138. 30 148.86 511. 72 -199.30 146.63 106.02 
Level 2 - High P.E. 147. 59 159.89 525.99 -190.24 148.08 100.33 
Level - High P.E. 159.20 173. 09 540. 15 -177.69 148.49 93. 27 
Level 3 - Med, P.E. 146. 74 157.58 520.34 -187.35 146.04 99. 53 
Level 2 - Med. l'.E. 154. 18 166.69 532.20 -180.19 147.45 95.64 
Level - Med, P.E. 163.63 177.57 543.93 -169.61 147.95 90.41 
Level 3 - Low P.E. 157. 13 168. 72 531. 31 -172. 04 145.52 92. 61 
Level 2 - Low P.E. 162. 18 175.03 539.86 -167.48 146.82 90.53 
Level 1 - Low P.E. 169. 44 182. 99 548.86 -158.86 147.23 86.89 
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Table 54. (Continued) 
Present Value of Net Cash Flow ($000) 
Program O:etion Mean Median Max Min Std.·Dev. C.V.(%) 
Deficiency Payments & 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. 197.93 209. 54 540.92 -71.87 136. 06 68. 74 
Level 2 - High P.E. 206.39 217. 60 554.86 -75.04 138.51 67.11 
Level - High P.E. 211. 73 221.45 565.17 -96. 01 140.54 66.38 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. 203.29 215.95 547.53 -68.19 136.53 67.15 
Level 2 - Med. P.E. 210. 15 221.25 559.37 -77.02 138. 70 66.00 
Level - Med. P.E. 214.57 223.23 56 7. 98 -94.32 140.41 65.C.4 
Level 3 - Low P.E. 210.05 221.63 556.06 -67. 72 137.21 65.32 
Level 2 - Low P.E. 214.80 225.95 565.00 -79.06 138.93 64.68 
Level - Low P.E. 218.19 225.80 571. 55 -91. 75 140.25 64.28 
Deficiency Payments, 
Disaster Payments & 
Federal Crop Insurance 
:.evel 3 - High P.E. 197.00 208.96 531.15 -73.56 132. 60 67.31 
Level 2 - High P.E. 205. 54 220.00 545.15 -62.07 134.59 65. 53 
Level - High P.E. 216.21 229.09 559.25 -59.33 l35. 70 62. 77 
Lt>vel 3 - ~!ed. P.E. 204.67 216.81 539. 53 -53.49 l32. 68 64.83 
Level 2 - Med. P.E. 211. 54. 226.48 5 51. 24 -52. 77 134.55 63.61 
Level - Med. P.E. 220.33 233. 00 563.20 -55. 71 135.43 61.47 
Level 3 - :.ow P.E. 214.24 227.15 550. 38 -48. 38 132. 91 62.04 
Le·:2 l 2 - Low ?.E. 218. 91 23li.. 53 558.94 -45.14 134.42 61. 40 
Level - Low P. E. 225. 75 238.02 568.35 -50.90 135.08 59.84 
Table 55. Ending Net Worth Information for the Jackson County High Equity 
Situation - Farm 1 
l'l_o~_!na!_ End!~et Worth ($000) 
Number of 
Bankrupt 
~~~~..-~~~pt io1~ Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. c. v. (%) Iterations 
No Government Program 1031.1 7 1025.36 1663.17 533.25 240.12 23.29 0 
Disaster Payments 983.28 1057.21 1600.44 635.38 212.52 20.31 0 
Deficiency Payments 1046.42 989.99 1570.51 560.24 218.17 22. 19 0 
Disaster & Deficiency Payments 1063.29 1072.30 1602.46 679.62 206.44 19.42 0 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. 975.90 977.61 1590.15 513.41 233.46 23.92 0 
Level 2 - Iii gh P. E. 991.33 995.45 1616.12 514. 73 237.41 23.95 0 
Level l - High P.E. 1001. 28 999.00 1634.04 501. 33 240.82 24.05 0 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. 985.56 988.65 1602.81 523. 11 234.38 23. 78 0 
Level 2 - Med. P.E. 998.13 1003.14 1624.18 523.36 237.75 23.82 0 
Level l - Med. P.E. 1006.30 1003.58 1639.00 505.94 240. 72 23.92 0 
Level 3 - Low P.E. 997.62 1000. 99 1618.80 534.15 235.60 23.62 0 
Level 2 - Low P. E. 1006. 35 1008. 99 1633. 93 530.14 238. 28 23.68 0 
Level l - Low P.E. 1012.63 1009.22 1645.19 512.51 240.54 23. 76 0 
Disaster Payments & 
Federal Crop lns11rance 
Level 3 - High P.E. 912.57 911.74 1487. 24 470.56 216.21 23.69 0 
Level 2 - High P.E. 926.85 925.66 1510.45 484.04 218. 72 23.60 0 f-"" 
f-"" 
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Table 55. (Continued) 
------
Nominal Ending Net Worth ($000)_ 
Number of 
Bankrupt 
~!:_?gr'.'~ Opt_ ion_ Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. C.V.(%) Iterations 
---- ---
Level l - High P.E. 944.34 948.91 1533.52 501. 09 220. 16 23.31 0 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. 924.90 925.91 1501.29 485.80 216. 18 23.37 0 
Level 2 - Med. I'. E. 936.43 936.982 1520.56 496.68 218.50 23. 33 0 
Level l - Med. P.E. 950. 70 956.02 1539.67 511. 04 219.88 23.13 0 
Level } - Low P.E. 940. 18 941. 54 1519.14 505.46 216.41 23.02 0 
Level 2 - Low P.E. 948.08 950.64 1533.05 512.64 218.41 23.04 0 
Level l - Low P.E. 959.08 965.30 1547. 70 524.25 219.50 22.89 0 
Oeficicency Payments & 
Feder'l Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. 998.23 1005.69 1534.01 622.58 205.86 20. 62 0 
Level 2 - High P.E. 1011.82 1018.76 1556. 70 634.42 209. 48 20. 70 0 
Level 1 - High P.E. 1020. 90 1029. 90 1573.44 618.82 212.26 20. 79 0 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. 1006.51 1013.82 1544.80 633.97 206.96 20.55 0 
Level 2 - Med. P.E. 1017.62 1024.41 1564. 03 633. 77 209. 96 20. 63 0 
Level l - Med. P.E. 1025.17 1034.80 1578.01 620.94 212.31 20. 71 0 
Level 3 - Low P.E. 1017.01 1024.20 1558.68 643.05 208.12 20.46 0 
Level 2 - Low P.E. 1024.82 1033. 06 1573.17 633.43 210. 5 7 20. 55 0 
Level l - Low P.E. 1030.60 1040.90 1583.81 623.99 212.36 20. 61 0 
...... 
...... 
-...J 
Table 55. (Continued) 
Program Option Hean 
Qeficiency Payments, 
Disaster Payments & 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - lligh P.E. 995.60 
Level 2 - High P.E. 1009. 15 
Level l - High P.IL 1025.85 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. 1007.18 
Level 2 - Med. P.E. 1018.18 
Level I - Med. P. E. 1032.02 
Level 3 - Low P.E. 1021. 7'J 
Level 2 - Low P.E. 1029.35 
Level I - Low P.E. 1040. 13 
Nominal Ending Net Worth ($000) 
Hedi an Max Hin Std. D!!.!_,_ 
1001.95 1518.12. 615.23 201.34 
1018.22 1540.91 633.82 204.64 
1034.39 1563.86 652.·11 206.63 
1014.83 1531. 94 630.03 202.06 
1027. 78 1550.83 646.36 204.90 
1040.08 15 70. 28 657.30 206. 59 
1030.80 1549.45 649.89 203.07 
1040.10 1563.36 655.60 205. 28 
1047.55 15 78. 66 663.21 206.54 
c.v.<U 
20. 23 
20.28 
20.14 
20.06 
20. 12 
20.02 
19.88 
19.94 
19.86 
Number of 
Bankrupt 
Iteration• 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
...... 
...... 
CX> 
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Table 56. Net Cash Flow Information for the Jackson County Low 
Equity Situation - Farm 2 
Present Value of Net Cash Flow ($000) 
Prolliram Oetion Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Range 
No Government Programs 1. 99 12.60 448.53 -539.40 198.25 987.93 
Disaster Payments -32.06 -11.21 390.67 -479.05 184.99 869. 72 
Deficiency Payments 21. 96 49.20 409. 78 -416.64 172.86 826.42 
Disaster & Deficiency Payments 38.45 64.93 411. 00 -353.66 163.61 754.66 
'°edera 1 Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. -42.37 -20.97 403.94 -513.69 198.88 917.63 
Level 2 - High P.E. -30. 28 -13.26 419.67 -531.51 200. 75 951.18 
Level - High P.E. -22. 96 -7. 16 430.60 -563.84 202. 86 994.44 
Level J - Med. P.E. -34.38 -12.88 411. 59 -516.05 198.41 927.64 
Level 2 - Med. P.E. -24.64 -10.02 424.54 -533. 73 200.21 958.27 
Level - Med. P.E. -18. 74 -3.51 433.63 -560.39 202. 09 944.02 
Level 3 - Low P.E. -24.56 -7. 54 421. 20 -521. 78 198. 17 942.98 
Level 2 - Low P.E. -17.92 -4.92 430.52 -535.99 199.65 966. 51 
Level 
-
Low ?.E. -13.45 1. 25 437.38 -555.33 201. 10 99 2. 71 
Dis;>ster Payments & 
F~deral Crop Insurance 
-:..."3've l 3 - High P.E. -93.20 -7 3. 78 33'l.Ol -552.46 ~92.46 891.!..7 
L~·1~ l 2 - High P. E. -81. 18 -55.34 353.88 -542.95 ~ 93. 16 896. 83 
I..2v2l - High P. E. -66.44 -39.03 368. 1 7 -529.89 l 92. 15 898. G6 
L.cve 1 - 'led. P.E. -82.39 -60. 75 348.01 -540.20 191. 05 888. 21 
~2 11~::. l 2 - :·t.-d. ?.E. -72. 79 -!i.S. 81 360. 17 -532.66 191. i2 892. 83 
Lev~: - '!2d. ?. E. -60. 76 -33.44 371. 93 -521.66 c?0.98 393. 59 
Level - Low P.E. -69. 09 -44. 50 359.24 -524.49 lg9.27 883. 73 
Level 2 - Low P.E. -62. 59 -35.52 367.88 -519.67 189.98 887.55 
Level - Low P.E. -53.33 -26.51 376.83 -510.72 189.50 887.55 
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Table 56. (Continued) 
Present Value of ~et Cash Flow ( $000) 
Program OEtion Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Range 
Deficiency Payments & 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. -16.41 14.02 370.68 -399.30 173.41 769.98 
Level 2 - High P.E. -5.96 19.41 384.82 -411. 88 174. 83 796. 70 
Level - High P.E. .56 25.24 394.41 -438.52 176.54 832. 93 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. -9.62 18.08 377.37 -398.93 173.00 776. 30 
Level 2 - Med. P.E. -1. 16 23. 72 389.04 -413. 58 174.44 802. 62 
Level - Med. P.E. 4. 10 29.30 397.00 -435.48 175.97 832.48 
Lev~l - Low P.E. -1. 06 23. 71 385.95 -403.30 172.68 789.25 
Level 2 - Low P.E. 4.65 28.55 394.26 -415.10 174.02 799.36 
Level - Low P.E. 8.68 34.37 400.26 -430.95 175.17 831. 21 
Deficiency Payments, 
Disaster Payments & 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. -17.07 11. 01 360.89 -406. 74 169.33 767.63 
r_evel 2 - High P.E. -6.30 20.80 375.10 -378.20 170. 19 753.30 
Level - High P.E. 7.17 37.07 389.08 -391. 20 169.66 780.28 
Level - Med. P.E. -7. 21 21. 07 369.46 -390. 77 168.02 760. 23 
Lev2l 2 - Med. P.E. 1. 47 29. 33 381. 24 -374.30 168.95 755.54 
LevPl - 'led. ?.E. 12. 38 42. 31 392. 70 -385.60 158.68 778. 30 
Level - ~ow ?.E. 5. J 5 ]_4, 53 380. 33 -370. 14 166. 59 750.47 
:..2v2 l - ~ow ?.E. 10. 34 38.45 388.30 -369. 72 167. 56 758.52 
:...~\JP l l - Low ?.E. 19. 11 4 7. 79 397.43 -377. 56 167. 38 774. 99 
Table 57. Ending Net Worth Information for the Jackson County Low Equity 
Situation - Farm 2 
--------·--------
Nominal Ending Net Worth ($000) 
Number of 
Bankrupt 
Program Opt ion Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. C.V.(%) Iterations 
-·----------·--- --
No Government Program 521. 75 5!12. 89 1154. 98 -108.42 26 7. 17 51. 21 38 
Disaster Pay~ents 468. 96 488.80 1061.47 -78.98 247. 77 52.83 41 
Deficiency Payments 540.95 559.58 1091. 74 17.63 235.62 43.56 31 
Disaster & Deficiency Paymeents 561. 22 576. :n 1093. 76 86.70 225.81 40.24 26 
Federal Crop Insurance 
l.evel 3 - High P.E. 459. 76 481.50 1082.51 -113.91 265.42 57. 73 44 
Level 2 - High P.E. 477.80 495.84 1108. 02 -110. 14 26 7. 71 56.03 43 
Level I - High P.E. 488.59 507.21 1125. 78 -139. 76 270. 6 7 55.40 43 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. 471.16 492.52 1094.94 -102.99 265.00 56.24 43 
Level 2 - Med. P. E. 485.39 504.08 1115.95 -llO. 75 267.49 55. ll 43 
Level l - Med. P. E. 494.17 513.95 1130. 71 -135.21 270.09 54.66 43 
Level 3 - Low P.E. 484. 77 505.84 1110.57 -98.44 265.23 54. 71 42 
Level 2 - Low P.E. 494.48 514.03 1125. 6 7 -111.05 267.38 54.07 42 
Level I - Low P.E. 501. 18 521.97 1136. 83 -128. 70 269.32 53. 74 43 
Disaster Payments & 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. 38 7. 5 B 404.33 977. 60 -167. 71 252. 17 65.06 50 
Level 2 - High P.E. 404.56 427.18 1001. 68 -154.99 253.41 62.64 49 
...... 
N 
...... 
Table 57. (Continued) 
---~-----------·---
Nominal Ending Net Worth ($000) 
Number of 
Bankrupt 
Program Option Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. C.V.(%) Iterations 
---------------
Level I - Hign P.E. 423. 72 444.18 1024.91 -138. 60 253.86 59. 91 44 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. 402.00 420.98 992. 18 -152.97 251. 09 62.46 48 
l .. evel 2 - Med. P. E. 415. ll 435. 13 1011.90 -142. 75 252.64 60.86 47 
Level l - Med. P.E. 43 l. 02 452.00 1031.01 -128.98 253.03 58. 70 44 
Level 3 - Low P.E. 419. 32 438.41 1010.41 
-134.04 250. 17 59.66 46 
Level 2 - Low P.E. 428. l 7 448.15 1024.44 -127.33 251. 69 58. 78 44 
Level l - Low P.E. 440. 71 460.66 1038.97 -116. 21 251. 82 57.14 43 
Deficiency Payment8 & 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P. E. 487.65 501. 74 1028,15 
-1.44 233.20 47. 82 35 
Level 2 - Hign P.E. 502. 76 514.32 1051.11 13.59 235.55 46.85 36 
Level 1 - High P.E. 512. 43 529.85 1066. 72 -10.69 238. 13 46.47 35 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. 496.97 510. 37 1039. 03 12.71 233. 27 46.94 34 
Level 2 - Med. P.E. 509. 28 522.58 1058. 00 13.30 235.51 46.24 35 
Level I - Med. P.1!:. 517. l 6 534.54 1070.92 -6.63 237.76 45.97 33 
Level 3 - Low P.E. 508. 78 522.07 1052.98 23.78 233. 59 45.91 34 
Level 2 - Low P.E. 517.18 532.41 1066.49 13.60 235.53 45.54 35 
Level l - Low P. E. 523. 20 540.50 1076.26 -0.74 237.25 45.35 33 
....... 
N 
N 
Table 57. (Continued) 
Program Opt ion Hean 
------
Deficiency Payments, 
Disaster Payments & 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. 485.29 
Level 2 - High P.E. 500. 7) 
Level I - High P.E. 519.42 
Level 3 - Med. p.E. 498.67 
Level 2 - Med. P.E. Sil. 10 
Level I - Med. P. E. 526.29 
Level 3 - I.ow P. E. 515.23 
Level 2 - Low P.E. 523.65 
Level I - Low l'.E. 535. 31 
Nominal Ending Net Worth ($000) 
Median Max Min Std. 0!!.!_ 
507. 03 1012.25 -11. 34 228.25 
515.63 1035.32 12. 72 230.06 
532. 20 1058.08 39.80 230.60 
514.83 1026.20 7. 91 227.53 
522.38 1045.32 28.21 229.28 
538.56 1063.98 46.91 229.92 
525.64 1043.87 32.80 226.91 
534.56 1057.63 47.35 228.49 
546.93 1071. 67 56. 97 228.88 
c.v.cu 
47.03 
45.94 
44.40 
45.63 
44.86 
43.69 
44.04 
43.63 
42. 76 
Nuiaber of 
Bankrupt 
Iterations 
34 
34 
33 
31 
33 
31 
29 
31 
29 
I-'. 
N 
w 
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programs. Both scenarios experienced substantial growth over the 10 
year planning horizon. Nominal ending net worth of Farm 1 increased 
an average of 67 percent from an initial value of $618,530 to an 
average ending value of $1,031,710 (in 1982 dollars). The average net 
worth for Farm 2 (the low equity situation) increased from $358,337 to 
$521,750 over the planning period, an average increase of 
approximately 46 percent. The mean of present value of net cash flow 
is positive for both situations however, this value is substantially 
higher for the high equity scenario (Farm 1). Thirty-eight bankrupt 
iterations occurred in this simulation of the low equity Farm 2. In 
other words, 38 percent of the time, the equity to asset ratio dropped 
below the 30 percent minimum for this situation. No bankruptcies 
occurred in any of the Farm 1 simulations. Since the two Jackson 
County scenarios are very similar except for the beginning equity 
level, the results indicate (as expected) that for equal levels of 
risk, the percent equity is a critical determinant of the economic 
viability of the farm. As the level of debt is increased the chances 
of firm survival is reduced. 
Disaster Payments Program. The addition of the Disaster 
Payments Program (not currently available), which is designed to 
reduce the risk resulting from low commodity yields, resulted in a 
reduction of the nominal ending net worth for both of these farm 
situations. This result, which may be surprising to some, occurs 
because of the set-aside requirement which reduces the effective 
production acreage. The reduction in revenues resulting from a 
smaller production acreage is, on the average, of greater importance 
than any revenues received in the form of disaster payments. 
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The average value of nominal ending net worth decreased from the 
base run average to $983,280 for Farm 1 (Table 55) and to $468,960 for 
Farm 2 (Table 57). Both farm situations however, experienced growth 
over the planning horizon. The effects of the Disaster Payments 
Program on V:ariability of net worth and survival of the firm are 
somewhat mixed. For the high equity farm, expected net worth and the 
coefficient of variation for net worth are both reduced. However, the 
coefficient of variation of nominal ending net worth for Farm 2 
increased somewhat due to the relatively larger decrease in the 
average value of ending net worth. Forty-one bankruptcies occurred in 
this simulation of Farm 2, an increase of 3 from the no government 
program opt ion. 
Income was also reduced substantially when participation in the 
Disaster Payments Program was assumed, as indicated by means of 
present value of net cash flow for the two situations. This value 
became negative (-$32,060) for Farm 2 but, remained positive for Fann 
1 ($168,010). 
Deficiency Payments Program. The Deficiency Payments Program 
is designed to reduce the adverse effects of low commodity prices. 
When participation in this program is assumed, both Jackson County 
farm situations appear better off than they are under the no 
government program option. The mean nominal ending net worth 
increased over the no program option to $1,046,420 for Farm 1 and to 
$540,950 for Farm 2. The variance in nominal ending net worth was 
reduced as indicated by the standard deviations and coefficients of 
variation. The number of bankrupt iterations in the Farm 2 (low 
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equity) simulations was reduced by approximately 18 percent from 38 
bankruptcies to 31. 
Present value of net cash flow was substantially increased with 
the addition of the Deficiency Payments Program. The average present 
value of net cash flow increased to $228,690 for Fann 1 and $21,960 
for Farm 2. The standard deviations of income were reduced for the 
two situations indicating a favorable reduction in the variance of 
income. 
These results indicate that for the yield and price distributions 
simulated low commodity prices maybe a more serious problem than low 
commodity yields. Also, the Deficiency Payments Program, which 
increases expected ending net worth and reduces relative variability, 
is considerably more desirable than the Disaster Payments Program in 
this area. 
Federal Crop Insurance Program. As with the Disaster Payments 
Program, the Federal Crop Insurance Program was designed to reduce the 
adverse effects on low commodity yields. However, the producer must 
pay an insurance premium for each acre of the insured crop rather than 
reducing crop acreages according to the set-aside requirements. Al 1 
nine of the Federal Crop Insurance options evaluated for both Jackson 
County Farm situations reduced mean ending net worth when compared to 
the no programs option. The SO percent or level 1 yield guarantee 
produced the highest ending net worth under each price elective. For 
the high equity farm situation, Federal Crop Insurance reduces mean 
ending net worth. For the low equity farm situation, Federal Crop 
Insurance also reduces ending net worth, but increases relative 
variability of ending net worth by a greater amount. The number of 
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bankrupt iterations increases from 38 under no government programs to 
42-44 under Federal Crop Insurance. 
The 50 percent yield guarantee level with the low price elective 
is the single most favorab1e of the Federal Crop Insurance options in 
Jackson County. Under this option, Farm 1 experienced a 64 percent 
increase in net worth over the 10 year planning horizon to an average 
v a 1 u e of $ 1, 012, 6 3 0. The level of average nomina 1 ending net worth 
for Farm 2 is $501, 180, an increase from the beginning net worth of 
approximately 40 percent. This level of coverage also results in the 
highest level of income. The present value of net cash flow is 
$201,800 for the Farm 1 situation and -$13,450 for the Farm 2 
situation. The low guarantee level - low price elective Federal Crop 
Insurance option results in higher ending net worth than any other FCI 
option. In addition, relative variability of ending net worth is 
reduced s 1 igh t ly for Farm 1 and more significantly for Farm 2 under 
this option. 
Even the most favorable of the Federal Crop Insurance Program 
options does not produce results as favorable as either the no program 
option or the Deficiency Payments Program option. All FCI options 
except for the 75 percent yield guarantee - high price elective option 
produce a higher mean of ending net worth and mean of present value of 
net cash flow than does the Disaster Payments Program. 
Disaster Payments and Deficiency Payments. The most favorable 
of al 1 the program options analyzed for the Jackson County farms is 
the combination of the Disaster Payments Program with the Deficiency 
Payments Program. This alternative results in the highest level of 
nominal ending net worth and present value of net cash flow for both 
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Farm 1 and Farm 2. This program combination provides a level of 
growth in net worth of approximately 72 percent for Farm 1 and 
approximately 57 percent for Farm 2. The mean of present value of net 
cash flow under this option is $241,120 and $38,450 for Farm 1 and 
Farm 2, respectively, significantly higher than the values for any 
other government farm program option. 
The coefficients of variation of ending net worth are 19.42 
percent and 40. 24 percent for Farm 1 and Farm 2, respectively. The 
standard deviations of present value of net cash flow are $134,210 for 
Farm 1 and $163,610 for Farm 2. The level of variability for nominal 
ending net worth and for present value of net cash flow for both farm 
situations are lower for this program combination than for any program 
alternative discussed thus fa"r, The number of bankruptcies which 
occurred on Farm 2 is 26, the lowest value for any analyzed government 
farm program. 
The combination of programs produces better results than either 
of the programs individually for several reasons. Both programs have 
the acreage reduction or set-aside requirement, However, this 
requirement must only be met once when the programs are analyzed in 
combination. 
assumption. 
One program is essentially cost-free under this 
That is, if the producer is participating in the 
Deficiency Payments Program, there are no costs involved to become 
e 1igib1 e for the Disaster Payments Program's low yield coverage. The 
producer can receive coverage or benefits from both programs at the 
same "cost" (income foregone due to the set-aside acreage) as required 
by individual program coverage. 
Also, the cumulative effects of off setting both low yields and 
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low prices at various times during the 10 - year simulation period 
contributes to the increased level and stability of net cash flow and 
ending net worth under this program combination. 
Disaster Payments and Federal Crop Insurance. As indicated 
earlier, in years prior to 1982 the Disaster Payments Program was 
available to producers of wheat, cotton and feed grains. Producers, 
in 1981, could participate in both the Disaster Payments Program and 
the FCI Program, however, the producer was not entitled to receive the 
30 percent FCI premium subsidy. Simulating the two Jackson County 
farm scenarios assuming participation in this program combination 
produces results less favorable than any of the options previously 
discussed. The average ending net worth and the average present value 
of net cash flows are significantly lower for this program combination 
than for FCI alone, no government programs, disaster payments, 
deficiency payments or the Disaster-Deficiency combination. Relative 
variability of ending net worth is not changed perceptibly for the 
high equity farm, but is increased for the low equity farm under this 
combination. 
Deficiency Payments and Federal Crop Insurance. Since the 
Disaster Payments Program is no longer available to producers, this 
program combination could prove to be the most important alternative 
for Jackson County farmers. This program combination produces more 
favor able results for both Jackson County farm scenarios than does the 
Disaster Payments and FCI Program combination. This result occurs, in 
part because the firms gain some protection from both low prices and 
low yields. As with other alternatives involving the Federal Crop 
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Insurance Program the 50 percent yield guarantee level - low price 
elective option provides the highest level of firm growth and income 
for both high and low equity scenarios. Relative variability of 
ending net worth is also slightly lower under this option. 
Average nominal ending net worth under the level 1 yield 
guarantee - low price elective option is $1,030,600 for Farm 1 and 
$ 5 2 3 , 2 0 0 for Fa rm 2. This represents an average growth of 
approximately 67 percent and 46 percent in ending net worth over the 
10 - year period for the two situations, respectively. The 
coefficients of variation of net worth are 20.61 percent and 45.35 
percent for Farm 1 and Farm 2, respectively. Relative variability of 
ending net worth is about the same (varies from 20.55 to 20. 79) for 
the nine FCI options for Farm 1 and is only slightly more yariable 
(from 45.35 to 47.82) for Farm 2. 
Implications for program participation are slightly different for 
the high equity and low equity farm situations. For the high equity 
situation (Farm 1) participation in the Deficiency Payments Program 
alone is clearly superior to the no government program option and 
Federal Crop Insurance because it offers higher ending net worth and 
net cash flow with lower levels of relative variability. The poorest 
alternative is participation in the Federal Crop Insurance program. 
Even un~er the most favorable option (50 percent yield guarantee and 
low price elective), FCI offers the lowest ending net worth and net 
cash flow with the highest relative variability of net worth and 
income. For the high equity situation, the choices between no 
government programs and participation in the combination of the 
Deficiency Payments Program and Federal Crop Insurance at the 50 
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percent yield guarantee and low price elective depends on the 
producers attitude toward risk. A risk averse producer might prefer 
the combination of the Deficiency Payments Program and the most 
favorable FCI option because the expected ending net worth is only 
slightly below that without government programs while net worth 
variability is considerably less with the program combination. 
For the low equity situation (Farm 2) participation in the 
Deficiency Payments Program is clearly superior to no government 
programs, Federal Crop Insurance or the most favorable Deficiency 
Payments - FCI combination. The Deficiency Payments Program has 
higher ending net worth and net cash flows coupled with lower relative 
variability of income and net worth. Once again, the best FCI option 
is clearly inferior to any analyzed program because it has the lowest 
expected net worth and net cash flow with the highest relative 
variability. The low equity operator would be better off with no 
government program than with FCI alone. However, slightly higher 
expected ending net worth and net cash flow and lower relative 
variability would be achieved by participation in the Deficiency 
Payments Program and the FCI 50 percent yield guarantee - low price 
elective option than avoiding government programs entirely. 
Deficiency Payments, Disaster Payments and Federal Crop 
Insurance. For a couple of years prior to the 1982 program year the 
producers could have ch"osen to participate in all three of these 
government farm programs in combination. The producer must have then 
fulfilled the set-aside requirement for the Deficiency Payments and 
Disaster Payments Programs. The producer was also required to pay the 
full, unsubsidized premium for Federal Crop Insurance coverage 
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however, that coverage would apply to a smaller number of acres due to 
the set-aside. Generally, for the Jackson County situations, this 
program combination produces more favorable results than does any 
other alternative involving the Federal Crop Insurance Program. 
The most favorable option for these two scenarios, assuming 
participation in this program combination, based on the level of 
ending net worth, the level of income and the number of bankrupt 
iterations appears to be the level 1 (50 percent) yield guarantee with 
the low price elective. The leve 1 1 yield guarantee - low price 
elective option resulted in a growth in net worth, over the 10 year 
planning horizon, for Farm 1 and Farm 2 of 68 percent and 49 percent, 
_respectively. The average of nominal ending net worth under this 
option is $1,040,130 for Farm 1 and $535,310 for Farm 2. If this 
combination of three programs were available, it would be a favorable 
alternative, only the Deficiency Payments Program alone has a higher 
ending net worth than the most favorable Deficiency, Disaster and FCI 
combination. However, the relative variability of the Deficiency 
Payments Program is considerably greater than the most favorable 
option of this combination. 
Wagoner County 
The Wagoner County scenan.o (Farm 3) is a relatively low equity 
situation somewhat like the low equity situation in Jackson County 
(Fa rm 2). The results of the simulations of this scenario are 
presented in Tables 58 and 59. Table 58 summarizes present value of 
net cash flow information generated from participation in each of the 
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government farm program alternatives. Nominal ending net worth and 
bankruptcy information for Farm 3 is presented in Table 59. 
No Government Programs. The initial simulation of the Wagoner 
County farm scenario is made assuming no participation in any 
government farm programs. The average value of nominal ending net 
worth 1s $202,290, representing a negative growth in net worth of 
about 20 percent over the 10 year period. The coefficient of 
variation of nominal ending .net worth is 62.18 percent, the lowest 
value under any government farm program assumptions. Forty-nine 
bankruptcies occurred under the no program assumption. This is also 
the lowest value recorded in the Wagoner County simulations. Average 
present value of net cash flow equals -$127,960. The standard 
deviation and range of present value of net cash flow is $100,890 and 
$535,200, respectively. 
Disaster Payments Program. The addition of the Disaster 
Payments Program places. the scenario in a somewhat less favorable 
situation. Fifty-four bankruptcies occurred under this program 
alternative, an increase of 10 percent over the no program 
alternative. Average nominal ending net worth was further reduced to 
$176,900. The coefficient of variation of ending net worth is 70.60 
percent, significantly higher than the coefficient when no 
participation is assumed. Apparently the lost income from set-aside 
acres exceeds the payments received under the Disaster Payments 
Program. When these reductions in income are accumulated for the low 
equity operator, mean net cash flow and ending net worth are both 
reduced and relative variability of ending net worth is increased. 
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Table 58. Net Cash Flow Information for the Wagoner County 
Situation - Farm 3 
Present Value of Net Cash Flow ($000) 
Program OEtion ~ Median Max Min Std. Dev. Range 
No Government Programs -127.96 -113. 32 99. 72 -435.48 100.89 535.20 
Disaster Payments -147.02 -132. 72 82. 73 -449.94 100.81 532.67 
Deficiency Payments -144.54 -129.82 81. 36 -439.52 99.75 520.88 
Disaster & Deficiency Payments -141. 82 -125. 87 82. 73 -434.80 99.11 517.53 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. -140.39 -125.40 85.84 -432.10 99.97 517.94 
Level 2 - High P.E. -137.43 -119.60 90.02 -435.21 100.91 525.23 
Level - High P.E. -139.26 -126.11 91. 47 -445.14 102. 11 536. 61 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. -138. 70 -122.62 87.98 -433.38 100. 12 521.35 
Level 2 - Med. P.E. -137.65 -122.33 90.56 -437. 73 101.14 528. 29 
Level - Med. P.E. -137.51 -124.04 92.83 -443. 89 101. 93 536,73 
Level 3 - Low P.E. -136.62 -120. 95 90.88 -434.59 100.29 525.47 
Level 2 - Low P.E. -135. 15 -119.94 92.93 -437.39 10 l. 05 530. 32 
Level - Low P.E. -135.37 -121. 57 94.47 -442. 23 101. 72 536. 70 
Disaster Payments & 
Federal Crop Insurance 
:..evel 3 - High P.E. -162. 70 -150.36 65.69 -451. 03 100. L..2 516. 72 
Lev"l - High ?. E. -159. 38 -142.86 70.07 -435.64 101.31 j 23. 71 
Level - High P.E. -159.83 -146.40 72. 80 -461. 50 102. 20 534.30 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. -160.29 -145.59 68. 39 -45 l. 28 100.46 519. 67 
':..evl"l 2 - ~ed. ?. E. -158.93 -145.03 71. 09 -455. 13 101. 40 526. 22 
Level - Med. P.E. -157. 79 -144.26 74.44 -459.86 101. 98 534.30 
Level 3 - Low P.E. -167.43 -155.61 65.13 -463.95 101. 71 529.08 
Level 2 - Low P.E. -155.92 -142.94 7 !+. 01 -454.04 101. 22 528.05 
Level - Low P.E. -155.34 -141. 66 76.38 -457. i7 101. 71 534.14 
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Table 58. (Continued) 
Present Value of Net Cash Flow ($000) 
Pros;ram OEtion Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Range 
Deficiency Payments & 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. -158.01 -144.34 65. 73 -438.05 98.91 503. 77 
Level 2 - High P.E. -154.62 -140.93 70. 17 -440.52 99.82 510.69 
Level - High P.E. -156.06 -141. 72 72. 19 -449.55 100.93 521. 74 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. -156.11 -142. 43 68.11 -438.88 99.03 506.99 
Level 2 - Med. P.E. -154. 77 -141.23 70. 79 -442. 75 100.02 513.54 
Level - Med. P.E. -154.27 -139.86 73.67 -448.20 100. 75 521.88 
Level 3 - Low P.E. -153. 45 -141.05 71. 23 -439.66 99.19 510.90 
Level 2 - Low P.E. -152.14 -138.27 73.49 -442;11 99.92 515.60 
Level 1 - Low P.E. -152.11 -137.59 75.45 -446.45 100. 52 521. 90 
Deficiency Payments, 
Disaster Payments & 
Federa 1 Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. -157.39 -143.53 65.69 -435.89 98.67 ;o 1. 58 
Level 2 - High P.E. -154. 12 -137.98 70.07 -438.50 99.56 508.58 
Level - High P.E. -154. 57 -139. 17 72. 80 -446.36 100.48 519.16 
Level - Med. P.E. -155.01 -139.94 68.39 -436.14 98. 71 504.53 
Level 2 - Med. P.E. -153.66 -139.12 71.09 -440,00 99.67 511. 09 
Level - Med. P.E. -152. 53 -137.03 74. 44 -444. 72 100. 27 519.16 
Level 3 - Low P.E. -162. 12 -149. 76 65.13 -448.81 99.99 513. 91.. 
Level 2 - Low P.E. -150.65 -135. 74 74. 01 -438.90 99.50 512. 91 
Level - Law ?.E. -150.10 -134.47 76. 38 -442.63 100. 00 519.01 
Table 59. Ending Net Worth Information for the Wagoner County 
Situation - Farm 3 
-----------·------
~om ~~-~-~ndi ng Ne ~-Wor t~J__$_000) 
Number of 
Bankrupt 
P1·ogram Opt ion Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. C.V.(%) Iterations 
---- --- ----- ------··-------- ---·------
No Government Program 202.29 220.55 521.41 -168.68 125. 79 62.18 49 
Disaster Payments 176.90 193. 77 498.87 -185.96 124.89 70. 60 54 
Deficiency Payments 180. 16 192.95 496. 75 -173. 69 123.63 68.62 53 
Disaster I'. Deficiency Payments 183. 31 196.91 498.87 -168.51 123.00 67. 10 52 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. 184.93 199.95 503.43 -166. 77 124.47 67.30 53 
Level 2 - High P. E. 189.32 207.59 509. 79 -169.95 125. 71 66.40 53 
Level l - High P.E. 187.60 205.17 510. 95 -180.33 126.93 67.66 53 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. 187.15 202.73 506.12 -167.88 124. 75 66.66 53 
Level 2 - Med. P.E. 189. 21 206.82 510. 31 -172.54 125.95 66. 57 52 
Level l - Med. P.E. 189. 74 207.63 512.69 -178. 77 126.84 66.85 53 
Level 3 - Low P.E. 190. 78 207.12 509.91 -168.83 124.97 65.50 52 
Level 2 - Low P.E. 192.80 209.94 513. 20 -171. 80 125.85 65. 28 52 
l.e ve I l - Low P. E. 192.43 210. 93 514. 78 -176. 73 126. 71 65.85 52 
Disaster Payments I'. 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P. E. 157.42 17 l. 88 475.89 -189.05 123.66 78.56 58 
Level 2 - High P.E. 161. 76 178.00 482. 69 -191.64 124.94 77. 24 57 ,_. 
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Table 59. (Continued) 
-·-------------
Nominal Ending· Net Worth ($000) 
Number of 
Bankrupt 
Program Opt ion Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. C.V.(%) lterat ions 
--·--- --
----------- - ---
Level l - High P.E. 161.65 177. 80 485.80 -199.70 125.89 77.88 56 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. 160. 51 174.94 479.49 -189.00 123.83 77.15 57 
Level 2 - Med. P. ~:. 162. 3 7 178. 26 483.92 -193.08 125.06 77.02 56 
Level l - Med. P.E. 164.06 180.28 487.98 -197. 71 125. 73 76.64 54 
Level 3 - Low P.E. 151. 76 168.06 475.22 -203.19 125. 07 82. 41 60 
Level 2 - Low P.E. 166.00 182.06 487.67 -191.51 124.98 75.29 54 
Level 1 - Low P.E. 166.96 183.29 490. 53 ·. -195.20 125.53 75.19 55 
Deficiency Payments & 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. 162. 91 173. 15 475.66 -173. 81 122.03 74.91 57 
Level 2 - High P.E. 16 7. 22 180. 75 482.54 -176.26 123.35 73. 77 54 
Leve·l I - High P. E. 165.99 178.31 484.68 -185.67 124.51 75.01 55 
Level 3 - Med. r.E. 165.25 175.15 478.83 -174.43 122. 28 74.00 55 
Level 2 - Med. P.E. 167. 15 179.44 483.23 -178. 54 123.58 73. 93 55 
Level l - Med. P.E. 168. 11 180.23 486.64 -184.02 124.40 74.00 54 
Level 3 - Low P.E. 168.54 l 78. 25 483.04 -174.94 122. 60 72. 74 54 
Level 2 - Low P.E. 170.37 181.86 486.68 -177. 50 123.58 72. 54 54 
Level 1 - Low P.E. 170. 68 182.98 488.98 -181.90 124.24 72. 79 54 
~ 
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Table 59. (Continued) 
Prngram Opt ion Hean 
Deficiency Payments, 
Disaster Payments & 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. 163. 55 
Level 2 - High P.E. 16 7. 69 
Level l - High P.E. 16 7. 63 
I.eve I 3 - Med. I'. E. 166.45 
Level 2 - Med. P.E. 168.34 
Level I - Med. P.E. 170.05 
Level 3 - Low P.E. 158.40 
Level 2 - Low P.E. 17 2. 02 
Level I - Low P.E. 172. 93 
Nominal Ending Net Worth ($000) 
Median Max Hin Std. Dev. 
175.35 475.89 -171.60 121.79 
183.51 482. 69 -174.20 123. 07 
182. 50 485.80 -182. 26 124.05 
178.76 479. 49 -171.55 121. 96 
183.08 483.92 -175.63 123.22 
184. 27 487.98 -180.26 123.91 
169.29 475.22 -185. 74 123. 15 
186.02 487.67 -174.06 123. 16 
186.67 490. 53 -177. 75 123.72 
c.v.cu 
74.47 
73. 39 
74. 00 
73. 27 
73.19 
72. 87 
77. 75 
71.60 
71. 54 
N11mber of 
Bankrupt 
Iteration• 
56 
. ' . 
53 
54 
55 
53 
54 
57 
53 
54 
...... 
w 
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Income was also reduced substantially with the addition of this 
program. Average present value of net cash flow is -$147,020 under 
this program. The standard deviation and range of present value of 
net cash flow was reduced from the no program values to $100,810 and 
$532,670, respectively. However, the minimum level of income is 
significantly lower (or more negative). 
Deficiency Payments Program. This program alternative is 
somewhat more favorable than the Disaster Payments Program alternative 
for the Wagoner County situation. Net worth decreased from $252,649 
to $180,160 over the planning horizon. The coefficient of variation 
of nominal ending net worth is 68.82 percent and 53 bankruptcies were 
logged. Mean present value of net cash flow is $144,540, slightly 
higher than under the Disaster Payments Program but, still a reduction 
from the no program alternative. 
The results indicates that, as in Jackson County, low commodity 
prices present a more serious problem than do low commodity yields. 
Recall that wheat and grain sorghum are the only program crops 
produced on Farm 3. Soybeans, the most important crop for this 
scenario, are not a program crop under the Deficiency Payments and 
Disaster Payments Programs. Participation in the Deficiency Payments 
Program increases expected ending net worth slightly while reducing 
variability of ending net worth slightly. Even so, no participation 
in government programs in Wagoner would be the best alternative. 
Federal Crop Insurance Program. Every option of the Federal 
Crop Insurance Program provides a higher level of ending net worth and 
income than does either the Disaster Payments Program or the 
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Deficiency Payments Program. However, participation in the FCI 
Program does not appear as favorable as the no government farm program 
alternative. 
In Wagoner County, two Federal Crop Insurance options give nearly 
identical results. The level 2 (65 percent) yield guarantee with the 
low price elective option results in a mean nominal ·ending net worth 
of $192,800 and a coefficient of variation of ending net worth of 
65.28 percent. The 50 percent yield guarantee - low price elective 
option results in ending net worth of $192,430 with a coefficient of 
variation of 65.85 percent. Thus, the level 2 guarantee - low price 
elective generates slightly better results. 
This opt ion a 1 so yields the highest level of average income for 
any program alternative except for the initial, no government program, 
simulation. Average presen:t value of net cash flow has a value of 
-$135, 150. The standard deviation and range of present value of net 
cash flow is $101,050 and $530,320, respectively. This option 
provides only slightly better coverage than either of the other low 
price elective options, but the difference between this option and the 
higher guarantee options are significant. 
If the producer preferred to participate in some type of program 
the level 2 yield guarantee - low price elective option may be the 
most significant. The reason this option is more favorable than the 
other government programs could be because of the limited crop 
coverage of the Disaster Payments and Deficiency Payments Programs. 
Neither of these programs provide any coverage for the soybean 
enterprise (Wagoner County's most important crop). Federal Crop 
Insurance does provide low yield coverage for the soybean enterprise. 
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Disaster Payments and Deficiency Payments. The Disaster 
Payments and Deficiency Payments Program combination, which proved to 
be the most favorable program alternative for the Jackson County 
situations, is not as favorable for the Wagoner County situation. 
This combination does (as it did in Jackson County) produce more 
favorable results than either of the component programs individually. 
In combination these programs produce higher income and ending net 
worth with lower variation in income and ending net worth than either 
of the individual programs. These results however, are less favorable 
than either the no government program option or the most favorable of 
the FCI options. 
Farm 3 experienced a negative growth in net worth of 
approximately 27 percent over the planning horizon to a value of 
$183,310. The number of bankrupt iterations is 52 under this option. 
Variability in nominal ending net worth is lower with this combination 
than with either of the component programs as indicated by the 67.10 
percent coefficient of variation. Present value of net cash flow has 
an average value of -$141,820, a standard deviation of $99,110 and a 
range of $517,530. 
Disaster Payments and Federal Crop Insurance. Under the 
assumption of a Disaster Payments and Federal Crop Insurance Program 
combination the results are less favorable than under either of these 
programs individually. Once again, the 65 and 50 percent yield 
guarantees with the low price elective generate very similar results 
and are the most favorable options. However, in both cases the mean 
ending net worth is lower and the coefficient of variation higher than 
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for Disaster Payments or the corresponding Federal Crop Insurance 
options individually. 
Deficiency Payments and Federal Crop Insurance. The 
combination of Deficiency Payments and Federal Crop Insurance is more 
favorable than the Disaster Payment - FCI options, but less favorable 
than Deficiency Payments or FCI individually. Imposing the set-aside 
requirement accompanying participation in the Disaster Payments 
Program apparently causes this result. Farm 3 experienced an average 
reduction in net worth of approximately 32 percent to an average value 
of $170, 680 and 54 bankrupt iterations under the 50 percent yield 
guarantee and low price elective option. The coefficient of variation 
of ending net worth is 72. 79 percent under this option, a figure that 
is higher than for Deficiency Payments or Federal Crop Insurance 
Programs individually. 
Deficiency Payments, Disaster Payments and Federal Crop 
Insurance. As in Jackson County, the combination of all three 
government farm programs produces results that are more favorable than 
the other combination alternatives evaluated for the Wagoner County 
situation. However, even this combination is less favorable than any 
of the individual programs. Once again, the set-aside requirements 
associated with participation in government programs appears to cause 
this result when the programs are combined. The level 1 (50 percent 
yield guarantee) and level 2 yield guarantee with the low price 
elective generate nearly identical results for this farm situation, 
under this program alternative, and generate average nominal ending 
net worth of approximately $172,000 with coefficients of variation of 
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nominal ending net worth about 71.60 percent. Average present value 
of net cash flow is about -$150,000 assuming either of these options 
of the program combination. 
Texas County 
The results of the Texas County analysis are presented in Tables 
60 and 61 and are very similar to the Wagoner County results. Table 
60 presents the present value of net cash flow information and Table 
61 presents the nominal ending net worth information and the number of 
bankrupt iterations which occurred in each program assumption, Farm 
4, in Texas County, is a low equity situation similar to the low 
equity situations in Jackson County and Wagoner County. This farm 
experiences substantial difficulty surviving through the 10 year 
planning horizon. The major reason for this difficulty is due to the 
firms low equity level and low levels of profitability projected into 
the future based on 1982 conditions. 
No Government Programs. This is the only program alternative 
which provides for net worth growth over the 10 year planning horizon 
for the Texas County scenario. Nomi na 1 ending net worth has an 
average value of $564,720, representing a growth of approximately 3 
percent over the 10 year period. The coefficient of variation for 
nominal ending net worth is 66.04 percent and 59 bankruptcies occurred 
in this initial simulation. The average present value of net cash 
flow is negative (-$159,470). For the Texas County situation the no 
government program alternative is the most favorable of the government 
programs analyzed in this study. All Disaster, Deficiency and Federal 
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Table 60. Net Cash Flow Information for the Texas County 
Situation - Farm 4 
Present Value of Net Cash Flow ($000) 
Program 02tion Mean Me\:lian Max Min Std. Dev. Range 
No Government Program -159.47 -131.11 425.27 -996. 70 287. 46 1421.97 
Disaster Payments -241.51 -207.97 356.69 -1064.57 285.92 1421.27 
Deficiency Payments -223.68 -195.41 352. 48 -995.90 277.89 1348.38 
Deficiency & Disaster Payments -217.30 -187.30 356.69 -992.95 274.97 1349.64 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. -219.37 -188.89 386.68 -1072. 40 291. 47 1459.08 
Level 2 - High P.E. -204.83 -175.48 399.19 -1054.97 292.62 1454.16 
Level - High P.E. -193.18 -162.36 406.06 -1044.85 294.01 1450.91 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. -205.58 -176.34 395.14 -1053.37 395.14 1448.50 
Level 2 - Med. P.E. -194. 38 -165.57 405.11 -1041. 32 291. 32 1446.43 
Level - Med. P.E. -185.45 -154.24 410. 41 -1033.96 292.53 1444.38 
Level 1 - Low P.E. -192.35 -164.17 403.07 -1035.25 288. 70 1438. 32 
Level 2 - Low P.E. -184.82 -156.00 410.67 -1028.30 290.03 1438. 97 
Level - Low P.E. -178.83 -148.73 414.19 -1024.53 291. 25 1438. 71 
Disaster Payments & 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. -319.31 -286.39 313.82 -1152. 61 292.63 1466.43 
Level 2 - High P.E. -306.10 -278. 71 322. 71 -1141.78 294. 23 1464. 49 
Le•1el - High P.E. -286.98 -264.58 332. i l -1123.88 294.04 1456.59 
:.evel 3 - Med. P.E. -301.35 -271. 56 323.40 -1132. 46 290. 96 1455.86 
Level 2 - Med. P. E. -291. 44 -267.09 330. 28 -1124.08 292. 32 1454.36 
L~vel - 'led. P. E. -276. 79 -251. 99 338.01 -1110.59 292. 28 '.448. 70 
L.ivel 3 - Low ?.E. ..:284. 66 -257. 52 332.30 -1111.53 288. 95 1 !,43. 93 
Level 2 - Low P.E. -278.13 -253.84 337.34 -1107. 37 290.42 1444. 71 
Level - Low ?.E. -267.80 -240. 80 342. 71 -1098.97 290. 70 '.441. 58 
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Table 60. (Continued) 
Present Value of Net Cash Flow (SOOO) 
Program Option Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Range 
Deficiency Payments & 
Feder a 1 Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. -277.41 -253.69 321. 84 -1055.98 280. 18 1377.82 
Level 2 - High P.E. -265. 13 -242.13 330.02 -1044.83 281. 90 1374.85 
Level - High P.E. -254. 77 -234.77 335.64 -1037.85 283.60 1373.49 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. -265.02 -240.89 328. 75 -1041. 93 279.42 1370.67 
Level 2 - Med, P.E. -255.62 -234.12 335. 10 -1033.32 280.90 1368.42 
Level - Med. P. E. -247. 72 -225.80 339.43 -1030.83 28 2. 41 i3 70. 27 
Level 3 - Low P.E. -253.16 -228.40 335.43 -1026. 79 278.31 1362. 22 
Level 2 - Low P.E. -246.93 -223.55 339.88 -1022.30 279.86 1362. 18 
Level - Low P.E. -241. 60 -218.01 342. 71 -1021. 97 281. 26 1364.69 
Deficiency PaY-roents, 
Disaster Payments & 
F~der.ql Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. -293. 55 -269.23 313. 82 -1081.42 281. 8.4 1395.44 
Level 2 - High P.E. -280. 84 -260.12 322. 71 -1070.60 283.45 1393.31 
Level - High P. E. -262.05 -242.39 332. 71 -1052.69 283.27 1385.40 
Level 3 - ~!;;d. P.E. -276.06 -254. 70 323. 40 -1061.28 280.10 1384.67 
Level - 'led. P.E. -266.42 -245.07 330.28 -1052.89 231. 48 1383. 17 
Level - ~led. P.E. -252. 11 -231.19 338.01 -1039.51 281. 49 1377.51 
'...evel 3 - Low ?.E. -259.67 -237.59 332. 30 -1040.45 278.04 1372. 75 
Level - Low ?.E. -253.32 -231.49 337.34 -1036.19 Z79.53 !373. 53 
:..2vel - Low P.E. -243.20 -219.99 3.+2. 71 -1027. 79 279.84 1370. 50 
Table 61. Ending Net Worth Information for the Texas County 
Situation - Farm 4 
--------
Nominal Ending Net Worth ($000) 
Number of 
Bankrupt 
Program Option Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. C.V.(%) Iterations 
--- -- ----
No Government Program 564. 72 592.57 1371.67 -494.79 372.96 66.04 59 
Disaster Payments 452.97 470.67 1234. 59 -576.43 365. 03 80.59 67 
Deficiency Payments 475. 77 497.38 1250.58 -493.20 354.92 74.60 67 
Deficiency & Disaster Payments 483.20 498.19 1250.58 -490.16 351. 63 72. 77 66 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. 485. 73 503. 70 1296. 44 -587.46 374.82 77.17 65 
Level 2 - High P.E. 504. 75 520.86 1323. 89 -565.44 377.85 74.86 64 
Level 1 - High P.E. 519. 9 7 542.80 1341.63 -550.37 380.58 73.19 62 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. 503.08 517.92 1313.05 -566.34 374.49 74.44 64 
Level 2 - Med, P.E. 517.87 536.91 1334.61 -549.02 377. 08 72. 81 63 
Level 1 - Med. P.E. 532. 09 553.64 1348. 42 -537.80 377.32 70.92 62 
Level 3 - Low P.E. 522.21 538.09 1327.84 -544.51 3 71. 74 71.19 64 
Level 2 - Low P. E. 530.02 549.38 1344. ll -533.59 376.19 70. 98 62 
Level 1 - I.ow P.E. 540.40 563.34 1354. 31 -526.91 376. 22 69.62 62 
Disaster Payments & 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. 353. 11 370. 77 1161. 80 -684.60 368.68 104.410 78 
Level 2 - High P.E. 371. 81 392.20 1176.90 -668.43 371. 64 99. 96 77 
...... 
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Table 61. (Continued) 
--------·--
Nominal Ending Net Worth ($000) 
---
Number of 
Bankrupt 
Program Option Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. c. v. (%) Iterations 
-----·----
Level l - High P.E. 395. 72 41l.89 1197.31 -644.74 372, 69 94.18 69 
Level 3 - Med P.E. 376.83 393.41 1177.03 -660.17 36 7. 52 97.53 76 
Level 2 - Med. P.E. 389. 70 41l.84 1188. 73 -647.57 370.19 94.99 71 
Level 1 - Med. P.E. 408.06 423.01 1205. 54 -629.66 371.17 90.96 68 
Level 3 - Low P.E. 397. 31 418.99 1190. 78 -635.50 366.20 92. 17 71 
Level 2 - Low P.E. 405.98 425.64 1200.13 -628.07 368. 75 90.83 69 
Level 1 - Low P.E; 420. 15 434.27 1212.85 -616.25 369.48 87.94 68 
Oef iciency Paymentti & 
federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. 405.53 413.38 1185.01 -569.02 355.32 87.62 72 
Level 2 - High P. E. 422.49 429.02 1208.95 -552. 37 358.25 84. 79 70 
Level l - High P.E. 435. 71 444. 85 1224.40 -541. 22 361. 14 82. 89 68 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. 421.89 428.30 1199. 44 -551.53 354.91 84. 12 68 
Level 2 - Med. P.E. 434.48 441. 6 7 1218.25 -538. 59 357.63 82.31 68 
Level l - Med. P.E. 444.57 456.46 1230.30 -530.55 360.01 80.98 68 
Level 3 - Low P.E. 436.63 442. 78 1212.25 -533.37 354.45 81.18 68 
Level 2 - Low P.E. 444.93 452. 52 1226.46 -525.61 357.03 80.24 67 
Level l - Low P.E. 451. 92 466.63 1235.39 -521. 17 359.09 79.46 67 
I-' 
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Table 61. (Continued) 
Progra~ Optio~ Mean 
Deficiency Payments, 
Disaster Payments & 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. 384. 17 
Level 2 - High P.E. 402. 32 
Level 1 - High P.E. 425.39 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. 407.26 
Level 2 - Med. P. E. 420.90 
Level l - Med. P. E. 438. 7 l 
Level 3 - Low P.E. 428.25 
Level 2 - Low P.E. 437.16 
Level I - Low P.E. 449. 70 
Nominal Ending Net Worth ($000) 
Median Max Min Std, D~ 
389.28 1167.31 -598.40 356.35 
409.87 1191. 25 -582. 23 359.29 
429. 79 1213.30 -558.54 360.47 
417. 28 1185. 5 7 -574.00 355.14 
427.97 1204.37 -561.37 357.38 
444.20 1221.52 -543.46 358. 45 
436.15 1201.91 -549.30 353.44 
442.48 1216.11 -541. 87 355.87 
457.13 1228.84 -530.05 357.04 
c.v. (l) 
92.60 
89.31 
84. 74 
87.20 
84.90 
81. 71 
82.53 
81.40 
79.40 
Number of 
Bankrupt 
Iteration• 
75 
70 
68 
71 
69 
68 
68 
68 
67 
...... 
.i::-
00 
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Crop Insurance alternatives reduce expected ending net worth and 
increase the coefficient of variation of ending net worth. 
Disaster Payments Program. Participation in the Disaster 
Payments Program for this farm ·scenario (Farm 4) reduces its chances 
of survival. The level of average ending net worth is reduced 
substantially to $452,970. The coefficient of variation of nominal 
ending net worth was increased to 80. 59 percent and 67 bankrupt 
iterations were logged. Average income was reduced to -$241,510, 
substantially below that of the no program alternative. The standard 
deviation of present value of net cash flow ($285, 920) and it's range 
($1,421,270) are slightly lower for this government farm program. The 
Disaster Payments Program provides low yield coverage for every crop 
produced on the Texas County farm situation simulated. The reduction 
in income due to the set-aside requirements appears substantially 
greater than the additional income provided by the disaster payments. 
Thus, the Disaster Payments Program results in lower mean ending net 
worth and greater net worth variability than the no government option. 
Deficiency Payments Program. Participation in the Deficiency 
Payments Program produces results somewhat more favorable than those 
produced by the Disaster Payments Program. As in the other two county 
situations, low commodity prices appear to present more of a problem 
to this farm situation than do low yields. With the Deficiency 
Payments Program average nominal ending net worth is $475, 770, a 
reduction in net worth of approximately 13 percent. Nominal ending 
net worth is less variable with this program alternative than with the 
Disaster Payments Program, as indicated by the 74.60 percent 
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coefficient of variation however, the same number of bankrupt 
iterations occurred. Average present value of net cash flow is 
-$ 223, 680, slightly higher than the average income generated with the 
Disaster Payments Program. Deficiency Payments increase the mean 
ending net worth and reduce relative variability when compared with 
the Disaster Payments Program. However, the no government program 
option is more attractive than either of the above government program 
alternatives. 
Federal Crop Insurance Program. If the Texas County producer 
preferred to participate in a government farm program to reduce risk, 
the Federal Crop Insurance Program may prove to be best alternative. 
Every option of this program provides for a higher level of average 
ending net worth and a lower number of bankrupt iterations than does 
any other program alternative with the exception of the no government 
program alternative. The most favorable option of the Federal Crop 
Insurance Program for the Texas County situation is the level 1 (50 
percent) yield guarantee - low price elective option. Although this 
opt ion does not, on the average, provide for any growth in net worth, 
it does nearly maintain the beginning level of net worth. The 
coefficient of variation of nominal ending net worth is 69.62 percent, 
lowest among the FCI options. 
The 60 and 7 5 percent yield guarantee with high price elective 
opt ions yield expected ending net worth higher than for deficiency 
payments, however, the relative variability is also higher. Thus, 
some producers may wish to choose the lower ending net worth, lower 
variability Deficiency Payments Program. Other FCI options result in 
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higher ending net worth and lower relative variability of net worth 
than Deficiency Payments. 
Disaster Payments and Deficiency Payments. When the Disaster 
Payments Program is combined with the Deficiency Payments Program the 
Jackson County situation resu'lts prove to be more favorable than 
participation in either program individually. These results are not 
unlike those produced with this program combination in the other 
county situations. Nominal ending net worth has an average value of 
$483, 200 and a coefficient of variation of 72.77 percent for the Texas 
County Situation. This program combination resulted in 66 bankrupt 
iterations, one less than either the Disaster Payments Program or the 
Deficiency Payments Program individually. The average level of 
present value of net cash flow under this program combination is 
-$217,300. Relative variation in ending net worth appears to have 
been redu·ced ·slightly from the other Disaster and Deficiency program 
alternatives, as indicated by the coefficient of variation. 
Disaster Payments and Federal Crop Insurance. Participation in 
a combination of the two low yield programs produces less favorable 
results than any of the government farm program alternatives discussed 
thus far. The increase in the FCI premium rates, due to the loss of 
the 30 percent government subsidy, seems to reduce any benefits that 
the Federal Crop Insurance Program (participated in individually) 
might have afforded. Level 1 yield guarantee - low price elective 
coverage provides the most favorable results under this program 
alternative. Average income or present value of net cash flow is 
-$267,800, substantially lower (more negative) than any other program 
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alternative. Net worth declined over the 10 years an average of 
approximately 23 percent to a value of $420,150. The coefficient of 
variation for nominal ending net worth is 87.94 percent and 68 
bank~upt iterations occurred. 
Deficiency Payments and Federal Crop Insurance. This program 
combination places the Texas County farm scenario in a somewhat worse 
situation than either of the Deficiency Payments Program or the 
Federal Crop Insurance Program alternatives because of the set-aside 
requirement for the Deficiency Payments Program crops. This set-aside 
is a normal requirement of the Deficiency Payments Program however, 
individual participation in the FCI Program has no such requirement. 
Every crop produced on the Texas County farm situation is subject to 
the set-aside requirement. This reduces the total number of acres 
insurable under this program combination and hence, reduces the level 
of income generated by the crops produced. As with the other Federal 
Crop Insurance Program alternatives, the level 1 yield guarantee - low 
price elective option provides the most favorable level of coverage. 
Ending net worth has an average value of $451,920 and a coefficient of 
variation of 79.46 percent and sixty-seven bankrupt iterations were 
registered. Average present value of net cash flow is significantly 
lower than with either of the component programs (-$241,600). 
Deficiency Payments, Disaster Paymen~s and Federal Crop 
Insurance. This program combination proves more favorable than the 
other two program alternatives in which the Federal Crop Insurance 
Program is combined with another government farm program. The 
di ff ere nc es are somewhat slight with respect to both ending net worth 
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and present value of net cash flow. These more favorable results 
occur because acreage is already reduced in the two p•ogram 
combination (such as the Disaster Payments - FCI Program combination), 
and the addition of another program (Deficiency Payments Program) is 
e s s e n t i a 1 1 y c o s t - f r e e t o the' f arm p r o du c er • There were 67 
bankruptcies with the level 1 yield guarantee - low price elective 
option. Average nominal ending net worth is $449, 700, representing an 
average decline in net worth of approximately 18 p.ercent from it's 
beginning value. The coefficient of variation for this option is 
79.40 percent and is the lowest coefficient of variation under this 
combination. The average present value of net cash flow is -$243,200. 
Evaluation of Federal Crop Insurance Options by Crops 
The results dealing with the Federal Crop Insurance Program and 
presented in the previous section of this chapter are derived assuming 
each crop is insured by the same FCI option (e.g., level 1 (SO 
percent) yield guarantee - low price elective) for each crop. Also, 
eve•y insurable crop produced by the farm scenarios is assumed insured 
under each of the Federal Crop Insurance Prog•am alternatives. In 
actual practice the producer may choose to insure each crop with a 
different FCI option. To determine the implications of selecting 
alternative options for each crop, an analysis was made to determine 
which option provided the "best" level of coverage for each crop 
produced by the low equity Jackson County farm scenario (Farm 2). 
In this portion of the analysis the level 3 yield guarantee -
high price elective option was applied to the cotton enterprises and 
held constant while the yield guarantees and price electives for wheat 
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were varied to determine the "best" level of coverage for the wheat 
enterprise. The low equity Jackson County farm situation was 
simulated once for each of the nine wheat options. The results of 
these simulations are presented in Tables 62 and 63. Table 62 
presents information concerning the present value of net cash flow 
generated with these FCI options. Nominal ending net worth 
information and the number of bankrupt iterations is presented in 
Table 63. Based on the most favorable results of these simulations, 
the Federal Crop Insurance option which provides the most desirable 
coverage for wheat can be determined because the dryland cotton and 
irrigated cotton options were not changed. This option appears to be 
the level 1 yield guarantee - low price elective option. Assuming 
this option for wheat and the level 3 yield guarantee - high price 
elective option for cotton provides for the highest level of firm 
growth, income and chances of firm survival of any of these 
simulations. Variation in nominal ending net worth appears to be the 
lowest recorded at a value of 54.63 percent. 
The study by Lemieux, Richardson and Nixon determined that for a 
typical Texas High Plains cotton farm the level 3 yield guarantee -
high price elective Federal Crop Insurance option provided the most 
desirable coverage for cotton. In the same study, this level of 
coverage was also found to provide benefits similar to that of the low 
yield Disaster Payments Program. It might be suspected that this 
option would also provide the most favorable coverage for the Jackson 
County situation. The "best" Federal Crop Insurance Program option 
for the cotton enterprises can be determined in much the same way as 
was the "best" wheat option. The FCI option for wheat was held 
Table 62. Net Cash Flow Information for the Jackson County Situation - Farm 2; 
75% Guarantee Level and $0.50 per lb. Price Elective for the Cotton Enterprises with the 
FCI Wheat Enterprise Options Varied 
Present Value of Net Cash Flow ($000) 
Program Option Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. -42.37 -20.97 403.94 -513.69 198.88 917.63 
Level 2 - High P.E. -33.95 -11.81 413.18 -517.97 199.18 931.15 
Level 1 - High P.E. -29.04 -7.44 419.36 -537.51 199.87 956.87 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. -36.36 -15.18 409.59 -515.29 198.46 924. 88 
Level 2 - Med. P.E. -29.76 -7.39 416. 77 -520.64 198.76 937.41 
Level 1 - Med. P.E. -25.90 -4.87 421. 66 -535. 62 199.36 95 7. 28 
Level 3 - Low P.E. -30. 11 -8.16 415.34 -519.19 198.14 934.53 
Level 2 - Low P.E. -25.84 -3.73 420.22 -523. 72 198.43 943.94 
Level 1 - Low P.E. -22.93 -2.59 423.81 -534.12 198.82 957.93 
....... 
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Table 63. Ending Net Worth Information for the Jackson County Situation - Farm 2, 75% Guarantee Level 
and $0.50 per lb. Price Elective for the Cotton Enterprises with the FCI Wheat Enterprise Options Varied 
Nominal Ending Net Worth ($000) 
Number of 
Bankrupt 
Program Options Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. C.V.(%) Iterations 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. 459. 76 481. 50 1082.51 -113. 91 265.42 57. 73 44 
Level 2 - High P. E. 472. 07 493.85 1097.54 -102.69 265.83 56.31 45 
Level 1 - High P.E. 479.03 500.65 1107. 59 -115.48 266.93 55. 72 43 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. 468.45 490.14 1091. 70 -106.25 264.93 56.55 44 
Level 2 - Med. P.E. 477.69 499.68 1103. 39 -99.45 265.65 55.61 43 
Level 1 - Med. P.E. 483.26 505.28 1111.33 -112. 83 266.51 55.15 43 
Level 3 - Low P.E. 476.97 498.93 1101. 05 -98.10 264.90 55. 54 42 
Level 2 - Low P.E. 483.01 505.36 1109. 00 -101. 44 265.52 54.97 43 
Level 1 - Low P.E. 487.17 509. 78 1114. 83 -110. 63 266.12 54. 63 42 
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constant at it' s most desirable level (level 1 yield guarantee - low 
price elective) and the simulations were reproduced for the van.ous 
levels of coverage for the cotton enterprises. Although the dryland 
cotton and irrigated cotton enterprises have a different set of yield 
guarantees and premiums they are assumed to be insured under the same 
FCI option for this evaluation. In other words, it was assumed that 
the option which provides the most desirable results for the dryland 
cotton enterprise also provides the most desirable results for the 
irrigated cotton enterprise. The results for this part of the 
analysis are presented in Tables 64 and 65. The level 1 (SO percent) 
yield guarantee - low price elective option, here again produces the 
most favorable results. This level of coverage provides for the 
highest level of average nominal ending net worth ($501,180) and the 
highest level of average present value of net cash flow (-$13,450). 
The coefficient of variation of nominal ending net worth for this 
option is 53.74 percent, the lowest value for these simulations. 
For the Jackson County situation the level 1 yield guarantee -
low price elective proved to be the most favorable option for both the 
wheat enterprise and the cotton enterprises. These results parallel 
the results of the initial simulations of the two Jackson County 
situations which were presented in the earlier section of this 
c\lapter. However, this discovery is quite different from the results 
of the Texas High Plains study where the leyel 3 yield guarantee -
high price elective option was determined most favorable for cotton 
enterprises. Apparently, the premiums charged Texas High Plains 
cotton producers are significantly lower relative to the level of 
coverage provided, than for Jackson County, Oklahoma·. Lemieux, et. 
Table 64. Net Cash Flow Information for the Jackson County Situation - Farm 2; 50% 
Guarantee Level and $2.50 per bu. Price Elective for the Wheat Enterprise with the 
FCI Cotton Enterprise Options Varied 
Present Value of Net Cash Flow ($000) 
Program Option Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. -22.93 -2.59 423.81 -534.12 198.82 
Level 2 - High P.E. -19.31 -5.03 430.27 -547.66 200.48 
Level 1 - High P.E. -16.94 -2.31 435.02 -560.45 201. 84 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. -20.99 -2.51 425.80 -534.88 198.80 
Level 2 - Med. P.E. -17.88 ~3.91 431.55 -547.22 200.35 
Level 1 - Med. P.E. -15.86 -1. 20 435.75 -558.89 201.62 
Level 3 - Low P.E. -17.37 -2.55 429.65 -536. 71 198.84 
Level 2 - Low P.E. -15.07 -1. 70 434.10 -546.39 200.11 
Level 1 - Low P.E. -13.45 1. 25 437.38 -555.33 201.10 
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Table 65. Ending Net Worth Information for the Jackson County Situation - Farm 2, 50% Guarantee Level 
and $2.50 per bu. Price Elective for the Wheat Enterprise with the FCI Cotton Enterprise Options Varied 
Nominal Ending Net Worth ($000) 
Number of 
Bankrupt 
Program Options Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. C.V.(%) Iterations 
Federal Crop Insurance 
Level 3 - High P.E. 487. 1 7 509. 78 1114. 83 -110. 63 266.12 54.63 42 
Level 2 - High P.E. 492. 77 512.41 1128. 08 -122.83 268.17 54.42 42 
Level 1 - High P.E. 496. 56 517.15 1132. 99 -134.91 269.93 54. 36 43 
Level 3 - Med. P.E. 489.86 512.32 1118. 06 -110. 78 266.24 54. 35 42 
Level 2 - Med. P.E. 494. 73 514.53 1127. 35 -121.93 268.13 54.20 42 
Level 1 - Med. P.E. 497.99 518.67 1134.18 -133.01 269.75 54. 17 43 
Level 3 - Low P.E. 494.91 516.98 1124. 31 -111.47 266. 5 7 53.86 42 
Level 2 - Low P.E. 498.57 518.62 1131. 48 -120.24 268.06 53. 77 42 
Level 1 - Low P.E. 501.18 521.97 1136.83 -128.70 269. 32 53. 74 43 
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al. indicate that the ratio of indemnities received by the Texas 
producer to premiums paid is, on the average, always greater than one. 
In other words, the producer generally receives more in indemnities 
than the amount of premiums paid by the producer. The opposite 
appears to be the case for the Jackson County situations used in this 
analysis. 
Federal Crop Insurance Per Acre Premium Adjustments 
The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation provides for an adjustment 
of the per acre premium rates based on the total dollar amount of 
indemnities received by the individual producer, the total dollar 
amount of premiums paid by the individual producer and the number of 
continuous year of Federal Crop Insurance experience in the specific 
crop. For most crops the premium rates may either be adjusted upward 
or downward, however, premium rates for cotton or corn can only be 
adjusted downward from their original value, remain unchanged or be 
adjusted back upward toward their original value. This adjustment 
process was built into the simulation model, and occurred throughout 
the 10 year analysis. 
Jackson County 
Wheat, dryland cotton and irrigated cotton produced on the 
Jackson County farms all experienced a substantial reduction in their 
respective FCI per acre premium rates. Table 66 presents the average 
per acre premium rate, for each crop in each year, that resulted from 
the simulations of these farm situations. The premium rates are the 
average of the 100 values generated in each year of the simulation for 
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the subsidized (30 percent) level 1 yield guarantee - low price 
elective option. Since this option produced the most favorable 
results of any FCI option on the Jackson County situations it was 
chosen for this evaluation. 
Figure 3 presents the average per acre FCI premium rates in each 
year, resulting from these simulations, as a percentage of the 
original (1982) premium rate for each crop. Premium rates for all 
other FCI options (including the unsubsidized options) were analyzed 
and experienced similar adjustments. The level 1 yield guarantee -
low price elective option resulted in smaller adjustments than for any 
other option. Although the premium rate for wheat adjusted the 
smallest dollar amount, it experienced the largest percentage change. 
It would be difficult to determine if the complete adjustments in the 
premium rates had been made by the end of the 10 year period. In 
other words, if the simulations were made over a longer planning 
horizon these premium rates may be reduced further. According to the 
adjustment process provided for by the FCIC the premium rates for 
wheat, grain sorghum and soybeans could have been reduced by a maximum 
of 35 percent of their 1982 value by the end of 10 years of continuous 
experience and a maximum of 50 percent is possible in later years 
(Table 4). Cotton premiums can only be reduced, according to the 
FCIC, by 25 percent of their original value (Table 5). Based on these 
figures, it appears that little additional adjustment in premiums 
would occur after the 10 year period. 
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Table 66. Average Federal Crop Insurance Per Acre Premium Rates for 
Years 1982 - 1991 for Insurable Crops Produced on the Jackson County 
Farm Scenarios - Farm 1 and Farm 2 
Dry land Irrigated 
Year Wheat Cotton Cotton 
($/Acre) ($/Acre) ($/Ac re) 
1982 1.90 2.60 4.55 
1983 1. 81 2.48 4.32 
1984 1.81 2.48 4. 32 
1985 1. 73 2.37 4.11 
1986 1. 73 2. 37 4. 10 
1987 1. 64 2. 26 3.89 
1988 1. 58 2.17 3.70 
1989 1. 49 2.07 3.48 
1990 1. 40 2.06 3.47 
1991 1.40 2.03 3.46 
Premium rates represent subsidized per acre premium rates for the 
"best" FCI option analyzed on the farm scenaios; 50% Guarantee Level 
with the Low Price Elective. 
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Figure 3. Average Federal Crop Insurance Per Acre Premium Rates as a Percent 
of the 1982 Premium Rates for Insurable Crops Produced by the Jackson County 
Farm Scenarios - Farm 1 and Farm 2. 
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Wagoner County 
The adjustments 1n per acre premium rates for Wagoner County 
crops are somewhat different than those for the Jackson County 
enterprises. Premium rates evaluated for the Wagoner County situation 
are those for the level 2 yield guarantee - low price elective option. 
Table 67 presents the average per acre FCI premium rates for each year 
of the Wagoner County simulations assuming the most favorable FCI 
option. Figure 4 presents these premium rates as a percentage of 
their 1982 value. 
The premium rate for wheat was reduced only a slight amount over 
the planning horizon. This may indicate that this premium rate is set 
at a nearly "correct" level. Small reductions in the premium rates 
indicate that (on the average) slightly more had been paid in premiums 
than had been received as indemnity payments over the planning 
horizon. Setting the premium rates at a level at which they will 
automatically adjust downward to the proper level may allow for the 
FCIC to build up its reserve to cover unexpected losses. (This 
reserve is an objective of the FCIC in setting premium rates.) The 
premium rate for grain sorghum 1n Wagoner County was reduced 
significantly from it's original value. The soybean premium rate was 
reduced by more than 20 percent over the 10 year period, a reduction 
very similar to the adjustments made in the premium rates for the 
Jackson County crops. 
Texas County 
The premium rates for the Texas County crops generally 
experienced a greater downward adjustment than did the premium rates 
165 
Table 67. Average Federal Crop Insurance Per Acre Premium Rates 
for Years 1982 - 1991 for Insurable Crops Produced on the Wagoner 
County Farm Scenario - Farm 3 
Grain 
Year Wheat Sorghum Soybeans 
($/Acre) ($/Ac re) ($/Ac re) 
1982 1.60 2.30 4.20 
1983 1. 54 2. 20 4.02 
1984 1. 5 7 2. 22 4.02 
1985 1. 53 2. 15 3.87 
1986 1. 54 2. 17 3.91 
1987 1.53 2.10 3. 73 
1988 1.50 2.03 3.59 
1989 1. 49 1. 97 3.42 
1990 I. 48 1. 94 3.28 
1991 1. 51 1.95 3.27 
Premium rates represent subsidized per acre premium rates for the 
"best" FCI option analyzed on the farm scenario; 65% Guarantee Level 
with the Low Price Election. 
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for the other two county situations. Table 68 presents the average 
values of the per acre premium rates for each insurable Texas County 
crop in each year of the simulation. Figure 5 illustrates the 
reductions in these premium rates as a percentage of their 1982 value. 
These premium rates represent the most favorable (subsidized) Federal 
Crop Insurance option, the level 1 yield guarantee - low price 
elective. 
The irrigated wheat premium rate was reduced slightly more than 
was the rate for dryland wheat. Both of these premium rates were 
reduced by almost 30 percent over the 10 year period, the largest 
percentage reductions of any of the premiums analyzed in this section. 
The premium rate for irrigated grain sorghum was reduced almost as 
much as were the wheat premiums (dryland grain sorghum is produced on 
the Texas County scenario but is not insurable with the FCIC). The 
irrigated corn premium rate was reduced by almost 25 percent. 
Government Costs 
Most of this analysis has dealt with benefits of government 
commodity and insurance programs from the producer's perspective. 
However, the costs of providing assistance to agricultural producers 
have been a topic of recent debate and deserves attention. Concern 
for government costs is probably a major reason for the implementation 
of the Federal Crop Insurance Program. The costs and benefits 
associated with providing assistance to these producers are difficult 
to measure, perhaps because the costs and benefits may be different 
for different crops and geographical area·s. To measure differences in 
government costs, estimates are made of costs (or surpluses) 
Table 68. Average Federal Crop Insurance Per Acre Premium Rates for 
Years, 1982 - 1991 for Insuranble Crops Produced on the Texas County 
Farm Scenario - Fann 4 
Irrig'lited 
Dry land Irrigated Grain Irrigated 
Year Wheat Wheat Sorghum Corn 
($/Acre) ($/Acre) ($/Acre) ($/Acre) 
1982 2.30 2.30 1. 70 3.00 
1983 2.19 2. 19 1. 62 2.85 
1984 2.19 2. 19 1. 62 2.85 
1985 2.08 2.07 1. 54 2. 70 
1986 2.08 2.07 1. 54 2. 70 
1987 1. 96 1. 96 1. 46 2.56 
1988 1. 85 1. 84 1. 38 2.43 
1989 1.74 1. 73 1. 29 2.29 
1990 1. 62 1. 61 1. 21 2. 28 
1991 1. 63 1. 61 1. 21 2.27 
Premium rates represent subsidized per acre premium rates for the 
"best" FCI option analyzed on the farm scenario; 50% Guarantee Level 
with the Low Price Election. 
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associated with providing assistance to farm producers in the form of 
low yield disaster payments, deficiency payments and all-risk crop 
insurance. 
It is assumed that the administrative cost of these programs is 
essentially a sunk cost or at least is uniform across government farm 
programs. With this assumption, the only difference in government 
costs are the differences in the levels of payments made to producers. 
By constructing a set of probabilities for various price and yield 
levels, an expected per acre cost or surplus for each crop in each 
county can be determined for each government farm program alternative. 
Each of the price and yield levels is assigned a probability based on 
the stochastic yields and prices generated by the model. The disaster 
payments for each yield level are calculated according to equation (5) 
in Chapter II and converted to a per acre basis. The disaster payment 
for each yield level is multiplied by its respective probability and 
the results are summed to determine the expected per acre government 
cost for the specific crop. The expected per acre government cost for 
the Deficiency Payments Program is calculated in the same manner based 
on equation (4) in Chapter II and the probability of each price level. 
Government costs or surpluses could result with the Federal Crop 
Insurance Program because of the premium which must be paid by the 
participating producer. With this program, the indemnity payment for 
each yield level is calculated according to equation (6) in Chapter II 
and expressed on a per acre basis. The per acre premium rate is then 
subtracted from the indemnity payment for each yield level (for higher 
yield levels the indemnity payment may be equal to zero). This will 
result in either a net goverrunent surplus or net government cost at 
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each yield level. The net surplus and net costs are then multiplied 
by their respective probabilities and summed to arrive at the expected 
per acre government cost or surplus. In this analysis these costs and 
surpluses are computed based on the 1982 premium rates. If these 
premiums are reduced as indicated in the previous section the expected 
per acre government costs will be increased and the expected per acre 
government surpluses will be reduced. To show this effect the per 
acre government cost and surpluses for the FCI Program are calculated 
based on the average value of the adjusted premium rates presented in 
the previous section and discussed in the following text along with 
the government costs and surpluses based on the 1982 premium rates. 
Jackson County 
The expected per acre government costs for providing the Jackson 
County production situations with the Deficiency Payments Program and 
the Disaster Payments Program are presented in Figure 6. These 
estimates of government costs are presented as per acre costs for each 
crop and are restricted to this subject area. Although these-costs 
are based on the normal farm yields assumed for the specific farm 
situations, they may also represent a county average expected per acre 
government cost because the normal farm yields are the county average 
yields and the yield distributions are based on a subjective 
interpretation of historical county yield series. Slight differences 
may occur because the variability in farm level yields may differ from 
farm to farm. 
The expected costs of both cotton programs are considerably 
higher than for wheat with both the Deficiency Payments Program and 
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the Disaster Payments Program. The costs associated with providing 
these programs are higher for irrigated cotton than for dryland 
cotton. The estimated government costs per acre for the Deficiency 
Payments Program are $2. 99, $11. 82 and $29.00 for wheat, dryland 
cotton and irrigated cotton, respectively. For the Disaster Payments 
Program the estimated per acre government costs are $1.28, $3.59 and 
$9. 22 for wheat, dryland cotton and irrigated cotton, respectively. 
There is a substantial difference in the cost associated with 
providing each of these programs. The Deficiency Payments Program 
costs for each crop are considerably higher than the costs associated 
with the Disaster Payments Program. But, since one of these programs 
is a 1 ow y i e 1 d program and the other is a low price program perhaps, 
it would be more appropriate to compare the costs of the Disaster 
Payments Program with the c.osts (or surpluses) of the Federal Crop 
Insurance Program. 
Al 1 of the options of the Federal Crop Insurance Program produced 
expected per acre government surpluses in Jackson County. These 
surpluses are presented in Figures 7 and 8. Figure 7 presents the 
expected per acre government surpluses for each option assuming the 
subsidized premium rates, and Figure 8 presents the expected per acre 
government surpluses for each option assuming the base or 
non-subsidized premium rates. The surpluses are generally 30 to 40 
percent higher with the non-subsidized premiums. This effect should 
be expected since, in effect, the government is paying part of the 
premiums when the premiums are reduced for the 30 percent subsidy. 
These surpluses are reduced each time the yield guarantee level is 
reduced. This reduction also occurs as the price elective is reduced. 
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The most favorable FCI option yields the lowest level of surpluses 
generated to the government for each crop. The level 1 yield 
guarantee - low price elective results in surpluses of $1.66, $2.11 
and $4.36 with the subsidized premiums, and $2.46, $3.21 and $6.31 
with the non-subsidized premiums for wheat, dryland cotton and 
irrigated cotton, respectively. When the average of the adjusted 
subsidized premium rates for the level 1 yield guarantee - low price 
elective option are incorporated into this analysis the per acre 
government surpluses become $1.41, $1.80 and $3.75 for wheat, dryland 
cotton and irrigated cotton, respectively. One objective of the FCI 
program is to reduce the government costs associated with providing a 
low yield assistance program. For this area, Federal Crop Insurance 
not only reduces costs but generates revenues for the government. 
Wagoner County 
The expected per acre government costs for wheat are slightly 
higher in Wagoner County than in Jackson County for both the 
Deficiency Payments Program and the Disaster Payments Program. These 
higher costs are probably due to the slightly higher normal farm 
yields used in the calculations of the payments, The estimates of the 
expected costs for wheat are $3.49 and $1.89 per acre for the 
Deficiency Payments Program and the Disaster Payments Program, 
respectively. With the grain sorghum enterprise the expected costs is 
higher for the Disaster Payments Program ($0. 58) than for the 
Deficiency Payments Program ($0.26), These costs are presented in 
Figure 9 and could indicate that low grain sorghum yields are more 
common than low grain sorghum prices in Wagoner County. 
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Figures 10 and 11 present the estimates of the per acre 
government costs and surpluses from participating in the Federal Crop 
Insurance Program. The costs and surpluses presented in Figure 10 
represent those resulting when the per acre premiums are reduced for 
the 30 percent subsidy. Figure 11 presents the costs and surpluses of 
providing the FC I Program with the base or non-subsidized premiums. 
Some of the FCI options produce net expected government costs for the 
Wagoner County wheat enterprise. This is considerably different from 
the Jackson County results in which all FCI options resulted in 
s urp lu s es. The level 2 yield guarantee - low price elective produces 
an expected government surplus of $0.04 per acre with the 
non-subsidized premiums and an expected government cost of $0.67 per 
acre with the subsidized premiums. The level of expected government 
cost is highest with the level 3 (75 percent) yield coverage at each 
price elective and changes from a net cost to a net surplus as the 
level of yield coverage is reduced. The net expected costs are 
reduced and are changed to surpluses as the price electives are 
reduced. 
A 11 of the FCI options result in net expected per acre government 
surpluses for the grain sorghum enterprise under both the subsidized 
and non-subsidized premiums. The level 2 (65 percent) yield coverage 
produces the highest surpluses and the level 1 (50 percent) yield 
coverage produces the lowest surpluses at each price elective. These 
surpluses are reduced as the price electives are changed to lower 
values. The FCI Program also generates government surpluses for 
soybean coverage in Wagoner County under all options. The highest 
surplus for soybean coverage is produced under the level 3 yield 
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guarantee - low price elective. As the guarantee level is reduced 
these surpluses are also reduced, and the same effect occurs as the 
price elective is reduced. The adjusted premium rates produce the 
expected changes in the per acre government costs and surpluses for 
the level 2 yield guarantee - low price elective option-. With these 
premium rates the per acre government cost for wheat coverage is 
higher ($0. 77). The surpluses for grain sorghum and soybeans are 
lower, at levels of $0.77 and $2.63, respectively. 
Texas County 
The analysis of Disaster Payments and Deficiency Payments Program 
government costs for the Texas County situation produces results very 
similar to the Wagoner County analysis. The estimated expected per 
acre government costs of providing the Deficiency Payments Program and 
Disaster Payments Program for each crop produced on the Texas County 
farm scenario are presented in Figure 12. The cost of providing the 
Deficiency Payments Program is significantly higher for irrigated 
wheat than for dryland wheat, and likewise for the grain sorghum 
enterprises. This effect was expected because the normal farm yields 
for the irrigated corps are higher than the normal farm yields for the 
dryland crops. These expected per acre government costs are $2.26, 
$4. 25, $0. 35, $0. 97 and $0. 02 for dryland wheat, irrigated wheat, 
dryland grain sorghum, irrigated grain sorghum and irrigated corn, 
respectively. The costs for providing the Disaster Payments Program 
are higher for the dryland crops than for the respective irrigated 
crops, possibly because there is a greater variability in the dryland 
yields. For both wheat enterprises and for the irrigated grain 
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sorghum enterprise the costs of providing the Deficiency Payments 
Program are substantially higher than for providing the Disaster 
Payments Program. 
All of the Federal Crop Insurance Program options produce 
surpluses for dryland wheat, irrigated wheat, and irrigated corn. 
Dry 1 and grain sorghum is an uninsurable crop in Texas County. Figures 
13 and 14 illustrate the levels of these costs and surpluses assuming 
the subsidized premiums and non-subsidized premiums, respectively. 
The resulting surpluses for dryland wheat, irrigated wheat and 
irrigated corn are very similar to the surpluses resulting from the 
Jackson County analysis. In other words, as the guarantee level is 
reduced the level of the surpluses is also reduced. The same effect 
occurs as the price electives are reduced. The most favorable option, 
the le ve 1 1 yield guarantee - low price elective option, produces the 
lowest level of expected per acre government surplus for each of these 
crops. Analyzing these per acre government surpluses for this option 
with the average adjusted subsidized premium rates shows that the 
surpluses are reduced as the premium rates are adjusted downward. 
These surpluses are $1.80, $1.96, $1.29 and $2.42 for dryland wheat, 
irrigated wheat, irrigated grain sorghum and irrigated corn, 
respectively. 
Some of the FCI options produce expected per acre government 
costs for the irrigated grain sorghum enterprise. These costs are 
always associated with the level 3 (75 percent) yield guarantee 
options and the highest costs occur with the high price electives. 
The level 1 yield guarantee options result in the highest level of 
government surpluses. 
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In all cases where surpluses are produced, the level of the 
surplus is less than the premium rate for the specific option. But, 
in some cases of the FCI program (those in which expected per acre 
government costs are produced) the costs are greater than the costs 
associated with providing the Disaster Payments Program. In these 
cases the objective of reducing government costs of providing a low 
yield program is not fulfilled. In general though, this objective is 
more than fulfilled with the FCI Program. 
The following chapter provides a summary of the problem analyzed 
in this study and the procedures used in completing the analysis. 
This chapter also presents a summary of the results generated by the 
a na 1 y sis and draws the information togethe;r to make conclusions about 
the government farm programs analyzed in this study. The conclusions 
presented are made with respect to public and producer objectives 
concerning the provision of and participation in government farm risk 
management programs such as the ones dealt with in this study. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Agricultural producers have long been subjected to a high degree 
of variability in both prices and yields of agricultural commodities 
resulting in a high level of variability in the income levels of 
agricultural producers. Natural phenomena are generally the major 
causes of yield instability. Commodity price variability is the result 
of many factors including business cycles, commodity cycles, exports, 
commodity price supports and worldwide weather events. Government 
farm risk management programs have historically been designed to 
buffer the instability in agricultural producer income levels caused 
by the variability in commodity prices and yields. 
Throughout, the history of American agriculture the U.S. 
government has enacted many policies and programs designed to support 
and, to a lesser extent, stabilize the level of income for farm 
producers. In recent years, concern has been voiced over high 
government costs associated with providing these programs. Many 
policymakers now feel that farm policy objectives include supporting 
farm income, reducing farm income variability, maintaining low, stable 
food costs and reducing the costs of government programs. The three 
programs analyzed in this study are the Disaster Payments Program, the 
Deficiency Payments Program and the Federal Crop Insurance Program. 
The Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 was designed to make "all risk" 
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crop insurance available on virtually all major crops in all producing 
areas of the country. The rep 1 a cement of the Disaster Payments 
Program by the FCI Program is a-n attempt to meet the new farm policy 
objectives. 
The major objective of this study is to analyze the effects of 
pa~ticipation in alternative government farm programs and combinations 
of these programs on the economic measures of the firm's growth and 
viability. A detailed analysis of each government farm program 
alternative and it's impacts on the firm growth and income levels and 
on the firm's chances of survival is made in a simulation context. To 
make these analyses, a simulation model which incorporates 
stochastically generated prices and yields was used under differing 
government farm program assumptions. This model simulates a specified 
farm scenario for a specified planning horizon and replicates the 
simulations to produce summary statistics for relevant financial 
variables. This model calculates balance sheet and net cash flow 
information and determines the number of bankrupt iterations occurring 
in each simulation. The model was modified to incorporate the effects 
of the analyzed government farm programs. 
Four farm scenarios were designed to represent typical, 
full-time, commercial farming operations in three different Oklahoma 
counties. Two farm situations were developed for Jackson County. 
These two scenarios are very similar, but differ in beginning equity 
levels. One farm situation has assets of approximately $879,468 and a 
beginning equity to assets ratio of approximately 70.33 percent. The 
other Jackson County farm is a lower equity situation with total 
assets of $907,411 and a beginning equity to asset ratio of 39.49 
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percent. Based on the results for Jackson County, a decision was made 
to focus on only low equity situations in Wagoner County and Texas 
County. The Wagoner County scenario has a total asset value of 
$639,619 and a beginning equity to asset ratio of 39.50 percent. 
Total assets of the Texas County scenario have a beginning value of 
$1,403,711 and a beginning equity to asset ratio of 38.97 percent. 
The 1 ow beginning equity levels for farms in three geographical areas 
permits an analysis of the impacts of alternative risk management 
programs on farm survival and growth. 
The data required by the model for each farm situation includes a 
complete description of the firm's beginning financial situation, the 
organization of production, the expected future investments in 
machinery and equipment and the government farm program to be 
analyzed. For each county situation, a set of randomly generated, 
correlated and triangularly distributed price and yield series were 
generated based on a subjective interpretation of historical series of 
prices and yields. An effort was made to represent the variability in 
the prices and yields that farm producers face in these different 
geographical locations within the state. The 1982 target prices, loan 
rates, costs of participation and each farm situation's normal farm 
yields for the crops produced, where appropriate, are specified for 
each government farm program analyzed. These scenarios are simulated 
over a 10 year planning horizon and the simulations are replicated 100 
times under each government farm program alternative. 
The government farm programs analyzed in this study are the 
Disaster Payments Program, the Deficiency Payments Program and the 
Federal Crop Insurance Program. Under the FCI Program the producer 
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may choose one of three yield guarantee levels (50, 65 or 75 percent 
of the normal crop yield) and one of three crop price electives. 
These producer choices provide the participating farmer with nine FCI 
coverage options. When no participation and combinations of the 
alternative government programs are considered, a total of 40 
alternatives are evaluated. Some of these alternatives do not 
currently represent real program choices to agriculture producers. 
All of the alternatives do, however, represent program choices that 
are currently available or that have been available within the past 
few years. When program combinations are evaluated certain 
adjustments are made in participation requirements. For example, the 
FCI premium rates are increased when participation is assumed in the 
FCI Program 1n combination with the Disaster Payments Program because 
the producer is ineligible for the 30 percent FCI premium subsidy. 
Government Farm Risk Management Strategies 
This section summarizes the resulting effects of participation in 
the various government farm program alternatives. The programs are 
analyzed assuming the current (1982) situation remains constant. In 
other words, the only effects desired are those created by the 
government farm programs, random prices and yields and their 
accumulative effects on the farm firm. These results are compared 
based on the 1 evel and variability of present value of net cash flow 
and nominal ending net worth. The number of bankruptcies that 
occurred in the simulation of the scenarios is also used as a basis of 
comparison. 
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Jackson County 
The analyses of the two Jackson County scenarios reveal that the 
firms are subject to the adverse effects of low commodity prices and 
yields in the absence of an income stabilization program. By comparing 
the two scenarios it is apparent that a lower equity position 
significantly increases the chances of firm failure. Analysis of the 
low equity Jackson County situation assuming no participation in 
government farm programs indicates that there is a 38 percent chance 
of firm failure. Agricultural producers with low equity positions 
should analyze the feasibility of participation in the government farm 
programs in an attempt to relieve the chances of firm failure 
associated with low prices and yields. However, high equity farm 
situations with little chance of firm failure may still find 
participation in government farm programs advantageous. 
The results of simulations assuming individual participation in 
each of the government farm programs are considerably varied from 
program to program for producers in this area. The Disaster Payments 
Program tends to result in decreases in net worth and income from that 
which occurs with no program participation and increases the chances 
of firm failure. However, the level of variability in net worth, and 
income is reduced below the levels of variability resulting with no 
participation. These lower levels of income and firm growth are due, 
at least in part, to the set-aside requirement for participation in 
this program. The loss in revenue due to the acreage reduction is 
apparently much greater than the average total disaster payments 
received by these producers. 
With participation in the Deficiency Payments Program both the 
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low equity and the high equity situations experienced substantial 
increases in the levels of ending net worth and income. This program 
also greatly reduces the probability o·f bankruptcy. For Jackson 
County situations the Deficiency Payments Program is probably the most 
effective program in supporting net farm income, net worth and fi,rm 
viability and reducing income and net worth variability of any of the 
individual program alternatives evaluated. 
Individual participation in the Federal Crop Insurance Program 
produces results very similar to the Disaster Payments Program for 
Jackson County situations. However, with proper selection of the FCI 
Program option the producer can realize significantly higher expected 
ending net worth than would be realized by individual participation in 
the Disaster Payments Program. However, the relative variability in 
net worth, as measured by the coefficient of variation, is lower for 
the Disaster Payments Program. Many variables such as the level of 
coverage, the price elective chosen by the producer and the premium 
the producer must pay for FCI coverage have significant impacts on the 
outcomes from participation in the Federal Crop Insurance Program. The 
level 1 (SO percent) yield guarantee results in a higher level of 
income and firm growth under each price elective. However, this 
guarantee level produces a higher degree of variability in both income 
and net worth than do the higher yield guarantee levels. The level 1 
yield guarantee - low price elective option appears to produce the 
most favorable results for the Jackson County situations but may 
re su 1 t in a slightly higher chance of firm failure than participation 
in the Disaster Payments Program. This may imply that the higher 
returns generated by· higher levels of coverage are not worth the 
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increase in premiums the producer must pay for this coverage. 
The combination of the Deficiency Payments Program with the 
Disaster Payments Program produces the most favorable effect of any 
program alternative analyzed in the Jackson County study area. The 
highest levels of ending net worth and income, the lowest levels of 
income variability and net worth variability and the lowest number of 
bankruptcies are all favorable results produced by this program 
combination. Both of these programs require a set-aside acreage 
however, this acreage reduction must only be met once for dual 
participation. By spreading this "implied" cost of participation over 
the two programs, essentially both programs produce more favorable 
results. With the discontinuation of the Disaster Payments Program, 
this option is no longer available to farm operators. 
During the 1981 crop year participation in the Disaster Payments 
Program in combination with the Federal Crop Insurance Program was an 
option. Under this program combination the producer was required to 
set-aside acres and was not eligible for the 30 percent FCI premium 
subsidy. This is probably the worst option the Jackson County 
producer could select. Relatively low levels of net worth growth and 
income are generated and the probability of firm survival for low 
equity situations is greatly reduced. 
With the absence of the Disaster Payments Program as an option 
for crop producers the combination of the Deficiency Payments Program 
with the Federal Crop Insurance Program may prove to be the most 
realistic and favorable program option for Jackson County producers. 
This program combination allows the producer to greatly reduce the 
probability of firm failure and to increase the level of income and 
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growth in net worth above that of the no program participation option. 
This program combination also provides for a significant reduction in 
variability of net worth and income when compared to no participation. 
However> participation in the Deficiency Payments Program alone is 
superior to no participation or the Deficiency Payments Program -
Federal Crop Insurance Program combination. 
Wagoner County 
The most favorable alternative for Wagoner County producers 
appears to be no participation in government farm programs. Analysis 
of this situation indicates that producers in a low equity position 
experience a high probability of failure. Participation in any of the 
government program options tends to decrease the probability of farm 
success. The worst single program alternative for the Wagoner County 
producer is the Disaster Payments Program. Although only a small 
percentage of the total crop acreage is covered by the Disaster 
Payments Program (or the Deficiency Payments Program) the reduction in 
income due to the set-aside requirement is significant. 
Participation in the Deficiency Payments Program also tends to 
reduce the level of income and ending net worth. But, these 
reductions are slightly less extreme as the Disaster Payments Program. 
The levels of variation in ending net worth and income are slightly 
reduced from those resulting with the low yield program. With a 
combination of Deficiency and Disaster Payments Programs the economic 
measures a re improved. This improvement occurs because, even though 
both programs require a set-aside acreage> the set-aside for one 
program meets the requirement for both programs. The producer can 
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then receive payments from both programs while incurring only the 
"cost" that one program requires. 
If the Wagoner County producer elected to participate in a 
government farm program the most favorable alternative would be 
ind iv i dua 1 participation in the Federal Crop Insurance Program. This 
program option produces more favorable results for the Wagoner County 
situation than any other program alternative, including any program 
combinations. FCIC insurance for soybeans (Wagoner County's most 
important crop) at favorable premiums makes All-Risk crop insurance 
more attractive than other government program alternatives analyzed. 
The level 2 (65 percent) or level 1 (50 percent) yield guarantee - low 
price elective not only provides for higher average levels of ending 
net worth and income than any of the Disaster Payments Program or 
Deficiency Payments Program alternatives but, it also decreases the 
level of variation in ending net worth and produces the smallest 
chance of firm failure. In the Wagoner County, the combination of the 
Deficiency Payments Program and the Federal Crop Insurance Program is 
less favorable than crop insurance alone and much less favorable than 
no program participation. 
Texas County 
The analysis of the Texas County situation produced results very 
similar to the Wagoner County analysis however, the number of bankrupt 
iterations was somewhat higher for the Texas County situation. 
Although the standard deviations of ending net worth and income are 
higher than with many of the other alternatives, the Texas County 
producer could expect much higher levels of income and net worth 
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growth and smaller probability of firm failure if the no government 
program alternative was elected. 
As with the other county situations, the Deficiency Payments 
Program yields more favorable results than the Disaster Payments 
Program. This option produces significantly higher levels of income 
and net worth growth and lower levels of variation in these economic 
measures than does the Disaster Payments Program. However, the 
chances of firm failure are about the same with these two programs. 
Here again, the combination of these two programs seems to be more 
favorable than individual participation in either program. 
Proper selection of the Federal Crop Insurance Program option 
will produce more favorable results than any other government farm 
program. The level 1 (SO percent) yield guarantee - low price 
elective option is the most favorable option for the Texas County 
situation. With the exception of the no program alternative, there 
are no other program alternatives which produce a higher level of 
average ending net worth or income or that produce lower levels of 
variation in these economic measures. 
When the Federal Crop Insurance Program is combined with the 
Deficiency Payments Program and the Disaster Payments Program in any 
of the three possible combinations the resulting income and net worth 
levels are substantially hampered as are the levels of variation in 
these values. If the Texas County producer wished to participate in 
one of these program combinations this producer may find the FCI -
Deficiency Payments Program combination to be the most favorable. 
This result is somewhat different from the other two county situations 
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where the three programs were found to produce the most favorable 
results of the FCI Program combinations. 
Strategy Comparison Across Farm Situations 
Specific farm situations have an obvious effect on risk 
management strategy selection. Such factors as the variability of 
commodity prices and yields, the average levels of commodity prices 
and yields or even the specific crops produced on the farm may place 
the farm organization in a very risky situation. These same factors 
may, on the other hand, be a reason for relative economic stability. 
The equity level or level of operator ownership seems to have no 
bearing on the strategy which the producer should select. This is 
indicated by the analysis of the two Jackson County situations. 
Generally, the options which produce the highest levels of income and 
net worth also produce the lowest levels of relative variation in 
these economic measures and the lowest chance of firm failure. In 
other words, whichever economic measure the producer chooses to 
optimize the other economic measures tend to follow, no matter the 
producer's equity situation. 
Producers in Jackson County will generally find the Deficiency 
Payments Program a very favorable alternative but, producers in 
Wagoner County and Texas County may find it more favorable to forgo 
any coverage against low commodity prices. Differences in the 
relative var iab i 1 it y of prices of program crops unique to each area 
account for this result. For instance, if cotton prices are more 
variable than grain sorghum and corn prices, the Jackson County 
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producer will be subjected to a greater probability of low prices than 
will Wagoner County or Texas County producers. 
The leve 1 s at which the target prices and loan rates are set for 
each crop have an effect on the occurrence and level or size of 
deficiency payments. Target prices for wheat and cotton are set at 
levels above the average or most likely prices for these crops, 
however the target prices for grain sorghum and corn are set below the 
average prices for these crops. Thus, wheat and cotton producers are 
more likely to receive deficiency payments than are grain sorghum and 
corn producers. Wheat and cotton producers may receive relatively 
higher per crop unit deficiency payments than grain sorghum and corn 
producers because the maximum deficiency payments are based on the 
loan rates. Loan rates for wheat and cotton are placed at 
approximately 88 percent and 77 percent of their respective target 
prices, but the loan rates for grain sorghum and corn are placed at 
approximately 93 percent and 94 percent of their respective target 
prices. 
The norma 1 farm yields also have an effect on the feasibility of 
participating in the Deficiency Payments Program. If the normal farm 
yield of a particular crop is higher for one farm than for another, 
the producer with the higher normal farm yield will receive larger per 
acre deficiency payments. However, if the per acre cost of production 
for the crop is about the same for both producers, the producer with 
the higher normal farm yield may find it costs more to participate (in 
terms of foregone net income due to the set-aside requirement) than it 
does for the producer with the lower normal farm yield. 
Many of the same factors that affect the feasibility of 
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participation in the Deficiency Payments Program also affect the 
feasibility of participation in the Disaster Payments Program. 
Perhaps, the most important of these factors is the relative 
variability in crop yields and the specific crops covered by the 
programs. ~11 of the major crops produced in Jackson County are 
eligible fo:r the Disaster Payments and Deficiency Payments Programs 
coverage but Wagoner County's most important crop, soybeans, is not. 
Thus, Jackson County producers may find the Disaster Payments Program 
(or the Deficiency Payments Program) a more favorable option than 
Wagoner County producers. If yields of program crops are less 
variable, the producer may fi:nd the Disaster Payments Program 
unfavorable because of a small probability of receiving disaster 
payments. In Texas County a fairly large portion of the program crops 
are irrigated and yields are less variable. 
The Federal Crop Insurance Program is not as complementary to the 
Deficiency Payments Program as is the Disaster Payments Program in any 
county area because producers must in effect incur two sets of costs 
to participate in the Federal Crop Insurance Program - Deficiency 
Payments Program combination. With the Deficiency Payments - Disaster 
Payments Program combination the producer must only meet the set-aside 
requirement. In this respect, the Federal Crop Insurance Program is 
not a very good replacement for the no longer available Disaster 
Payments Program in any of the study areas. 
As a general statement, producers in any of the study areas would 
be best off if they chose not to participate in any of the programs, 
with the exception of the Deficiency Payments Program and it's 
combinations in Jackson County. The 1 o s s in revenue due to the 
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set-aside requirement and the added expense of the FCI premium are 
more than any payments (on the average) the farmer would receive by 
participating in the programs. While a program may be favorable for 
one crop in a particular area but not favorable for other crops, this 
study compared results based on participation in all program crops for 
a specific study area. Thus, implications could differ somewhat on a 
crop by crop basis in the study counties. 
Federal Crop Insurance Program Options 
For Specific Crop Enterprises 
The analysis of Federal Crop Insurance participation in this 
study assumed that every insurable crop on a particular farm situation 
would be insured at the same FCI option. The producer may however, 
choose to elect different FCI options for different insurable crops or 
choose to insure one crop and not another. Thus, an analysis was made 
to determine the most favorable FCI option for each insurab:.e Jackson 
County crop. By holding the cotton coverage constant at the level 3 
yield guarantee - high pdce elective option and analy:dng the nine 
wheat options, the level 1 yield guarantee - low price elective option 
provided the most favorable coverage for the wheat em:erprise. 
Holding the wheat coverage constant at this level and analyzing the 
nine FC I cotton options showed that the level 1 yield guarantee - low 
price elective option is the most favorable for cotton enterprises in 
Jackson County. 
The FCI option which produces the most favorable results in these 
study areas seems to always be the option with the lowest premium 
rates. However, this option may not be the most favorable for all 
crops in Wagoner County as evident from the simulation :-esults for 
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Wagoner County where the level 2 yield guarantee - low price elective 
option and the level 1 yield guarantee - low price elective option 
produce almost indistinguishable results •. If in fact the FCI option 
with the lowest premium rate is generally the most favorable for all 
crops it ma~ be that the premium rates for most coverage levels are 
set too high to provide any benefits of coverage against low yields. 
In other words, based on the level of crop yields and the variability 
of these crop yields the premium rates are set so high that the farmer 
wi 11 never (on an average) receive indemnity payments in low yield 
years equa 1 to the total premiums paid. The fact that the producer 
would generally .be better off not to participate in any program than 
to participate in the FCI Program seems to support this hypothesis. 
Federal Crop Insurance Premium Adjustments 
An adjustment of the per acre premium rates for each crop based 
on the dollar amount of indemnities received by the producer, the 
dollar amount of premiums paid by the producer and the number of 
continuous ye a rs of FCI participation is provided for by the Federal 
Crop Insurance Corporation. This adjustment was incorporated into the 
analysis of the government farm programs as described in Chapter II. 
The average premium rate for each crop in each year that occurred in 
the simulations of the most favorable FCI option are reported in 
Chapter IV. 
Premium rates in all three counties experienced reductions over 
the 10 year planning horizon. Premium rates in Texas County were 
generally reduced more than premium rates in the other counties and 
premium rates in Wagoner County were generally reduced the least. 
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Gener ally the premium rates were reduced by 20 to 30 percent of their 
original or 1982 values. These large reductions indicate that the 
premium rates are currently too high, and in some cases, substantially 
so. The Federal Crop Insurance Act states that the FCIC shall set 
premiums at a level the Board of Directors feels is sufficient to 
cover claims for losses and establish as expeditiously as possible a 
reasonable reserve to protect the Corporation against unforeseen 
losses. In these counties and for these crops, it appears that the 
reserve generated to protect the Corporation is established too 
rapidly and at the expense of the producer. It appears that near the 
end of the 10 year planning horizon, the premium rates have made most 
of their reduction. A longer planning horizon would be needed to 
fully determine the extent of the reductions. 
The premium rate for wheat in Wagoner County was reduced the 
least (approximately 5.6 percent). It appears that this premium rate 
is at about the appropriate level at the beginning of the analysis. 
Because the producer is receiving approximately the amount paid in 
premiums as indemnity payments in low yield years, this producer is 
probably receiving significant benefits from participation in the 
Federal Crop Insurance Program for wheat production. Producers in all 
three counties appear to be receiving some benefits from participation 
in this program for their crops in years close to the end of the 
planning horizon because the premium rates have been reduced to levels 
low enough to provide benefits. 
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Government Costs 
The U.S. Government has traditionally borne the entire cost of 
providing income stabilization for agricultural producers. The cost 
of government programs has grown quite large in recent years. The 
Federal Crop Insurance Program was implemented to provide protection 
to crop producers from low commodity yields while sharing the cost of 
this program. This study presents an analysis of the expected per acre 
government costs or surpluses from providing disaster payments, 
deficiency payments and All-Risk crop insurance. Expected per acre 
costs or surpluses over time are based on the probabilities of 
specific price or yield levels from the stochastically generated price 
and yield series used in the earlier section of the analysis. These 
costs do not include any administrative costs for the programs because 
it is assumed that these costs are approximately the same from program 
to program. 
The Deficiency Payments Program and the Disaster Payments Program 
are costly programs for the government for most of the crops produced 
in these study areas. These costs have been of major political 
concern in recent years. In these counties and for these crops, the 
Deficiency Payments Program costs the government significantly more 
per acre than the Disaster Payments Program, Thus, either structural 
differences exist in the programs that provide the producer with 
greater compensation for low prices than for low yields or low 
commodity prices present the producer with greater problems than do 
low yields. In other words, low commodity prices may be more 
prevalent than are low commodity yields for these study areas. 
The Federal Crop Insurance Program, on the other hand, is 
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substantially less costly than the Disaster Payments Program. In 
fact, the FC I Program typically generates government surpluses. The 
calculation of the expected per acre government surpluses under the 
FC I Program is based on the initial unadjusted premiums. If premium 
adjustments were incorporated into the evaluation, the "overtime" 
expected per acre surpluses would be reduced. 
The expected per acre government surpluses are lower with 
subsidized premiums than when the non-subsidized premiums are assumed. 
However, for options that generate costs, the costs are slightly 
higher when the premiums are subsidized. This is the case with wheat 
in Wag oner County and Irrigated Grain Sorghum in Texas County. These 
expected per acre government costs may indicate that the premium rates 
are set at a more nearly correct level, at least from the producers 
perspective. Again, because of the premium rate adjustment process, 
high costs would not prevail because the premium rates would soon be 
adjusted upward to cover the costs. On the other hand, if the 
premiums were truly subsidized, the government would be expected to 
incur some cost in providing this program. 
Policy Implications 
The program alternatives analyzed in this study are designed to 
reduce ·many of the risks associated with agricultural production and 
each of these program alternatives has unique influences on the 
growth, income and viability of agricultural firms. If producers were 
only considering participation in a low yield program the replacement 
of the Disaster Payments Program by the Federal Crop Insurance Program 
has apparently been an improvement. However, this may not be too 
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realistic as the Deficiency Payments Program is currently available 
for producer participation to reduce the adverse effects of low 
commodit~ prices. In two areas, the combination of Deficiency 
Payments Program and the FCI Program, currently being promoted by the 
government, is the worst alternative to producers. Participation in 
price and yield programs today (Deficiency Payments and Federal Crop 
Insurance Programs) is not as attractive as the combination of the 
Deficiency Payments and Disaster Payments Programs was. This 
implication should be given careful consideration during the maturing 
stages of the Federal Crop Insurance Program as crop producers are 
subjected to high degrees of variation in both crop prices and crop 
yields. The loss of stability that could be provided for with 
efficient low yield and low price programs in combination may cause a 
large number of low equity producers to become insolvent. For low 
equity farmers who likely have to borrow to purchase "f'.ederal Crop 
Insurance, participation reduces the mean ending net worth and 
increases the coefficient of variation when compared with other 
options, including no government program participation. With the 
inability of young or beginning farmers to become viable agricultural 
producers the agricultural sector may suffer dramatic structural 
changes. 
The premium rate structure of the Federal Crop Insurance Program 
should also be given careful consideration as this program is 
developed. At their current levels these premium rates do not seem to 
al low the program to yield any significant benefits to agricultural 
producers until after the producer has participated in the program for 
several years. These seemingly high premium rates may be a reason for 
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historically low rates of participation in the FCI Program. But, much 
thought should be placed on land use impacts that may occur if the 
program becomes too attractive. If this program becomes too liberal 
and provides excess coverage, land in high-ris~ areas may be brought 
into cultivation when it should be used for other purposes such as 
grazing. 
Variability of normal or average crop yields from farm to farm 
within an area may also indicate that Federal Crop Insurance yield 
coverage should be tied more closely to individual farm producer's 
historical yields and the variability within these yields. But, 
attention should be given to the possibility of low yields resulting 
- from the producer's own poor management practices. Without this 
attention the program could be subject to abuse and misuse by 
participants. 
Research Limitations 
This study was designed to determine the "best" program 
alternative for a specific set of farming scenarios in a specific set 
of geographical locations within the state of Oklahoma. The 
stochastically generated price and yield series are based on a 
subjective interpretation of historical series of prices and yields 
for these specific study areas and are not transferable to other 
areas. The price series used are seasonal average prices received by 
producers across the state but, the specific scenario places 
limitations on their use in other areas of the state. 
Other variables such as inflation rates and price and yield 
trends which were held at a constant rate of zero throughout the 
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analysis and future interest rates which were assumed to be in real 
terms may have significant impacts on program feasibility if they were 
to take on different values. Variables such as cropping patterns, 
specific crops produced, firm size and the portion of rental use may 
generate a completely unique set of results. 
A 1 though this study does point out areas within the structure of 
the government farm programs that may be adjusted to make these 
programs more feasible to the farm scenario used in the analysis it 
does not indicate specific adjustments that should be made to make 
these programs more beneficial to agricultural producers. Of major 
concern is the costs of participation in these programs, whether they 
be out-of-pocket costs or in the form of implied costs; specifically 
the premium rates for FCI Program participation and the set-aside 
requirement for participation in the Deficiency Payments Program and 
the Disaster Payments Program. 
The government costs and surpluses described in this study are 
expected per acre costs and surpluses from providing these programs to 
the specific scenarios used in this analysis and are not transferable 
to other situations. Distributions of stochastically generated prices 
and yields and the FCI premium rates make these costs and surpluses 
unique to these specific situations. These costs and surpluses also 
do not include any allowances for program administration costs. These 
administration costs are difficult to determine and are not within the 
scope of this study. 
Even though these limitations may restrict the use of the results 
of this study to some extent, the analysis does provide a base for 
evaluating these government farm programs with specific respect to 
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producer benefits from participation in each program. Based on these 
specific scenarios, basic assumptions can be made about the financial 
stability and impacts on firm viability provided by these government 
farm programs. 
Need For Additional Research 
Several unanswered questions remain following this evaluation of 
government farm programs. This research has not dealt with the 
structural implications of alternative government farm programs. 
Additional research is needed to determine if these programs promote a 
specific farm structure. Current programs do not appear to offer 
adequate protection to low equity producers and participation may 
increase the chances of firm failure in this group. With regard to 
farm sector structure, it may also be important to determine the 
correlation between program benefits and firm size. Program 
adjustments may be needed to insure a uniform distribution to farmers. 
Additional research is needed to more accurately determine the 
leve 1 of government costs and surpluses resulting from providing these 
government farm programs. This research should also focus on the 
commissions paid to the private insurance sector for their sales of 
Federal Crop Insurance. With an accurate estimate of these costs and 
surpluses the currently available programs might be made more suitable 
with respect to producer benefits. The compatibility of programs in 
combination is a major area of concern. This evaluation would require 
extensive research aimed at determining optimal premium rates and 
levels of coverage in both the low yield program and the low price 
program. 
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Broad questions such as the ones presented here provide a solid 
base for future research in the area of farm risk management programs 
provided by the government. With the answers to these and other 
related questions policymakers and legislator may better be able to 
formulate risk management programs to benefit both agricultural 
producers and the national economy. 
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